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Foreword 
In January 2019, I received the highest honor of my law school career—I 
was elected Editor-in-Chief of the Duke Law Journal. My predecessor 
quickly announced my election to a group of EICs from other schools. 
Additional election results soon followed: Noor Hasan, California Law 
Review; Nicole Collins, Stanford Law Review; Ela Leshem, Yale Law 
Journal. As is customary, our congratulations went to the outgoing EICs 
and (jokingly) our condolences to the incoming ones. Results continued to 
pour in: Maia Cole, New York University Law Review; Christina Wu, 
Texas Law Review; Lauren Kloss, Cornell Law Review. I watched closely: 
Lauren Beck, Harvard Law Review; Annie Prossnitz, Northwestern 
University Law Review; Gabriella Ravida, Pennsylvania Law Review; 
Laura Toulme, Virginia Law Review; Emily Vernon, University of Chicago 
Law Review. Cautious excitement. Mary Marshall, Columbia Law Review; 
Alveena Shah, UCLA Law Review; Sarah McDonald, Michigan Law 
Review. Holding my breath. Grace Paras, Georgetown Law Journal. 
The Editors-in-Chief at the flagship law reviews of the top sixteen law 
schools in the country were all—for the first time ever—women. 
What follows is a commemoration of this anomaly. Celebrating in concert 
with the 100th anniversary of the 19th Amendment, the sixteen of us joined 
forces to publish a series of essays by prominent women in the legal 
community. Our hope was that these women would share the lessons they 
learned in pursuit of their prominence and that along the way, we would 
learn a little more about who we are—and who we hope to become. 
This publication and the accompanying event could not have been possible 
without the support and mentorship of the Duke Law faculty—particularly 
Dean Kerry Abrams, Dean Katharine T. Bartlett, and Professors Kathryn 
Webb Bradley, Marin K. Levy, and Neil S. Siegel—and the hard work of 
my dear friend and Duke Law Journal Executive Editor, Nicole Wittstein. 
“Thank you” cannot even begin to express the gratitude they deserve. 
The inescapable reality of our legal system is that it was built by men 
occupying the highest echelons of this profession. That fact dominates our 
legal education and continues to shape our view of women leaders. 
Candidly, our achievement was surprising because it is unexpected to see 
women in such high positions at such high numbers. I treasure what we 
have accomplished, recognize that our work is incomplete, and hope that in 
a hundred years, the women and men of the legal community look back at 
this with bewilderment—for what we recognize today as exceptional has 
become, to them, utterly ordinary. 
Farrah Bara 
Editor-in-Chief 
Duke Law Journal 
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One hundred years ago, our nation ratified the Nineteenth Amendment 
to the Constitution, extending to women the right to vote, run for public 
office, and serve on juries. Today, we celebrate all we have gained. Women 
are now leaders throughout society—of states, cities, and towns, of 
corporations, universities, and foundations. Indeed, this issue represents not 
only a celebration of the Nineteenth Amendment but also the leadership of 
women in the field of law: women now make up over 50 percent of law 
students,1 and the coeditors of this issue are the sixteen female editors-in-
chief of the flagship law reviews of sixteen of the most prestigious law 
schools in the country. All told, these sixteen law schools have seven female 
deans. 
Our progress, however, is far from finished. In law, and in most elite 
professions, men still dramatically outnumber women in positions of 
leadership. Although half of law students and nearly half of lawyers are 
women, women make up only one-third of attorneys in private practice, 21 
percent of equity partners, and 12 percent of the managing partners, 
chairmen, or CEOs of law firms.2 Men also run the corporations that we 
represent as lawyers: fewer than 5 percent of CEOs of Fortune 500 
companies are women.3 Women are also underrepresented as lawmakers and 
interpreters of the law, making up about 24 percent of Congress, 18 percent 
of governors, 29 percent of state legislators, 27 percent of mayors of the 
 
Copyright © 2020 Kerry Abrams.  Edited by the Duke Law Journal.  
 †  James B. Duke and Benjamin N. Duke Dean and Professor of Law, Duke University School of 
Law. 
 1. Stephanie Francis Ward, Women Outnumber Men in Law Schools for First Time, Newly 
Updated Data Show, ABA J. (Dec. 19, 2016), http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/women_ 
outnumber_men_in_law_schools_for_first_time_newly_updated_data_show.  
 2. Cristina Violante & Jacqueline Bell, Law360’s Glass Ceiling Report, by the Numbers, LAW360 
(May 28, 2018), https://www.law360.com/articles/1047285. 
  3. Judith Warner, Nora Ellmann & Diana Boesch, The Women’s Leadership Gap, CTR. FOR AM. 
PROGRESS (Nov. 20, 2018, 9:04 AM), https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/women/reports/2018/ 
11/20/461273/womens-leadership-gap-2. 
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largest one hundred cities,4 27 percent of federal judges,5 and 35 percent of 
state appellate judges.6 Why, despite years of equality in access to voting for 
lawmakers, do women still trail behind men in the legal profession? 
To understand what holds us back, I believe we need to look beyond 
political rights—voting, holding office, jury service—to gendered family 
norms and the workplace structures that reinforce these norms. Equality in 
the workplace and in the public sphere surely matters, and some of the most 
egregious cases of discrimination occur overtly. But the more pernicious and 
intractable problem is not overt discrimination but the covert discrimination 
that occurs every day, in kitchens, living rooms, and bedrooms, and seeps 
over into the workplace. Those of us who have managed to become leaders 
in government, academia, or business succeeded not because we are smarter, 
faster, or wiser than others, but because we have managed to work our way 
around these norms. This complex dance requires the support of spouses and 
partners, family members, supervisors, and coworkers. It requires a 
tenacious insistence on our own self-worth. Perhaps most importantly, it 
requires a large dose of pure luck. For most women, gendered family norms 
at home and in the workplace still make the possibility of obtaining a position 
of leadership extraordinarily difficult. 
This phenomenon has been amply documented across many fields by 
social scientists. In law, one of the most comprehensive and important 
studies is a longitudinal analysis of graduates of the University of Virginia 
School of Law, where I taught for thirteen years. This study shows the stark 
differences that children make in the lives of male and female attorneys who 
are otherwise identically situated. Fifteen years after graduation, male and 
female lawyers without children living at home were virtually identical in 
their working patterns: 96.4 percent of men worked full time, versus 95 
percent of women. But for lawyers with children at home, the story was very 
different: 99.2 percent of men worked full time, but only 50 percent of 
women.7 With this large number of women, even from a very prestigious law 
school, exiting paid work at a critical time in their careers, it is no wonder 
that so few women are achieving the highest levels of career success in law. 
The entire project of evaluating “women’s” advancement, especially 
this project of considering advancement in light of gendered family law and 
 
 4. Current Numbers, CTR. FOR AM. WOMEN AND POL., https://cawp.rutgers.edu/current-numbers. 
 5. Debra Cassens Weiss, The Percentage of Women in the Federal Judiciary Is the Same as Men 
with These Names, ABA J. (Apr. 26, 2018), http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/the_ 
percentage_of_women_in_the_federal_judiciary_is_the_same_as_men_with_th. 
 6. Diane M. Johnsen, Building a Bench: A Close Look at State Appellate Courts Constructed by 
Respective Methods of Judicial Selection, 53 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 829, 889 (2016). 
 7. John Monahan & Jeffrey Swanson, Lawyers at the Peak of Their Careers: A 30-Year 
Longitudinal Study of Job and Life Satisfaction, 16 J. OF EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 4, 13 (2019). 
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family norms, depends of course on a binary notion of sex, a convergence of 
sex and gender, and a heterosexual family. Many LGBTQ people will find 
the constraints of the heteronormative family to be the least of their 
problems, as they fight against overt discrimination rather than oppressive 
social norms.8 Even LGBTQ people, however, can find themselves hemmed 
in by the application of heteronormative gender roles, especially within 
families.9 
In this Essay, I consider the path to female leadership from my own 
personal perspective. I am interested in sharing my experiences as an 
“exception”—as a woman who has obtained a position of leadership in my 
profession—to explore what it would take for women as a group to be truly 
equal in our field. To put it differently, what are the circumstances necessary 
to ensure that the sixteen female editors-in-chief of this joint issue continue 
to be leaders throughout their careers? 
WORK AND FAMILY, THEN AND NOW 
Understanding inequality in the family requires a look back into the age 
in which the law actually mandated gender inequality. The Nineteenth 
Amendment focused on political rights, but equally important to women’s 
equality over the last century have been civil rights—the rights to enter into 
enforceable contracts, to sue in a court of law, and to own and manage one’s 
own property.10 Like political rights, these rights were also denied to women 
in the United States at common law and under our original Constitution. 
The mechanism for this denial was, quite literally, the family. Although 
single women had civil rights, even before they had the vote, the law treated 
married women as incapacitated, no longer possessing civil rights. This 
system was referred to as “coverture” because, under it, a married woman 
“perform[ed] every thing” under the “wing, protection, and cover” of her 
husband.11 A married woman was referred to as a “feme-covert,” or covered 
woman, and her condition during marriage was called “coverture.”12 
Under the doctrine of coverture, married women were incapable of 
entering into contracts. They could own property, but during the marriage 
their husbands had the authority to manage it, and any income generated by 
 
 8. See, e.g., Sonia K. Katyal & Ilona M. Turner, Transparenthood, 117 MICH. L. REV. 1593, 1612–
26 (2019) (analyzing case law that shows patterns of discrimination in custody determinations involving 
transgender parents). 
 9. See generally Darren Rosenblum, Unsex Mothering: Toward a New Culture of Parenting, 35 
HARV. J.L. & GENDER 57 (2012). 
 10. T.H. MARSHALL, CITIZENSHIP AND SOCIAL CLASS 10 (1950). 
 11. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 442 (1771). 
 12. Id. 
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the property belonged to the husband.13 If a woman worked outside the home, 
her husband owned her wages. In turn, husbands were legally responsible for 
supporting their wives, for their wives’ debts, and for torts their wives 
committed.14 The coverture doctrine reflected legal, social, and cultural 
norms. Indeed, one of the chief arguments against the Nineteenth 
Amendment was that granting political rights to women would undermine 
the “natural” gender roles within the family.15 
The incapacitation of married women had profound implications for the 
rights of all women. For example, in the case of Bradwell v. Illinois,16 the 
U.S. Supreme Court upheld a law excluding women from practicing law.17 
In a famous concurrence, Justice Bradley justified the result based on the 
incapacity of married women to enter into contracts—including contracts to 
represent clients.18 For Justice Bradley, coverture justified excluding all 
women, not just married women, from the legal profession: “It is true that 
many women are unmarried and not affected by any of the duties, 
complications, and incapacities arising out of the married state,” he wrote, 
“but these are exceptions to the general rule.”19 He then went on to write: 
“The paramount destiny and mission of woman are to fulfil the noble and 
benign offices of wife and mother. This is the law of the Creator. And the 
rules of civil society must be adapted to the general constitution of things, 
and cannot be based upon exceptional cases.”20 
Indeed, the law of coverture affected women both in and out of 
marriage. Because the social structure of marriage presumed that a husband 
was responsible for providing for his family, it was legally and socially 
justifiable to pay grossly disproportionate wages to men and women for 
identical work, regardless of their marital status.21 Women could also be 
excluded from some jobs or subjected to restrictions on the hours or 
conditions in order to protect their future as mothers; too much work would 
“impair their reproductive capacities and threaten the future of the race.”22 
 
 13. See HENDRIK HARTOG, MAN AND WIFE IN AMERICA 115–25 (2000). 
 14. HOMER CLARK, THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 219–20 (1968). 
 15. See Reva B. Siegel, She the People: The Nineteenth Amendment, Sex Equality, Federalism, and 
the Family, 115 HARV. L. REV. 947, 977–97 (2002). 
 16. Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130 (1873).  
 17. Id. at 139.  
 18. Id. at 141–42 (Bradley, J., concurring). 
 19. Id. at 141 (Bradley, J., concurring).  
 20. Id. at 141–42 (Bradley, J., concurring). 
 21. Federal law did not require equal pay until the passage of the Equal Pay Act of 1963, Pub. L. 
No. 88-38, 77 Stat. 56 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (2012)). 
 22. ALICE KESSLER-HARRIS, IN PURSUIT OF EQUITY: WOMEN, MEN, AND THE QUEST FOR 
ECONOMIC CITIZENSHIP IN 20TH-CENTURY AMERICA 31 (2001) (discussing Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 
412 (1908), and subsequent labor legislation). 
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Today, our cultural understanding of women’s political equality is 
sometimes oversimplified into a “before” and an “after.” Before the 
Nineteenth Amendment, women could not vote; after the Nineteenth 
Amendment, they could. Of course, the world was always more complicated 
than that. For example, prior to the passage of the Nineteenth Amendment, 
women already had the right to vote in nearly all the Western states.23 But 
there is a fairly simple truth in the notion in that the Nineteenth Amendment 
provides a clear moment of constitutional transformation in which women’s 
citizenship was finally ratified nationally and enshrined in the most 
important public statement of our most basic values. 
In contrast, there was no clear moment when we publicly ratified as a 
nation the idea that women should have equal civil rights. This regime began 
to change with the passage of Married Women’s Property Acts in the 1830s, 
which allowed women to continue managing property they brought into a 
marriage as well as keep wages earned during marriage. As numerous legal 
historians and law professors have shown, however, the change brought by 
these statutes was not as dramatic or swift as a constitutional amendment.24 
The thousands upon thousands of statutes and precedential cases that made 
up the doctrine of coverture were slowly amended or overturned, although 
some are still officially on the books.25 
A dramatic transformation almost did happen. In 1972, Congress passed 
the Equal Rights Amendment, and by 1977, thirty-five states had ratified it. 
But then the amendment stalled, and so the continued work of dismantling 
coverture continued to be addressed piecemeal. Ruth Bader Ginsburg and 
other feminist advocates developed theories of gender equality under the 
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. They then brought—
and won—cases challenging the legal structures that proscribed rigid gender 
roles within the family.26 But Ginsburg and others chose their plaintiffs 
strategically, so the cases that dismantled the remnants of the coverture 
system were largely cases about how sex stereotyping harmed men.27 These 
 
 23. T.A. Larson, Woman Suffrage in Western America, 38 UTAH HIST. Q. 7, 19 (1970), 
https://issuu.com/utah10/docs/uhq_volume38_1970_number1. 
 24. See, e.g., Reva B. Siegel, Home as Work: The First Woman’s Rights Claims Concerning Wives’ 
Household Labor, 1850-1880, 103 YALE L.J. 1073, 1082–83 (1994) (showing how coverture unwound 
slowly and unevenly, so that women might only have capacity to contract in some states). 
 25. See BLACKSTONE, supra note 11, at 442 (noting that a married woman “perform[ed] every 
thing” under the “wing, protection, and cover” of her husband, and therefore, she was referred to as a 
feme covert, or covered woman, and her condition during marriage was called “coverture”). 
 26. See, e.g., Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975); Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974); 
Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971); Moritz v. Comm’r, 469 
F.2d 466 (10th Cir. 1972). 
 27. See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (striking down a law allowing women to purchase 
3.2 percent beer at age eighteen but requiring men to wait until age twenty-one). 
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cases have been foundational and crucial for advancing women’s rights and 
for reducing the stereotyping of both women and men, but they fall short of 
the dramatic paradigm shift represented by the Nineteenth Amendment in 
the political sphere. 
Today, the social ideal of marital unity persists. Although some 
coverture rules are still technically in force, for the most part culture rather 
than law dictates the meaning of marital unity. Even when not legally 
prescribed, these gendered family norms continue to shape how families 
divide labor. Those decisions, in turn, shape the expectations that employers 
and coworkers have for how workers should behave and shape the law of the 
workplace. The dismantling of these expectations and structures is the work 
that remains unfinished. 
HUSBANDS AS BREADWINNERS 
Even though the law of coverture no longer dictates gender roles within 
the family, the entire structure of heterosexual marriage still reflects these 
rules.28 I have experienced in my own life some vestige of most of the rules. 
For example, when I married in 2005, I was thirty-four years old.29 I had a 
career—I had graduated from law school, clerked for a federal judge, 
practiced law at a New York firm, and taught law for three years. Both my 
future husband and I knew that marrying would change our relationship with 
one another. But we did not fully understand how marriage would change 
the way other people saw us and the extent to which social norms still dictate 
how married women (even women with flourishing careers) and married 
men (even men who wholeheartedly support their wives’ careers) are 
expected to behave. 
The first and most obvious indication that my status had shifted were 
the many congratulatory wedding cards I received for “Mr. and Mrs. [His 
Last Name].” I had decided to keep my birth name, but a significant number 
of our family and friends clearly never even considered that we might have 
made this choice. (My husband had also decided to keep his surname; this 
surprised no one.) The taking of a husband’s name by a wife, of course, was 
one of the clearest and most symbolic indications of the coverture regime. 
The law required a married woman to take her husband’s surname—this 
 
 28. Same-sex couples appear to structure their relationships differently, although they are still 
constrained by social expectations. See Deborah A. Widiss, Changing the Marriage Equation, 89 WASH. 
U. L. REV. 721, 771–79 (2012) (discussing gender norms in same-sex couples and their role in the debate 
over same-sex marriage). 
 29. I was relatively old; in 2008, the average age of first marriage for college-educated Americans 
was twenty-eight years old. RICHARD FRY, PEW RESEARCH CTR., THE REVERSAL OF THE COLLEGE 
MARRIAGE GAP 1 (2010), https://www.pewresearch.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/3/2010/11/767-
college-marriage-gap.pdf. 
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signaled to the world that she had lost her legal identity, as “covered” by her 
husband, and was now his responsibility. Even though name changing is no 
longer legally required, the persistence of gendered social norms means that 
in reality the rules of coverture continue to operate in a way that subsumes 
wives’ legal identity to that of their husbands. Fewer than 10 percent of 
married women have names other than husbands’ surnames.30 My friends 
and relatives were not wrong in their guess that my name had probably 
changed upon marriage. 
Names are of course not the only vestige of coverture that shapes 
married people’s lives; there is also money and who is presumed to control 
it. Marriage equality―thankfully—has forced many state agencies to stop 
asking for information about “husband” and “wife.” Now people fill out 
forms as “applicant #1” or “taxpayer #2.” These seemingly neutral terms are 
not treated as such: with every new title, deed, loan application, or tax form, 
we have to make a decision about whether we will fight to have my name—
which comes first alphabetically—come first.31 
Another hangover from the coverture days is the assumption that a 
woman will follow her husband to further his career, even at the expense of 
her own. At common law, courts termed this principle the “derivative 
domicile.” A husband decided where a couple lived, and his wife shared his 
legal domicile―even if she was not physically present with him. This rule 
reflected the husband’s duty as a breadwinner; in order to support his family, 
he needed the freedom to decide where he could best make a living. Today, 
in most states, a husband’s domicile no longer dictates his wife’s, and the 
law presumes that both husband and wife “usually regard the same place as 
home.”32 
I first discovered the persistence of the derivative domicile rule in 
today’s culture when my future spouse and I were both seeking tenure-track 
academic positions at law schools. One committee chair asked me at the very 
beginning of an interview whether my “husband” had an interview at the 
other law school in the region where the interviewing school was located. (I 
did not yet have a husband, just a fiancé, and I had not disclosed to the 
 
 30. Elizabeth F. Emens, Changing Name Changing: Framing Rules and the Future of Marital 
Names, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 761, 785 n.82 (2007) (casting some doubt on the reliability of the 10 percent 
number cited in the text). 
 31. Our experience is an example of what Elizabeth Emens has termed “desk-clerk law,” the “advice 
given by government functionaries who . . . frequently mislead people and discourage unconventional 
naming choices as a result of ignorance or their own views about proper practice.” Id. at 762. 
 32. Kerry Abrams, Citizen Spouse, 101 CALIF. L. REV. 407, 426 (2013) (citing Restatement 
(Second) of Conflict of Laws § 21, cmt. b (1988 revision)). As a practical matter, however, in a 
heterosexual marriage, it is usually the wife who would have to demonstrate, for tax purposes or others, 
that she does not regard her husband’s home as her own. Id. 
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committee that I was in a serious relationship.) The rest of the interview was 
an extremely awkward exercise in clock watching, as it was clear to the 
committee that it was essentially over—if my “husband” could not move to 
the region, then neither could I. My interviews included a series of similar 
fumbles by other hiring chairs, each of which reminded me that my 
relationship and the constraints the faculty imagined it must place on me 
were at the forefront of the committee members’ minds. 
WIVES AS CAREGIVERS 
So far, all of my examples of lurking coverture norms have involved 
situations where a wife loses her social identity, where the “one” person a 
married couple becomes is the husband. Women take their husband’s names; 
vendors and banks treat women as secondary on financial accounts and 
documents; employers expect that women will follow their husbands 
wherever their careers take them. But coverture had another very important 
feature that likely shapes family life even more. Although women under 
coverture lost their legal identity, they gained through marriage a very 
important new role of “wife.” This role included a legal obligation to render 
“services” to their husbands. These services included the work of 
maintaining a home and caring for children.33 
This feature of coverture, like others, no longer exists today in the same 
form it did at common law. There are always multiple ways to make a law 
gender neutral. In the case of spousal services, the law could have been 
changed to promote either independence or mutual dependence. Courts 
opted in this case for mutual dependence. The law is now gender neutral; 
both spouses are required to support each other and provide services. 
Imagine for a moment that, instead, courts had opted for independence. 
In that world, the law would no longer require either spouse to support the 
other financially and would no longer require either spouse to provide 
services for the other. In this alternative world, spouses would be able to 
reach agreements to provide services or support, and if their relationship 
ended, through divorce or death, they could receive compensation for the 
services they had given. 
This imaginary world was one that courts were forced to consider in 
interpreting married women’s property acts, which allowed women to keep 
wages that they earned during marriage. Instead of allowing married couples 
to contract with each other, courts instead interpreted the married women’s 
 
 33. They also included sexual services, hence the impossibility at common law of marital rape. See 
generally Jill Elaine Hasday, Contest and Consent: A Legal History of Marital Rape, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 
1373 (2000). 
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property acts as prohibiting contracts between spouses for domestic 
services.34 The rule they created was gender neutral on its face: now, both 
spouses have a legal right to each other’s uncompensated services, and both 
spouses have a legal obligation to financially support the other. Yet today, 
women continue to do the lion’s share of housework, “life admin,” and 
childcare, often to the detriment of their careers and to their impoverishment 
upon divorce.35 
Nowhere is the social expectation that wives are different from 
husbands clearer than in the norms around caring for children. Some of these 
norms may have biological roots―women can become pregnant, and we 
sometimes breastfeed our children after birth. These biological facts give us 
a head start on bonding with a newborn child. Often, however, they lead 
families down a path where the mother becomes the dominant caregiver, 
even when it is no longer necessary. Health professionals, family, neighbors, 
and friends all contribute to this slide. Same-sex couples, who “often divide 
responsibilities more evenly than their heterosexual counterparts,” 
nevertheless experience pressure to conform to a heteronormative model.36 
The law charges parents with responsibility for their children, but 
virtually no parent performs every childcare task alone. Schools, extended 
kin, siblings, daycares, babysitters, au pairs, nannies, long-term or temporary 
romantic partners, friends, and neighbors all contribute to childcare.37 The 
management and negotiation of these care relationships is the responsibility 
of a sex-neutral “parent,” and it is difficult to tell from outside a family how 
that parent is actually able to handle this complex task.38 We know, however, 
from surveys, sociological studies, and the barrage of evidence that is 
everywhere around us in our daily lives, that the person coordinating, 
managing, and negotiating childcare—even childcare she does not do 
herself—is usually a woman.39 
The legal requirement that women have the sole responsibility in 
 
 34. Jill Elaine Hasday, The Canon of Family Law, 57 STAN. L. REV. 825, 845 (2004) (noting that 
this prohibition “protect[ed] a husband’s prerogatives under common law coverture from the potential 
threat that the married women’s property acts posed”). 
 35. Elizabeth F. Emens, Admin, 103 GEO. L.J. 1409, 1419 n.34 (2015) (describing household 
“admin” as “the office-type work involved in running a life,” including everything from completing 
institutional paperwork to creating shopping lists to managing and coordinating schedules). 
 36. Rosenblum, supra note 9, at 88; see id. at 58. 
 37. See Melissa Murray, The Networked Family: Reframing the Legal Understanding of Caregiving 
and Caregivers, 94 VA. L. REV. 385, 390–91 (2008) 
 38. Id. at 398 (“[A] zone of privacy that prevents the state from seeing into the black box of family 
life to understand how caregiving responsibilities actually are performed.”). 
 39. See generally ARLIE HOCHSCHILD, THE SECOND SHIFT: WORKING FAMILIES AND THE 
REVOLUTION AT HOME (1989) (discussing research on the balance of household work between working 
women and their spouses). 
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marriage to provide services and childcare may no longer exist, but the social 
norm is still broadly present, resulting in daily reminders to mothers and 
fathers alike that certain tasks are (or are not) their responsibility. At every 
school my children have attended, teachers have contacted me first if a child 
has a cold, seems nervous meeting other children, or has been the subject of 
discipline. This pattern has continued from school to school, even though our 
registration forms are riddled with special notes: “Call dad first! Then 
grandma and grandpa! Only call mom if there is no other option!” These 
notes appear to be completely ignored by school administrators and teachers, 
and when they do remember, it is often with a comment such as “oh right, 
you guys have that special deal” or “oh yes, you’re a working mom.” The 
same is true of other parents (usually mothers), who will persist in calling 
and texting me to get our kids together even when my husband was the one 
to make the first overture. 
Coverture-era norms of childcare do not only affect women. Our culture 
reminds fathers constantly as well that childcare is not really their job. Of 
course, many men do a lot of childcare, but when they do, they are often met 
with either amazement (“What an incredible dad! He’s spending time with 
his child!”) or amusement (“Poor guy, he’s trying so hard but just isn’t as 
good as mom”). Sometimes the cultural refusal to recognize fathers as 
competent parents is dangerous. Calling “mom” first when a child is sick at 
school is not only an irritant to the mother who is on a business trip, but it is 
also dangerous for the child waiting to be taken to the hospital while the 
school officials fail to contact “dad” because they presume he is too busy. 
For me, flouting the expectation that women manage households and 
childcare has been necessary to the development of my career. It has also 
required meticulous planning, constant communication with my spouse and 
extended family as our needs change, and, over the years, an army of 
babysitters and nannies, preschools and day-care centers, and housekeepers 
and lawnmowers. The situation is, of course, far more challenging for parents 
who are single or impoverished (or both) and stuck in a system that still 
presumes a child has two parents, one of whom is constantly available. I 
frequently have to forgo “parent’s night” at my kids’ school because I am 
traveling for work, but my husband or my parents are able to attend. In 
contrast, many other parents miss “parent’s night” and a host of activities 
because they are working the night shift at a second job. For me, the 
persistence of coverture norms is an irritation, a time waster, and socially 
awkward; for many, the persistence of these norms threatens their economic 
stability and livelihood. In all cases, these norms make it much, much harder 
to put in the little bit of “extra” time and effort that it takes to make it to the 
top of a profession. 
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TOO MANY JOBS 
Of course, the gender norms that exist within families do not stop when 
one arrives at work. If anything, this is where they really impact women’s 
ability to rise in organizations. In my experience, this dynamic happens for 
two reasons. First, the amount of time and mental energy people are able to 
devote to their jobs is affected directly by the gendered dynamics of their 
families’ lives. Second, the gendered dynamics of family lives bleed over 
into how people behave at work and what their expectations are for male and 
female employees. 
Go into most workplaces today, and you will see women and men 
working side by side, often doing what appears to be the same job. But looks 
can be deceiving. Often, some workers—disproportionately women—are 
doing their job while simultaneously planning for what sociologist Archie 
Hochschild describes as their “second shift”: picking up children, making 
dinner, paying bills, helping with homework, taking care of elderly parents.40 
It is not that men do not do these tasks—they certainly do—but women do 
them much more often.41 Women are also judged more harshly if they fall 
short of perfection in carrying them out.42 
I have experienced this dynamic in almost every job I have ever had. In 
my factory and retail work, I noticed that different people had very different 
reactions in identical situations. Sometimes, we would reach the end of a 
shift and discover that the next worker had called in sick. Some of us would 
rejoice at the opportunity for overtime. Others—usually parents of small 
children, most often mothers—would panic because they could not afford to 
be late for childcare pickup. Women are, statistically speaking, far more 
likely to work a significant second shift than men. Women are more likely 
to be single parents and more likely to have “primary” responsibility for 
children if they are coupled. 
Employees who do not jump at the opportunity for overtime, whether 
 
 40. See generally id. 
 41. According to a 2005 study, married women with no children do an average of 16.5 hours of 
housework per week, and married men with no children an average of seven hours. In contrast, single 
women did a little over ten hours per week and single men about eight. The study concluded that marriage 
“saves” men an hour of housework per week and “costs” women seven hours. Chore Wars: Men, Women 
and Housework, NAT. SCI. FOUND. (Apr. 28, 2008), 
https://www.nsf.gov/discoveries/disc_images.jsp?cntn_id=111458; see also Charts by Topic: Household 
Activities, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS (Dec. 20, 2016), 
https://www.bls.gov/tus/charts/household.htm (providing various data demonstrating that women, on 
average, spent more time on household activities than men in 2016). 
 42. See Sarah Thebaud, Leah Ruppanner & Sabino Kornrich, The Simple Reason Why Men Do Less 
Housework, On Average, Than Women, FAST COMPANY (July 3, 2019), 
https://www.fastcompany.com/90372399/why-men-do-less-housework-than-women (“Women may be 
judged more harshly for having a less-than-spotless home . . . .”). 
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literally or metaphorically, fall behind in the long run by appearing less 
committed and motivated than others. This is especially true in professions 
such as law where “face time” is important and some of the most interesting 
and career-advancing work comes in late in the day. Many of the best 
assignments I received as a law firm associate were ones that I volunteered 
for at 7:00 p.m., after associates with small children had left for the day. 
Lawyers are also sometimes more relaxed in the evening, and there is a 
feeling of camaraderie among the people who are so committed that they are 
willing to stay late into the night. In my experience, some lawyers will 
purposely schedule themselves to be at the office in the evening precisely so 
they can get credit for their commitment, even when they do not actually 
have work that requires them to be there. 
It should be obvious how these workplace cultures affect 
disproportionately people with families. Those people who are responsible 
for a second shift lose out overtime and find themselves falling behind. They 
are less likely to become, in the legal world, partners, or in the corporate 
world, senior executives. They are more likely to find an alternative path—
a “mommy track”—that allows reduced hours. The reality of those tracks, 
however, is that they often lead to a permanent reduction in income and in 
satisfying, challenging work. 
What is less obvious is not what happens to women, but what happens 
to men. Women are not simply “opting out” of full-time work. Many men, 
buoyed by the gendered norms of who does housework and childcare at 
home, are “opting in” to longer and longer workweeks. A part-time schedule 
at many law firms is forty-to-sixty hours per week. “Full time” is really “all 
the time”—which means someone else is handling everything outside of 
work. Men and women tend to work the same number of hours when they 
are single with no children, but after marriage, men work several hours more 
than women each week (and, as noted above, married women do more 
housework). Some researchers have identified this difference, rather than 
overt gender discrimination, as the reason for the gender wage gap.43 
For men, the impact of this difference is both a benefit and a burden. It 
tends to mean more pay, greater prospects for promotion, and higher status 
at work. It also means that men who rise high in the legal profession are less 
likely to spend significant time with their families. And it provides very little 
choice. The notion that women choose to “opt out” has been roundly 
critiqued; instead, women are “pushed out” when workplace structures 
 
 43. See, e.g., Payman Taei, Is the Difference in Work Hours the Real Reason for the Gender Wage 
Gap?, MEDIUM (Jan. 22, 2019), https://towardsdatascience.com/is-the-difference-in-work-hours-the-
real-reason-for-the-gender-wage-gap-interactive-infographic-6051dff3a041 (arguing the pay gap directly 
results from “the difference between the number of hours spent at work by women and men”). 
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refuse to recognize the reality of their family lives.44 Similarly, men who “opt 
in” are responding to workplace structures that leave them few choices. 
For men who deviate from this norm, the response can be punishing—
sometimes even more punishing than for women. As Joan Williams and 
Stephanie Bornstein have documented, “men who dare to exercise their right 
to take family and medical leave to which they are legally entitled may 
experience stigma and career penalties at work for doing so.”45 
For me, the ability to rise in my profession while still being a wife and 
mother has been a direct result of the jobs that my husband and I chose. After 
several years of legal practice, we both left our law firms to become law 
professors. This career change was something we very much wanted to do 
professionally, but we also knew that it would provide more flexibility in our 
lives. Contrary to popular belief, academic positions are not stress-free. 
Teaching law students is difficult and much more time-consuming than 
rookies often realize, engaging in legal research and publishing high-quality 
scholarship requires time and care, and contributing to the intellectual life at 
a school and within a community of scholars requires constant interaction 
with other faculty and students, as well as travel. We have both worked 
throughout our careers far more than the traditional forty-hour, “full-time” 
workweek. Academic jobs are different from others, though: we had 
remarkable control over our schedules; with the exception of classes and 
committee meetings, we could choose when, where, and how we worked. To 
return to the statistics I referenced at the beginning, 5 percent of CEOs of 
Fortune 500 companies are women, as are 21 percent of equity partners at 
law firms. Nearly 40 percent of law school deans are women—including 43 
percent of the deans of the very prestigious law schools represented in this 
joint issue. Academic culture, which values actual output over the time spent 
producing and has a more flexible approach to the workday, appears to result 
in more women in positions of leadership. 
Also crucial to our mutual success has been that we both have flexible 
jobs. The picture is very different for families in which one spouse is an 
academic and the other has a “24/7” job. The academic’s schedule can easily 
be compressed so that it is treated as secondary to the lawyer or executive’s 
schedule, and the academic’s second shift grows. The aggregate result of this 
dynamic is a gender disparity in achievement in the academy, where male 
 
 44. JOAN C. WILLIAMS, JESSICA MANVELL & STEPHANIE BORNSTEIN, “OPT OUT” OR PUSHED 
OUT?:  HOW THE PRESS COVERS WORK/FAMILY CONFLICT 7 (2006), available at https://perma.cc/PM29-
P3F9 (“This Report argues that most mothers do not opt out; they are pushed out by workplace 
inflexibility, the lack of family supports, and workplace bias against mothers.”). 
 45. Joan C. Williams & Stephanie Bornstein, The Evolution of “FReD”: Family Responsibilities 
Discrimination and Developments in the Law of Stereotyping and Implicit Bias, 59 HASTINGS L.J. 1311, 
1331 (2008).  
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faculty are often supported by stay-at-home or part-time employed wives 
who take care of the entire second shift, but female faculty are still taking on 
that entire shift to help support the career of a husband who is in a less 
flexible profession. 
Parental leave is an important piece of this puzzle, but solving the 
parental-leave conundrum does not solve the long-term issues in family 
dynamics because parental leave exists only for the first few months of an 
infant’s life. For me, generous parental leave was critical to my ability to 
continue successfully toward academic tenure. The amount of time was not 
the only important factor. Flexibility was also important; for example, during 
the fall of my first pregnancy, I taught my Family Law class four days a week 
instead of two and finished teaching in mid-October to accommodate my due 
date. Also crucial was the application of the parental-leave policy to my 
husband, who also taught his class double time and was able to share 
parenting equally with me during the time when patterns of parenting 
behavior develop. 
Yet equal parental leave has a downside that is well documented; male 
academics are more likely to work on research and scholarship during 
parental leave, using it as a respite from teaching, while female academics 
use it to recover from childbirth and bond with their infants.46 This 
phenomenon is similar to the way in which the transformation of the 
coverture-era rule that wives provide services to their husbands to a gender-
neutral version has had disproportionate effects on women when they are 
socially expected to do more at home. When social norms encourage women 
to take care of infants and men to get ahead in the workplace, gender-neutral 
parental leave policies can have gendered effects. 
PLAYING WIFE AND MOM AT WORK 
So far, I have been arguing that women are less likely to get “to the top” 
in most workplaces because the workplaces do not account for the reality of 
their gendered family roles at home. There is a second way in which these 
roles affect the workplace, one that can be even more difficult for women to 
navigate, because nothing we do can change how other people behave. 
People’s experiences with women outside of work affects their attitudes 
about women at work. Studies have consistently shown that women are more 
likely to volunteer for “office housekeeping” tasks and that other employees 
 
 46. See Justin Wolfers, A Family-Friendly Policy That’s Friendliest to Male Professors, N.Y. TIMES 
(June 24, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/26/business/tenure-extension-policies-that-put-
women-at-a-disadvantage.html (“[M]en who took parental leave used the extra year to publish their 
research, amassing impressive publication records. But there was no parallel rise in the output of female 
economists.”). 
 FAMILY, GENDER, AND LEADERSHIP 15 
are more likely to ask women to volunteer.47 This feature of the workplace 
affects women regardless of their actual family circumstances. You do not 
have to be a wife or mom to be treated like one. 
I have seen this dynamic play out in multiple workplaces throughout 
my career. At law schools, it tends to play out in two ways. First, female 
faculty disproportionately mentor and counsel students, especially about 
issues that go beyond academics. At every law school I have attended or 
taught in, there have been a handful of faculty who “everyone knows” are 
the go-to people for discussing personal problems. These individuals are 
usually women, people of color, or LGBTQ faculty—often a combination of 
all of the above. Students come to us with issues related directly to these 
identities—disclosures of sexual assault or racial harassment, for example. 
It is not only students who share our gender or racial identities who come to 
us, however—it is all students. Male students, too, are accustomed to getting 
support and nurturing from women and are quite comfortable asking for—
or even demanding—it. 
The problem is the students are genuinely needy, and sometimes the 
problems are true emergencies. No one wants to be the faculty member who 
turned away a suicidal student; most of us would like to be the person a 
student looks back on years later as having made an enormous difference to 
them in a time of trouble. This is not work that most of us would feel 
comfortable refusing, and it can be a source of meaning and satisfaction. The 
problem is that the work is not evenly distributed, so some faculty do more 
of it than others, and it is not valued institutionally. Talking with students 
about their personal lives does not get you promoted; publishing quality 
scholarship and teaching effectively in the classroom do.48 
“Big sister” or “mom” are not the only roles women are expected to 
play in the workplace. As Dean Laura Rosenbury has explained, during 
much of the twentieth century, secretaries performed the role of “office wife” 
for men in executive roles.49 Today, there are more permutations of 
relationships at work—ciswomen who have work wives, ciswomen who 
have work husbands, transmen who have work wives, and on and on. But, as 
Dean Rosenbury notes, many of these relationships play out traditional 
 
 47. See, e.g., Linda Babcock, Maria P. Recalde, & Lise Vesterlund, Why Women Volunteer for 
Tasks That Don’t Lead to Promotions, HARV. BUS.  REV. (July 16, 2018), https://hbr.org/2018/07/why-
women-volunteer-for-tasks-that-dont-lead-to-promotions (arguing that women are more likely than men 
to volunteer for time consuming, yet “non-promotable,” tasks). 
 48. See id. (“[I]n industry, revenue-generating tasks are more promotable than non-revenue-
generating tasks; in academia, research-related tasks are more promotable than service-related tasks . . . . ”). 
 49. See Laura A. Rosenbury, Work Wives, 36 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 345, 347 (2013) (explaining 
that women working as secretaries were often charged with “providing support that frequently looked 
like the care wives provided to their husbands at home”). 
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gender roles, with the employee in the position of “wife” providing 
emotional support, reminding the other employee of where he or she needs 
to be, and even looking out for the coworker’s health, by dispensing aspirin 
or reminding them to see the dentist.50 
None of the activities that women engage in at work are inherently bad. 
In fact, many are good—good for the office, good for coworkers, maybe 
even good for the person engaging in them because they lead to fulfillment 
and happiness. They do not, however, lead to promotions—at least not 
without all of the other achievements necessary for promotion. In many 
workplaces that appear to be equal, some employees are not only carrying 
on a second shift at home but are also expected to conform to this gendered 
home identity at work, caring for their coworkers and supervisors the way 
they care for their children at the expense of their own advancement. Men at 
work, meanwhile, can be oblivious to this work, the benefits they receive 
from it, and the toll it takes on women’s achievement. 
CONCLUSION 
I have two final thoughts as I think about the future careers of our 
sixteen editors-in-chief and the millions of other young women who hope to 
lead their professions someday. Their achievements to date have resulted 
from their talent and hard work. Their talent and hard work will of course 
affect their ability to lead twenty years from now, but their talent and hard 
work will not be enough. Until we—“we the people”—decide that the legal 
and social structures underlying families and the workplace need to change, 
the only women who will become leaders will be those who manage to slip 
through the cracks—the exceptions. The exceptions are women who have 
found partners who prioritize our career success. We have found workplaces 
that provide the flexibility needed to maintain and nurture relationships 
outside of work. We are contrarian enough in our thinking that we are willing 
to tolerate the daily reminders that our exceptionalism makes others 
uncomfortable. 
If our society is to move beyond a world where women leaders are 
exceptions, we need to move beyond expecting women to solve the problems 
of workplace structure and gendered family norms. Men will have to work 
with women to remake institutions, often in ways that make them profoundly 
uncomfortable, relinquish their male privilege, and change the way they live. 
Men who have benefited from this system will need to understand that the 
choices they have made—choices made, admittedly, under structural 
constraints—adversely affect the women with whom they work. The first 
 
 50. Id. at 365. 
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hundred years of a world with the Nineteenth Amendment have been about 
women fighting for equality. In the next hundred years, we need men to take 
responsibility for their role in perpetuating gender hierarchies, not just at the 
polls, in the jury box, or even in workplaces, but in their own homes and 
families—the source of it all. 
 
MOTHERHOOD AS MISOGYNY 
JANE H. AIKEN† 
INTRODUCTION 
I remember the day that I sat in a chair teaching my second class of the 
day, three days after having a C-section. I could not afford leave without pay, 
the only leave available. It was my fault anyway; I had not timed this 
pregnancy well. The others had been “academic babies”—born when I had 
time to stay at home. I now was on a beeper at work: I was beeped when the 
baby woke up so that I could run home, breastfeed her, and get back to work 
in time for office hours. And then there were the times I needed to pump 
breast milk in my office and worried that the factory-like sounds coming 
from inside might draw attention. Even evenings were fraught as I would run 
to my other children’s soccer games, dressed in business clothes and 
inevitably late, and endure the withering looks of fellow mothers, many 
balancing boxes of cupcakes in their laps for after games (yikes, when was 
it my turn again?). And why did I struggle so much to figure out how to get 
the children to the doctor? Did any of this ever occur to my husband? Why 
didn’t I ask him? Of course, it never ends. I am now the dean of a law school, 
having taken that job only once all my children were out of college, and I am 
worried that I will be missing my son’s graduation from medical school 
because, on the same day, I preside over this law school’s graduation. How 
much mental energy do I spend every day thinking about how to be the best 
mother I can be for my children? Motherhood has profoundly influenced my 
choices, my success as a law professor, my identity as a woman. Critical to 
that identity is my responsibility to put my children first no matter the impact 
on me. Mostly, I fail at that. I am caught in the double bind: expected to 
perform as a teacher and scholar yet criticized for not being selfless if I do 
not give appropriate primacy to the care of my children.    
Flash forward twenty-five years from the birth of my first child. I am 
teaching a Motherhood and the Law class at Georgetown University Law 
Center with twenty-four young women sitting around a table in a seminar 
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room.1 My first question: “How many of you are mothers?” Not one hand 
went up. Puzzled, I asked each of them why she was taking this class. Every 
one of them expressed some form of, “How do I be a mother and succeed in 
my career as a lawyer?” These women were not objecting to the structure 
that made this question necessary, but rather asking how to manage it. They 
all appreciated that a mother’s value derives from her capacity to sacrifice. 
They had come to the course with a hope that I could help them develop a 
plan for coping with this inevitable challenge. My job was to help them 
manage their expectations about what they could have for themselves and 
where to sacrifice. In all my time as a law professor, I have never been asked 
that type of question by a man.2 
 
I.  MOTHERHOOD AS SACRIFICE 
Mothering is hard work. It is constant; it is intense; it is exhausting. 
Mahatma Gandhi said that mothers best demonstrate the quality of ahimsa, 
a Hindi word that means infinite love and, at the same time, infinite capacity 
for suffering.3 Mothers adjust their lives to accommodate children. 
Mothering children often requires a mother to choose less remunerative 
work, lesser chance for advancement, and lower status in order for her to do 
all the mundane but necessary things required to care for children: 
breastfeed; arrange for doctors’ appointments, play dates, birthday parties, 
reading, and homework; buy new shoes; attend parent–teacher meetings; 
prepare food that children will eat; nurse them when sick; awaken during the 
night to the slightest irregular sound. No one likes doing all of this work. 
Mostly, it goes unacknowledged as work; it is merely what we expect from 
mothers. Nevertheless, this unpaid labor is critical to family function and to 
our economy.4 Parenting, handled primarily by mothers, is a job that is 
neither compensated nor counted in America’s gross domestic product.5 The 
work that mothers put into raising their children to become successful adults 
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 5. Cf. JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ ET AL., MISMEASURING OUR LIVES: WHY GDP DOESN’T ADD UP 49 
(2010) (explaining that conventional economic measures fail to account for the monetary value of 
household production and childcare). 
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is also not counted in terms of government benefits such as Social Security,6 
nor is it uniformly considered when determining alimony and the division of 
assets in a divorce.7 Rather, the implied compensation mothers receive is the 
personal satisfaction of having children. Although having a family certainly 
provides many women with happiness and fulfillment, society promotes the 
notion that this is a sacrifice that is expected of “good” mothers whether they 
want to make the sacrifice or not.8 Any behavioral problems with the children 
or issues of neglect are also automatically blamed on the mother rather than 
the father.9 Given the penalties for not being selfless, it is hardly surprising 
that mothers put their children’s needs before their own, often at the cost of 
their own lives.10 This prioritization of children’s needs may explain why 
women all over the world are poorer than men despite working longer 
hours.11 Our construction of motherhood hinges on an expectation of 
selflessness—an apparent willingness to put the needs of others before the 
needs of self.  
Where once there was an explicit expectation that a woman’s sole role 
was to bear and care for children while deriving joy and satisfaction through 
that relationship and subordinating her own needs to the needs of their 
children, today that expectation has gone underground. It emerges as an 
 
 6. See Iulie Aslaksen & Charlotte Koren, Reflections on Unpaid Household Work, Economic 
Growth, and Consumption Possibilities, in COUNTING ON MARILYN WARING: NEW ADVANCES IN 
FEMINIST ECONOMICS 55, 64 (Margunn Bjørnholt & Ailsa McKay eds., 2d ed. 2014). 
 7.  See generally Lee R. Russ, Annotation, Divorce: Equitable Distribution Doctrine, 41 A.L.R. 
4th 481 § 12 (1985) (observing that courts in only twenty-six states and the District of Columbia 
recognized one spouse’s performance of homemaking duties as a contribution to the marriage that should 
be considered when dividing the marital estate). 
 8. See, e.g., SUSAN CHIRA, A MOTHER’S PLACE: CHOOSING WORK AND FAMILY WITHOUT GUILT 
OR BLAME 32 (1998); TWENTY-FIRST-CENTURY MOTHERHOOD: EXPERIENCE, IDENTITY, POLICY, 
AGENCY (Andrea O’Reilly ed., 2010); see also Isabel S. Wallace, Being a Good Mother Requires 
Understanding, Devotion, and Sacrifice, in BULLETIN NO. 35, TRAINING LITTLE CHILDREN: 
SUGGESTIONS FOR PARENTS 75, 75 (Bureau of Educ., U.S. Dep’t of Interior ed., 1919). 
 9. See, e.g., VICKY PHARES, “POPPA” PSYCHOLOGY: THE ROLE OF FATHERS IN CHILDREN’S 
MENTAL WELL-BEING 39 (1999); Jonathan Metzl, The New Science of Blaming Moms, MSNBC (July 21, 
2014, 2:24 PM), http://www.msnbc.com/melissa-harris-perry/the-new-science-blaming-moms. 
 10. See, e.g., Rebecca J. Cook, International Human Rights and Women’s Reproductive Health, 24 
STUD. FAM. PLAN. 73 (1993) (observing that “[t]he cost to women’s health of discharging [the duty of 
bearing children has historically gone] unrecognized”); Jeremy Shiffman, Can Poor Countries Surmount 
High Maternal Mortality?, 31 STUD. FAM. PLAN. 274 (2000) (discussing the high rates of maternal 
mortality, particularly in developing countries); L. Lewis Wall, Dead Mothers and Injured Wives: The 
Social Context of Maternal Morbidity and Mortality Among the Hausa of Northern Nigeria, 29 STUD. 
FAM. PLAN. 341 (1998) (discussing the high rate of maternal mortality among the Hausa); Alicia Ely 
Yamin & Deborah P. Maine, Maternal Mortality as a Human Rights Issue: Measuring Compliance with 
International Treaty Obligations, 21 HUM. RTS. Q. 563 (1999) (discussing solutions involving the use of 
potential human rights tools to encourage states to adopt policies and practices dedicated to reducing 
maternal mortality). 
 11. See, e.g., CRITTENDEN, supra note 4, at 8. 
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unstated assumption when women deviate from their expected selfless role. 
Mothers move through this culture with identities that do not include the full 
range of emotions, severe character faults, or malicious capabilities 
commonly considered possible in others. Instead, mothers are supposed to 
be selfless in caring for their children, and anything less risks heavy criticism 
from the rest of society. This expectation of abnegation is so ingrained in our 
culture that it often passes without notice.12   
This Essay draws on my experience as a mother, a lawyer, and an 
academic handling or analyzing cases where women killed their children, 
were held responsible for someone else killing their children, or killed 
someone who threatened their children. Mothers’ choices are measured on a 
continuum of selflessness to selfishness. Paradoxically, both ends of the 
continuum are implicated in these categories of cases.  
These extreme cases offer some insight into the hidden expectation of 
selflessness incorporated in our consciousness and deeply embraced by our 
social structures. The social fallout from cases such as these prompted all 
those students in my Motherhood class to worry, to plan, and to limit 
themselves.  
II.  MOTHERS WHO KILL THEIR CHILDREN 
To most people, a mother who kills her child is either a selfish monster 
or mad.13 In cases where a mother is charged with killing a child, that 
mother’s motherhood is on trial. Insanity is the only explanation, but in the 
criminal justice system, a mother’s insanity often reflects her own extreme 
form of selflessness. Under the M’Naghten rule, 
to establish a defence on the ground of insanity, it must be clearly proved 
that, at the time of the committing of the act, the party accused was 
labouring under such a defect of reason, from disease of the mind, as not to 
know the nature and quality of the act he was doing; or, if he did know it, 
that he did not know he was doing what was wrong.14 
 
 12. It is not at all clear that there is a legal strategy for challenging the ways in which this expectation 
influences decisions and assessments. This influence may be best understood using a Foucauldian social 
construction theory. That theory posits an all-encompassing, interlocking network of social regulation 
that, for mothers, enforces the expectation of selflessness. See generally MICHEL FOUCAULT, 
POWER/KNOWLEDGE: SELECTED INTERVIEWS AND OTHER WRITINGS 1972-1977 (Colin Gordon, ed., 
Pantheon Books 1980) (providing a collection of essays and interviews that have shaped and discuss 
Foucauldian social construction theory). 
 13. See Michelle Oberman, Mothers Who Kill: Coming to Terms with Modern American Infanticide, 
34 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1, 43 (1996); Elizabeth Rapaport, Mad Women and Desperate Girls: Infanticide 
and Child Murder in Law and Myth, 33 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 527, 528 & n.5 (2006). 
 14. M’Naghten’s Case (1843) 8 Eng. Rep. 718, 722 (HL). 
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In these cases, women often fail to meet the rigorous standard for the 
insanity defense because they are aware that what they are doing will be 
punished, yet they do it anyway.15 Looking at prominent insanity claims by 
women who killed their own children, one sees a striking number of cases in 
which the mother killed the child under the false belief that it would be better 
for the child—in other words, out of a deranged sense of caring.16 Their 
deranged sense of “selflessness” both inspires the act and defeats the insanity 
defense. They live out the oxymoron of being both a loving mother of 
children and the children’s killer. 
In October 1994, Susan Smith, distraught over the state of her life, 
stopped her car on a bridge in Union County, South Carolina, and considered 
jumping off the bridge to kill herself.17 As she approached the railing, she 
stopped, realizing that were she to jump, she would be abandoning her two 
boys, asleep and strapped in their car seats.18 Ms. Smith said later, “I felt 
even more anxiety coming upon me about not wanting to live. . . . I felt I 
couldn’t be a good mom anymore, but I didn’t want my children to grow up 
without a mom. . . . I felt I had to end our lives.”19 She believed that a good 
mother would not leave her children to grow up without a mom.20 Ms. Smith 
returned to her car, sobbing and dazed, and drove to John D. Long Lake.21 
Seeing a boat ramp, she drove the car onto the ramp, allowing it to roll into 
the water, ready to die with her children.22 As the car entered the water, Ms. 
Smith panicked, and she jumped out of the car as it continued into the water 
and sank.23 With no one to help her save the children, Ms. Smith thought to 
herself that she should tell no one what had happened because they would 
hate her.24 Ms. Smith had not wanted to leave her children alone and, 
planning her own suicide, decided to kill them to ensure they did not grow 
 
 15. See CHERYL L. MEYER & MICHELLE OBERMAN, MOTHERS WHO KILL THEIR CHILDREN: 
UNDERSTANDING THE ACTS OF MOMS FROM SUSAN SMITH TO THE “PROM MOM” 95 (2001). 
 16. See, e.g., Josephine Stanton et al., A Qualitative Study of Filicide by Mentally Ill Mothers, 24 
CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 1451 (2000) (providing a survey of various instances of filicide by mothers); 
Susan Ayres, “[N]ot a Story to Pass On”: Constructing Mothers Who Kill, 15 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 
39, 86–88, 97, 100–01 (2004). 
 17. GEOFFREY R. MCKEE, WHY MOTHERS KILL: A FORENSIC PSYCHOLOGIST’S CASEBOOK 156, 
158 (2006).  
 18. Id. at 156. 
 19. ANDREA PEYSER, MOTHER LOVE, DEADLY LOVE: THE SUSAN SMITH MURDERS 3 (1995). 
 20. MCKEE, supra note 17, at 156. 
 21. Id. at 157. 
 22. Id.  
 23. Id.  
 24. Id. Ms. Smith then dissembled the facts and made a claim easily believed in her small Southern 
town: that her children had been taken by a black man. See id. That assertion prompted a manhunt and a 
national story. See id. 
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up without a mother.25 No one would understand that she, too, wanted to die 
and save her children from abandonment by taking them with her, but that 
she ultimately did not have the courage to follow through with her suicide. 
She was charged with capital murder and the prosecution sought the death 
penalty.26 I assisted the defense with pretrial surveys of potential jurors. The 
survey results indicated two possible responses of jurors: that something 
must have been terribly wrong with Ms. Smith, rendering her insane, or that 
the killing was the result of Ms. Smith’s uncontrolled sexual desires and 
rejection of the sacred maternal role. As the evidence unfolded, it was clear 
that Ms. Smith had been victimized by her stepfather and suffered 
considerable trauma.27 That evidence did not result in a finding of insanity,28 
but it did help Ms. Smith avoid the death penalty.29    
In a similar case, defendant Andrea Yates told her doctor that she had 
killed her children because she felt she was such a bad mother that she had 
doomed her children to hell.30 The only way she could save them, she 
believed, was to kill them.31 Her attorney, George Parnham, noted that Ms. 
Yates believed that “[t]hese children of hers needed to die in order to be 
saved . . . because [she] was such a bad mother that she was causing these 
children to deteriorate and be doomed to the fires of eternal damnation.”32 
This case shows the tragic meta-recursive layers to this thought process: A 
woman is so consumed with shame about being a bad mother that she 
believes she is embodying the archetypal “good” mother qualities in 
committing the most heinous crime a mother can commit against her 
children. 
Contrast the women in these cases with fathers who kill their children, 
who rarely manifest this selfless, yet deranged, motivation.33 Instead fathers 
 
 25. PEYSER, supra note 19, at 3. 
 26. See Rick Bragg, Carolina Jury Rejects Execution for Woman Who Drowned Sons, N.Y. TIMES 
(July 29, 1995), https://www.nytimes.com/1995/07/29/us/carolina-jury-rejects-execution-for-woman-
who-drowned-sons.html. 
 27. See Rick Bragg, Susan Smith Verdict Brings Relief to Small Town, N.Y. TIMES (July 30, 1995), 
https://www.nytimes.com/1995/07/30/us/susan-smith-verdict-brings-relief-to-town.html. 
 28. See Rick Bragg, Judge Rules Susan Smith Is Fit for Trial on Murder Charges, N.Y. TIMES (July 
12, 1995), https://www.nytimes.com/1995/07/12/us/judge-rules-susan-smith-is-fit-for-trial-on-murder-
charges.html. 
 29. See Bragg, supra note 27. 
 30. See Lisa Sweetingham, Defense: Yates Killed Kids to Save Them, CNN (June 27, 2006, 11:31 
AM), https://www.cnn.com/2006/LAW/06/26/yates.trial/index.html. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. 
 33. See Elizabeth Yardley et al., A Taxonomy of Male British Family Annihilators, 1980–2012, 53 
HOW. J. CRIM. JUST. 117, 132 tbl.14 (2014) (finding that only 14% of male family annihilators kill their 
children as “a way of protecting them from [a] threat”). 
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predominately act out of anger, jealousy, and marital and life discord.34 The 
majority of men who kill their own children engage in family annihilation, 
usually after a threat of divorce.35 They kill not only their children but 
oftentimes also their spouse or partner.36 Studies of fathers who kill their 
children note that the primary motivation for such acts can be characterized 
as self-righteousness.37 Researchers explain family annihilators classified as 
self-righteous: 
For these men, [the idea of a traditional nuclear] family is central to their 
masculinity. Their role as the ‘breadwinner’ affords them a significant 
degree of control. Thus the threat of family breakdown results in efforts to 
keep the family together—through an escalation of controlling behaviour 
that may involve threats and violence towards their partners. Where their 
partners show signs of thriving without them, the family is perceived as 
having failed. . . . The self-righteous family annihilator, therefore, engages 
in a dramatic performance of his domineering, masculine identity. By 
removing his children, he effectively prevents them from becoming the 
stepchildren of another man. For the self-righteous family annihilator, the 
family has failed in its function as a forum for the performance of 
masculinity through dominance and control. 
Here we should note that the threat has come from within the family—
specifically the non-compliance of his partner, who has wrested back a 
degree of power and independence.38 
Had she not acted so selfishly, he would not have needed to annihilate 
the family. 
In other cases where mothers, particularly young mothers, kill their 
children, the failure to engage in selfless behavior heightens the probability 
of being found guilty. Young mothers who kill their children are often 
criticized as having engaged in selfish behavior by ridding themselves of an 
unwanted “problem.” The prosecution often makes considerable use of the 
trope of selfishness. The trial of Casey Anthony is illustrative. 
Ms. Anthony was charged with first-degree murder, aggravated 
manslaughter, and aggravated child abuse of Caylee Anthony, her daughter, 
who after having been missing for several weeks was found dead, buried, 
 
 34. Fathers tend to use more violent means than mothers when they kill their children; for example, 
by using firearms, stabbing, inflicting head injuries, hitting, or kicking. Timothy Y. Mariano et al., 
Toward a More Holistic Understanding of Filicide: A Multidisciplinary Analysis of 32 Years of U.S. 
Arrest Data, 236 FORENSIC SCI. INT’L 46, 47 (2014). 
 35. See id.; see also Yardley et al., supra note 33, at 130 (finding family breakdown to be the 
primary cause of male family annihilation). 
 36. Id. at 129. 
 37. Id. at 131–32. 
 38. Id. 
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and gagged with duct tape.39 A significant part of the prosecution’s theory of 
the case was the suggestion that selfishness was the motive for murder, and 
the prosecution painted Ms. Anthony as a party girl who had a much better 
life now that Caylee was out of her way.40 The prosecution’s theory of Ms. 
Anthony’s selfishness, though intended to smear her character in the 
courtroom, spoke most strongly to the throngs of people following the case 
throughout America.41 Ms. Anthony went against the prototypical mother—
from her reaction at her trial (Nancy Grace called Ms. Anthony stone-faced 
and said that she would like to slap the expression off Ms. Anthony’s face42) 
to her actions the day after Caylee disappeared (running errands to 
Blockbuster and Target and staying inside her room with boyfriend Tony 
Lazzaro all day43). The prosecution took this idea even further and posited 
that Ms. Anthony wanted Caylee out of the way so that she could party.44 It 
presented testimony that Ms. Anthony gave Caylee a sedative so that Caylee 
would sleep through the night and Ms. Anthony could go out.45 It showed 
pictures of Ms. Anthony partying with her boyfriend several days after 
Caylee first disappeared.46 And finally, it ended by presenting a picture of 
Ms. Anthony’s tattoo, which reads “Bella Vita,” a phrase that means 
“beautiful life,” that she got several days after Caylee’s disappearance.47 
Impugning a woman’s mothering practices as selfish or suggesting that she 
has not engaged in the requisite selfless behavior appears to be a strategy of 
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choice in painting a defendant as worthy of punishment no matter the 
limitations of the proof.48 
III.  MOTHERS OF MURDERED CHILDREN 
A woman is also blamed when her child is killed by another. She has 
either acted selfishly by staying with the killer despite his violent tendencies 
toward the child, or she has failed as a selfless mother due to her inability to 
recognize the risk of harm to her child.  
Legislators ostensibly design failure-to-protect statutes to protect 
children, and these statutes appear to be a logical way to reduce instances of 
child abuse.49 Child abuse statutes typically appear in two forms: 
commission statutes aimed at active abusers and omission statutes 
criminalizing the passive conduct of those who expose a child to a risk of 
abuse or fail to care for or protect a child in violation of a legal duty.50 
Omission statutes aim “to protect children’s ‘best interests’ by compelling 
parents to remove their children from abusive environments.”51 Typically, 
the passive parent’s liability for child abuse or homicide is predicated upon 
(1) the parent’s legal duty to protect the child, (2) the parent’s actual or 
constructive notice of the foreseeability of abuse, (3) the child’s exposure to 
the abuse, and (4) the parent’s failure to prevent such abuse.52 Every state 
imposes some form of criminal liability for passive child abuse.53 Usually, 
the prosecutor must show that (1) the defendant had a legal duty to protect 
the child, (2) the defendant had notice of the foreseeability of abuse, (3) the 
child was abused, and (4) the defendant failed to prevent the abuse.54 Mothers 
who fail to protect their children from third-party abuse can be charged not 
 
 48. In a case with which I am involved, our client, a mother of five children, was charged and 
convicted of killing her husband. Transcript of Trial Proceedings at 707, State v. Prewitt, No. CR484-5F 
(Mo. Ct. App. Apr. 19, 1985). Faced with little evidence of her connection to the crime, the prosecution 
suggested that the motive for the killing was our client’s engagement in extramarital affairs. Id. at 659. 
The affairs in question had occurred six years prior during a period of separation from her husband, the 
victim. Id. at 584, 682–83. Apparently seeking to bolster the power of the evidence, on cross-examination, 
and without objection, the prosecutor asked: “Where were the children when you engaged in intercourse 
with him?” Id. at 639. In a memoir later written by the prosecutor, he described questions like this as “a 
few parting shots” that relied on “the old favorite, motherhood.” TOM R. WILLIAMS & NAN COCKE, 
PRACTICE TO DECEIVE 467 (2016). 
 49. See Linda J. Panko, Legal Backlash: The Expanding Liability of Women Who Fail to Protect 
Their Children from Their Male Partner’s Abuse, 6 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 67, 67–68 (1995). 
 50. Id. 
 51. Michelle S. Jacobs, Requiring Battered Women Die: Murder Liability for Mothers Under 
Failure to Protect Statutes, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 579, 615 (1998). 
 52. Id.; Panko, supra note 49, at 68. 
 53. Jeanne A. Fugate, Note, Who’s Failing Whom? A Critical Look at Failure-to-Protect Laws, 76 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 272, 278 (2001). 
 54. Id. at 279. 
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only with failure to protect, but also with child abuse, reckless endangerment, 
accessory to murder, and even felony murder.55 These failure-to-protect 
statutes can inflict devastating prison sentences and felony convictions.56 
When combined with felony murder, failure-to-protect convictions can even 
carry life sentences.57 Under this framework, evidence of prior abuse of the 
mother can actually work against her: Instead of being used to potentially 
explain why a mother was afraid to come between her batterer and her child, 
evidence of prior abuse can show the mother should have known that her 
child was in danger.58 Only a few states provide statutory affirmative 
defenses that allow the accused to argue that she believed interfering in the 
abuse would cause physical harm to herself or further injury to her child.59   
Society’s conception of motherhood plays a role in the decision to 
prosecute for failure to protect. The justice system will often ascribe a 
preternatural instinct to a mother to see that her child might be at risk of 
harm. One writer observes that “[s]ociety believes that the maternal instinct 
bestows upon a woman a superior ability to protect.”60 Another researcher 
echoes the sentiment: “While courts have determined that the primary 
responsibility of the child falls upon both parents, mothers are singled out as 
the primary care takers, and take primary blame when tragedy strikes.”61 One 
client of mine, whose abusive housemate killed her baby as she walked her 
six-year-old to the bus stop, could not fathom that this could have happened. 
She felt that surely it must be her fault. Her all-consuming guilt—and 
insistence that she had failed as a mother—made defending her against a 
charge of child endangerment and failure to protect all but impossible. When 
I met her, she had been in prison for several years, always on suicide watch. 
I learned her story when I advised her that the paper she asked me to interpret 
was a voluntary relinquishment of her parental rights—she had signed it 
earlier, not appreciating its significance. The state had terminated her 
parental rights to her six-year-old. Although there was not much I could do 
about this termination after the fact, I determined that we had several grounds 
to challenge her criminal conviction. She refused to move forward, 
convinced that she should have known: “After all, I was their mother.” I am 
haunted by this case. The client remains in prison under suicide watch.  
 
 55. See id. at 277 n.19, 279 n.26. 
 56. Id. at 277 n.19, 278–79 & n.26. 
 57. See, e.g., Jacobs, supra note 51, at 582–83. 
 58.  Fugate, supra note 53, at 291–92. 
 59. Id. at 279. 
 60. Rebecca Ann Schernitzki, What Kind of Mother Are You? The Relationship Between 
Motherhood, Battered Woman Syndrome and Missouri Law, 56 J. MO. B. 50, 50 (2000). 
 61. Geneva Brown, When the Bough Breaks: Traumatic Paralysis—An Affirmative Defense for 
Battered Mothers, 32 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 189, 224 (2005). 
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Even though failure-to-protect statutes are written in gender-neutral 
terms, prosecutors use them against mothers far more often than against 
fathers.62 One advocate stated: “In the 16 years I’ve worked in the courts, I 
have never seen a father charged with failure to protect when the mom is the 
abuser. Yet, in virtually every case where Dad is the abuser, we charge Mom 
with failure to protect.”63 Thus, common beliefs concerning motherhood 
have created a bias in the justice system.64 “[T]hat a mother is charged at all 
in the failure-to-protect scenario is a powerful example of the ‘mother-
blaming’ bias that permeates not only our legal institutions, but also our 
cultural norms,” writes Professor Jennifer M. Collins.65 
Perhaps the most poignant example of the lopsided nature of failure-to-
protect statutes can be seen in the aforementioned Andrea Yates case. The 
nation was consumed with the sad story of Ms. Yates, the suburban mother 
who in 2001 killed all of her children by drowning them and then called the 
police to report what she had done.66 Ms. Yates had suffered from intense 
postpartum depression that transformed into psychosis after her fourth baby 
was born.67 She spent considerable time in a mental hospital to recover.68 
Although warned by her physician that she was likely to have the same or 
worse experience should she give birth again, after pressure from her 
husband, Rusty Yates, Ms. Yates decided to have another child and risk her 
descent into psychosis.69 Indeed, when that baby was born, Ms. Yates did 
experience postpartum depression.70 According to the trial testimony, Mr. 
Yates was told by the psychiatrist that Ms. Yates was not capable of caring 
for the children and should not be left alone with them.71 However, without 
 
 62. See Gregory L. Lecklitner et al., Promoting Safety for Abused Children and Battered Mothers: 
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 63.  Id. at 176. 
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 65. Jennifer M. Collins, Lady Madonna, Children at Your Feet: The Criminal Justice System’s 
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20, 2016), https://time.com/4375398/andrea-yates-15-years-drown-children; Sweetingham, supra note 
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 67. See Terri Langford, Yates Recounts Wife’s Descent: Tearful Husband Details Frustrating 
Search for Medical Help, NEWSROOM, Feb. 28, 2002, at A1. 
 68. See id. 
 69. Timothy Roche, The Yates Odyssey, TIME, Jan. 28, 2002, at 42, 48.  
 70. See Langford, supra note 67. 
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CHRONICLE, July 13, 2006, at 1. 
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consulting the doctor about his plans, Mr. Yates began leaving his wife alone 
with the children for an hour in the morning and an hour in the afternoon in 
the weeks leading up to the drownings to ensure that she did not become 
totally dependent on him and his mother, who had been helping care for the 
children, for her maternal responsibilities.72 Mr. Yates decided that Ms. 
Yates needed to start caring for the children again and decided to leave her, 
despite the warning of the psychiatrist that Ms. Yates was a danger to the 
children.73 On June 21, 2001, Andrea Yates killed all five of her children.74 
She was charged with, tried for, and convicted of their murders.75 After 
retrial, she was determined to have been insane at the time of the killing.76 
Mr. Yates, on notice of the physical risk to his children, was never charged 
with anything.  
Men who batter children often also batter the children’s mothers.77 
Failure-to-protect cases implicate not only norms of selfishness when a 
mother does not intervene, but also norms of selflessness when she is 
expected to incur great harm to herself to intervene. The battered mother 
charged with failure to protect finds herself in a particularly precarious 
position. Selflessness is readily apparent in this line of cases because our 
expectation of mothers is so different from our expectation of fathers. In 
cases in which the mother is the victim of domestic violence, she is expected 
to put her own risk aside and act on behalf of her children. A battered woman 
is still held to the heightened expectation placed on all mothers even though 
it is hardest for her to intervene. “The battered mother is placed in the 
dichotomous sphere where her survival is opposed to that of her children.”78 
Knowing that she may be prosecuted for failing to protect her children, 
“[s]he must place herself in harm’s way to protect her children and have no 
regard for her safety and wellbeing.”79  
After leaving her four-year-old daughter, H.C., home alone with her 
live-in boyfriend, Floyd Boyer, Casey Campbell returned from work shortly 
after 7:00 PM to find her daughter severely burned.80 Mr. Boyer claimed the 
burns were from spilled coffee.81 Instead of taking H.C. directly to the 
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hospital, Ms. Campbell went to play darts with Mr. Boyer, afraid to provoke 
the man who “had been physically abusive to [her] for years.”82 Ms. 
Campbell and Mr. Boyer did not take H.C. to the hospital until 2:00 AM—
after they had returned from darts and H.C.’s pain had intensified.83 The 
examining physician did not believe the burns were from hot liquid, and 
contacted the police.84 Mr. Boyer pleaded guilty to misdemeanor child 
endangerment.85 Ms. Campbell, who had also been charged with child 
endangerment, went to trial.86 Her attorney requested a continuance to 
explore a battered woman’s syndrome defense, but the court denied it.87 At 
Ms. Campbell’s trial, Mr. Boyer confirmed that he had abused Ms. Campbell 
in the past.88 He testified that he believed Ms. Campbell did not seek medical 
care for H.C. that night and left her to play darts to avoid angering him and 
risking further abuse.89 At the jury instruction stage, Ms. Campbell’s attorney 
requested an instruction on the defense of duress and coercion, but the 
instruction was denied.90 Ms. Campbell was convicted of felony child 
endangerment, a far more serious crime than the one to which Mr. Boyer 
pleaded guilty, and she was sentenced to prison.91   
Ms. Campbell was not at home when her child was injured, and she 
only failed to get appropriate medical care out of fear of her batterer, Mr. 
Boyer. Because of the prior abuse by Mr. Boyer that she had endured, Ms. 
Campbell could not have reasonably been expected to defy the wishes of her 
batterer, yet she was denied an opportunity to explore a battered woman’s 
syndrome defense. Ms. Campbell was allowed to testify that she “had been 
abused by her brother since she was seven years old, by her stepfather since 
a teenager, and by Boyer since she was sixteen years old, and Boyer had 
violently assaulted her with knives and guns on past occasions.”92 She also 
testified that “[a]t the time of HC’s injuries, she feared for herself and HC if 
she defied Boyer that night by refusing to play darts.”93 However, the court’s 
refusal to instruct the jury on the defense of duress and coercion nullified the 
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relevance of this testimony.94 The justice system failed to recognize that Ms. 
Campbell might have reasonably failed to protect her child due to her 
experience of prior abuse and the rational fear that any intervention would 
further endanger herself or her child. Although the actual abuser received 
only a misdemeanor conviction, Ms. Campbell was convicted of a 
devastating felony and sentenced to jail time.95 
Casey Campbell’s story is indicative of a recurring problem. As it 
currently stands, the legal system punishes women for failing to protect their 
children regardless of whether they could have reasonably halted the abuse. 
Battered women, victims themselves, appear to have a reason to hesitate to 
intervene in their partners’ abuse of their children. Research suggests that 
battered women are six times more likely to be accused of child abuse than 
women who have not been battered.96 Nevertheless, the current state of the 
law has trouble recognizing the effects of domestic violence on a mother’s 
capacity to protect. The expectation that women put their children first 
overlooks evidence suggesting that doing so can be virtually impossible.  
A court might better appreciate the reasonableness of a mother’s actions 
if it considered a woman’s decision to stay in the home of her batterer in light 
of the real threat that her batterer will retaliate if she leaves. Separation 
assault is well documented, and women often find themselves in a “no-win 
situation”: “You’re in danger when you’re with him and you’re in danger 
when you’re not . . . . That’s what leads to a lot of behavior by abused women 
that those of us on the outside can’t understand.”97 The expectation of 
selflessness is so strong that unless a woman risks her own life to protect a 
child, and many often will, she has failed and is punishable.  
IV.  MOTHERS WHO KILL TO PROTECT THEIR CHILDREN 
Ironically, despite the expectation that women protect their children 
before themselves, when women kill to protect their children, that 
protectiveness is not used to mitigate the crime. Instead, it is often recast as 
a selfish act. Self-defense is justified when there is an imminent threat of 
death or serious bodily harm.98 Without imminence, the defense is virtually 
unavailable.99 Often when there are children involved, the batterer threatens 
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to take the children if the woman leaves.100 Battered women may choose to 
stay with their batterers, managing the abuse to ensure that their children 
remain safe and in their custody. I represented twelve women convicted of 
murder as a part of the Missouri Battered Women’s Clemency Coalition.101 
Several of the women had attempted to leave their batterer, but returned out 
of fear—and in some cases, financial necessity—after their batterer stalked 
them.102 Many of the women did not kill their batterer until they learned that 
that their batterer was physically abusing their children, sexually abusing 
their children, or both.103 As one client told me, 
I tried to leave, but he hunted me down. I thought I had found a way to live 
with the beatings, but then he turned on the kids. I guess that was when I 
snapped. It is one thing when it is him or me . . . it is really another when it 
was him or the kids. 
Unable to see any way to escape the abuse, facing prison was a sacrifice 
these women were willing to make to protect their children.  
I heard story after story of women negotiating ways to protect their 
children. There was one woman who set up entirely self-sufficient rooms for 
her three children, with refrigerators and TV sets, to ensure that they did not 
have to come into the family area and risk the physical wrath of their father. 
When the woman’s husband physically threw her son out of the house into 
the snow without shoes or proper clothing for the cold, she felt that her 
attempts to protect the children were not sufficiently effective. She turned to 
murder. Another client was charged as an accomplice in the murder of her 
husband. Her son was charged as the killer. The prosecutor approached her 
and offered a deal: “If you agree to plead guilty to murder with a life sentence 
without parole for 50 years, I will not charge your son with capital murder 
and not seek the death penalty.” The client accepted. Thirty-two years later, 
she was freed from prison. 
Another mother filed for divorce alleging that her husband abused her 
and the children. The guardian ad litem, influenced by the husband, 
discounted the abuse and alleged that the mother was engaging in parental 
alienation. Fearing that she would lose custody, the mother withdrew her 
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petition for divorce and returned to the family home with the children where 
the abuse escalated. After her teenage daughter reported that her father was 
coming into the bathroom when she was showering and touching her, this 
client killed her batterer. She called the police and confessed to the murder, 
minimizing the violence she experienced and not mentioning his abuse of 
her daughter. She had internalized the message she had learned well during 
her attempt to gain custody in her failed divorce proceeding: mentioning 
abuse could result in being accused of lying.  
V.  MATERNAL SACRIFICE IN THE FACE OF INCARCERATION 
These cases help to shed light on this expectation of selflessness. The 
power and control inherent in the expectation serve as an unstated limit on 
women’s ability to thrive. There is no data on how many mothers sacrifice 
for their children and go to prison to protect them or how many go in their 
children’s place. Sentences may be enhanced because mothers fail to accept 
a plea deal and get punished for their failure to cooperate. Sentencing 
guidelines do not take into account family ties or even the duress that may 
arise due to the presence of children in abusive relationships when 
determining appropriate departures. The plea bargaining system is roughly 
based on a contract model: the prosecutor offers the defendant a deal that is 
calculated to be somewhat better than what might result from a sentence after 
trial.104 The prosecutor’s incentive is not only to quickly dispose of a case, 
but often—especially in cases where there are multiple defendants—to 
garner evidence against other, perhaps more serious participants in the 
alleged crime.105 This incentive is time-sensitive. In other words, the first to 
“flip” on his or her fellow defendants is most likely to receive the deal.106 
This incentive structure results in significant disadvantages to a woman 
defendant who may be involved in a crime due to her relationship with 
another potential defendant. She may not have access to “dealable” 
information because she is insulated from the higher-ups involved in the 
crime. She may be “in love” or a victim of domestic abuse, making the 
calculation of whether to deal a more difficult question and thus not 
something that can be done quickly. Meanwhile, the prosecutor moves to the 
next defendant and the offer lapses. For mothers, plea bargaining can be even 
more difficult. The selflessness often expected of and reinforced in mothers 
corrupts the plea-bargaining process and systematically disadvantages 
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mothers. A mother faces many additional barriers to quick action on a plea 
deal. She may not have a plan for caring for her children, so prison time 
seems impossible. Her children may be at physical risk should she turn on 
her partner, and therefore she is, in essence, held hostage. Finally, her 
children may face enhanced charges if she fails to take an offered plea 
bargain. In short, mothers face once again the societal need to be “selfless” 
in the face of criminal liability, sacrificing themselves to protect their 
children.   
Even if a woman goes to trial, she may find that any assertion that her 
decisions to assist in crimes were made to protect herself or her children has 
no place in assessing the appropriate sentence. Although the Federal 
Sentencing Guidelines consider “serious coercion” relevant at sentencing, 
courts may limit this departure to physical coercion and ignore the “endemic 
sociological and psychological realities of male dominance, female 
victimization, and emotional abuse.”107 Furthermore, post-Booker, courts are 
still uncomfortable exercising their newfound discretion to deviate from the 
guidelines unless given explicit permission with a recognized departure.108 
Specifically, courts are reluctant to use their discretion in considering the 
effects of coercion exerted upon battered offenders; “many courts appear no 
more able than jurors to shirk the ‘myths’ and ‘misconceptions’ surrounding 
domestic violence, even in connection with sentencing.”109 Finally, even if 
courts find these battered offenders who act to ensure their safety and the 
safety of their children less culpable or outside the scope of the congressional 
purposes of punishment and wish to exercise their discretion to account for 
these factors, their discretion is limited by legislative mandatory minimum 
sentences.110 
VI.  REJECTING MATERNAL SACRIFICE 
In all of the cases I handled, the expectation of maternal sacrifice lurked 
in the background, sometimes asserting itself as a justification for rules and 
policies by conflating self-interest with selfishness, sometimes motivating 
insane acts, and sometimes resulting in the imposition of sanctions without 
ever revealing itself. I identified with all of the women I represented. We 
shared the expectation that being a mother required sacrifice. The biggest 
challenge I faced representing the women was stepping out of that frame. I 
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encountered this challenge again while teaching my Motherhood and the 
Law class. There were many times when I wondered how the class would 
have proceeded had it included some men. Were we being fair? Were we too 
harsh in our analysis? Was it okay to look at this only with a woman’s 
perspective? Ironically, the real question I was asking myself was, “Are we 
being selfish?” Reinforcing selfless behavior as appropriate, inevitable, 
objective, and rational obfuscates the exercise of power and control. Often, 
when we see shared social norms operating on others, we can finally see the 
flawed misogynistic structure in which we operate. Only then do we gain the 
power to name the harm and to resist it.  
We must squarely analyze society’s embrace of the belief that mothers 
should put children ahead of their own needs and appreciate how that belief 
controls women and limits their lives. This persistent sexist belief reinforces 
women’s primary role as one of service, support, and care. Kate Manne 
identifies the manifestation of this belief as an essential component of 
misogyny:  
Women may not be simply human beings but positioned as human givers 
when it comes to the dominant men who look to them for various kinds of 
moral support, admiration, attention, and so on. She is not allowed to be in 
the same way as he is. She will tend to be in trouble when she does not give 
enough, or to the right people, in the right way, or in the right spirit. And, 
if she errs on this score, or asks for something of the same support or 
attention on her own behalf, there is a risk of misogynistic resentment, 
punishment, and indignation.111 
Perhaps mothering is the pinnacle of being a human giver.112 Mothering 
is reflected in the mutually constitutive nature of social institutions and 
discourse, and it makes change in this area difficult. Selfless identity is 
merely a construction. Uncovering the rhetoric that normalizes the 
repression and unmasking the power that reinforces it is a critical feminist 
project. That is why I teach Motherhood and the Law. We must deconstruct 
that question my students were so eager to engage: “How do I be a mother 
and succeed . . . ?” Someday I will teach a Parenthood and the Law course, 
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populated by students of any gender identity. The project will not be to 
negotiate the inherent limits associated with parenting, but to create a world 




ON POWER & INDIAN COUNTRY 
MAGGIE BLACKHAWK† 
When we are young, the words are scattered all around 
us. As they are assembled by experience, so also are 
we, sentence by sentence, until the story takes shape. 
― Louise Erdrich (Turtle Mountain Ojibwe)1 
I. DAYS OF 20072 
At the time I was admitted to Stanford Law School, I hadn’t met more 
than a handful of lawyers. The handful that I had met, I had known only for 
a few months, and they were the very women who had convinced me to apply 
to law school in the first place. As a Native woman, daughter of a mother 
who attended community college and who earned her degree after I left 
home, I had quite a bit of learning to do. 
One of the first things that I did was to tell George. George Redman, 
born and raised on the Wind River Reservation in Wyoming and citizen of 
the Northern Arapaho Nation, had worked with lawyers as a paralegal. 
George knew where I could find some advice. That day, we drove the slow 
road from Fort Washakie to Lander, where the attorneys had their office. The 
drive was only about fifteen miles, but it was “off reservation”—that is, 
outside of the borders of the Wind River Reservation. Driving off reservation 
always made distances seem a bit farther. The towns were worlds apart, 
separated by sovereignty, culture, language, and history. 
We parked the pickup, dusty with reservation soil, in front of the law 
firm office building. The nondescript, tan one-story was hidden behind trees 
and housed the firm that had served then as the attorneys for the government 
of the Northern Arapaho Nation. But Wyoming is such flat country that 
every building looms large. George and I walked into the immaculate 
western law office, carrying reservation dust along with us. 
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He asked to speak with Berthenia Crocker, a named partner. “No, we 
didn’t have an appointment and, no, she likely wasn’t expecting us.” But 
Berthenia had worked in Indian Country long enough to understand Native 
manners. George had worked for the law firm years before, they had an 
established relationship, and he drove fifteen miles to ask for her advice. He 
brought with him his family member, me, who had just been admitted to 
Stanford Law School. If manners weren’t enough, we were certainly odd 
enough to pique the interest. Berthenia took the meeting. 
Nervousness has a way of locking in the details of memories. I 
remember the shine of Berthenia’s desk when George and I first sat down. I 
had never been in a lawyer’s office before, and I wasn’t sure I had ever seen 
a space so clean and neatly organized. George spoke first and introduced us 
both. Berthenia thanked him for coming by and, with a curious look, turned 
to me. “Congratulations,” she said. “That is a great achievement. Do you 
know what kind of law you are interested in?” 
I looked up from the shine of her desk for the first time to see bobbed 
blonde hair and a smile spread across a friendly face. “Federal Indian law,” 
I said. I placed an awkward emphasis on “federal” because I had only 
recently learned that Indian law made by the United States was called 
federal, as opposed to tribal law or the law made by tribal governments. 
“Oh,” Berthenia replied as only a specialist could, “that’s a big field. Are 
you interested in any particular areas? Environmental law? Tax?” 
Without hesitation, I replied: “jurisdiction.” 
Jurisdiction is a technical term, belonging to the specialized parlance of 
lawyers. In essence, jurisdiction means power—the ability to make and 
apply the laws that govern daily life. First-year law students often hear the 
word for the first time in their courses on civil procedure. But it isn’t until 
their second or third year in law school that the meaning of jurisdiction 
finally takes shape. However, even then the word remains technical—
stripped bare of any moral content. 
Outside of Indian Country, justice rarely involves jurisdiction. Justice 
is more often concerned with the language of rights. To the extent that justice 
concerns itself with jurisdiction at all, it is to seek ways to expand the 
jurisdiction of the federal courts to better protect rights. The simple story is 
that rights are the protectors of justice, and federal courts are the protectors 
of rights. 
In Indian Country, this simple story doesn’t hold. Federal power was at 
the heart of American colonialism, and federal rights have long been used to 
further the colonial project. Instead, jurisdiction is synonymous with justice. 
Jurisdiction is at the heart of sovereignty, and sovereignty is to Indian 
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Country what air is to fire. Rather than the language of rights, it is the 
language of sovereignty that empowers Native people. The language of 
sovereignty offers us the power to build and shape a world of our own 
choosing, to constitute a government of our own design, and to make laws 
and define rights that fit Native values. To speak the language of sovereignty, 
power, and jurisdiction is to aspire for more than the ability to beg for 
protection by another’s government. Sovereignty offers the ability to govern. 
“Jurisdiction?” Berthenia replied, still smiling. “Well, that’s the perfect 
thing to study at law school.” 
Before meeting Berthenia, Chai Feldblum and her team were the first 
lawyers I had ever met in my life. At the time, I worked as a social science 
researcher at the University of California, Los Angeles. I held a joint position 
as manager of research on the Ethnography of Autism Project and as a senior 
policy producer at the Center on the Everyday Lives of Families (CELF). 
My position at CELF was created so I could work with Chai and her team to 
translate our research on working families into more family-friendly 
workplace policy. 
The most remarkable thing about Chai and her team wasn’t that they 
were all women; it was that they weren’t stereotypical lawyers. They were 
“lobbyists” or, in Chai’s terminology, “legislative lawyers.”3 Rather than 
bringing claims in courts, legislative lawyers took their arguments to 
Congress, and although their arguments were at times framed in the language 
of rights, they weren’t always so limited. Chai had risen to legislative-
lawyering fame when she helped draft and pass the Americans with 
Disabilities Act as a lobbyist for the ACLU. As most first-year law students 
learn, the Supreme Court had rejected special rights protection for 
individuals with disabilities.4 By turning to the legislature and looking 
beyond the language of rights as defined narrowly by the Court, Chai was 
able to better protect a community that, because of its small numbers, might 
never wield majority political power. Chai’s work showed again and again 
that the simple story of rights and courts was too simple, and not just in 
Indian Country. 
At CELF, it was my job to support Chai and her team as they advocated 
for better law. Over the course of a year, they taught me everything they 
knew about the lawmaking process. They also eventually convinced me to 
apply to law school. 
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After meeting Chai and Berthenia, I imagined that Stanford Law School 
would offer courses on lawmaking, jurisdiction, power, and justice. I 
imagined that I would study Congress and parliamentary procedure and join 
student groups focused on legislative lawyering. I imagined that I would 
learn about justice through a lens of power and an exploration of governance. 
Through Chai and Berthenia, I had seen firsthand the power of wielding 
jurisdiction and of taking one’s case to the lawmaking process for redress. 
But the simple story still dominated at Stanford Law School. Lessons of 
justice were taught entirely in the language of rights. Any concern with 
jurisdiction or procedure often focused on the federal courts as protectors of 
justice through rights. 
Another glaring absence at the law school was any mention of “Indian 
Country.” Scholars of Native Studies write in great depth about the process 
of erasure of Native Nations and Native people as being central to American 
colonialism. Paintings of empty Western landscapes and stories of the 
disappearing Indian formed the heart of Manifest Destiny. But it is still hard 
to articulate the experience of erasure as a Native person. It was even more 
challenging to experience erasure as a Native person within an institution 
that aimed to educate future leaders about the law. 
The United States is the only government in the world to recognize 
inherent tribal sovereignty and support Native Nations’ ability to self-
govern. Federal Indian law supports American exceptionalism in this regard. 
Unlike Canada, New Zealand, and other countries, the United States 
provides more legibility and visibility to Native Nations and Native peoples 
within its domestic law than any other body of law in the world.5 Title 25 of 
the United States Code is titled “Indians” and it, among other laws, governs 
the relationship between the United States and the over 570 federally 
recognized Native Nations within its territorial borders.6 Other statutes 
govern the United States’s relationship with Native Nations in Alaska and 
Hawaii.7 
Even beyond the specialized laws that regulate the United States’s 
relationship with Indian Country directly, interactions between the United 
States, Native Nations, and Native peoples have shaped law across a broad 
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range of subject-matter areas.8 The majority of treaties negotiated and 
ratified by the United States in its first hundred years were with Native 
Nations.9 Areas of law like the war powers, foreign relations, the territories, 
and even immigration developed in the context of Indian affairs and owe 
many of their characteristics—for better or for worse—to that history.10 
So to experience the near invisibility of Native Nations and Native 
peoples at Stanford Law School when American law is virtually teeming 
with the legibility of Native people came as an unwelcome surprise. The first 
mention of Natives came in my first-year History of American Law course 
when an offhand comment during a lecture stated that Native Nations and 
Native peoples no longer existed in any real form in the United States. I was 
sitting in the front row of the class, as anxious and prepared as ever. The 
story of the disappearing Indian was so deeply taken for granted that no one 
questioned the comment, even as I sat next to my classmates. I was erased 
by the first mention I heard of Native people while in law school and in a 
class on the history of American law. 
One way that Native people combat the active erasure of Indian Country 
is to self-identify. In doing so, we put our bodies and our reputations between 
the force of erasure and the furtherance of the American colonial project. To 
face a Native person is not only to face the reemergence of an erased 
history—it is to struggle with the difficult moral reality of being both a 
constitutional democracy and a colonial power that has ruled through 
conquest. To face a Native person is also to struggle with one’s ongoing 
participation in the erasure of American colonialism—it is to struggle with 
the “Indian” Halloween costumes, headdresses and playacting during 
Thanksgiving, “land grab” games in elementary school, racialized mascots, 
and the list goes on. For academics, facing the reality of Native history, 
Indian Country, and the ongoing existence of Native people is to face the 
possibility that previous projects have been incomplete or even incorrect 
because of that erasure. 
Simply put, recognizing Native people is difficult for non-Natives. 
Because it is difficult, the typical response to self-identification is often 
rejection. Rejection most often takes the form of disbelief or a series of 
requests for evidence of “authentic” Native status. Questions like, “How 
much Native American are you?” or “How did you find out that you were 
Native American?” often follow. Even worse than the requests for evidence 
 
 8. Maggie Blackhawk, Federal Indian Law as Paradigm Within Public Law, 132 HARV. L. REV. 
1787, 1806–45 (2019). 
 9. Id. at 1809–15. 
 10. Id. at 1806–45. 
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are the conclusions without evidence, “funny, you don’t look that Native 
American.” Unlike other forms of racialization, the modern racialization of 
Native people doesn’t often provoke violence or disgust—it doesn’t inspire 
feelings of inferiority or judgment. Instead, it forces Native people to work 
endlessly to prove their very existence to non-Native evaluators—evaluators 
with little or no understanding of Indian Country and with quite a bit invested 
in its erasure. 
These types of interactions can prove to be an incredible distraction and 
can often deflect real reform. Rather than discussing and debating the law of 
American colonialism and its impact on the laws of the United States, I was 
often stuck addressing fundamentals—like the very existence of Native 
Nations and Native people today. As the late, great Toni Morrison teaches, 
this distraction is often by design: 
[T]he function, the very serious function of racism . . . is distraction. It 
keeps you from doing your work. It keeps you explaining over and over 
again, your reason for being. Somebody says you have no language and so 
you spend 20 years proving that you do. Somebody says your head isn’t 
shaped properly so you have scientists working on the fact that it is. 
Somebody says that you have no art so you dredge that up. Somebody says 
that you have no kingdoms and so you dredge that up. None of that is 
necessary. There will always be one more thing.11 
There came a point in my law school tenure when the exhaustion drove 
me toward different solutions. I had come to Stanford Law School to defend 
Indian Country, tribal sovereignty, and the jurisdiction or power of Native 
governments. My law school education had been thorough and rigorous. I 
had trained in constitutional litigation with the very best, Pam Karlan, and 
had studied the legislative process with Jane Schacter, who combined 
theoretical inquiry with hands-on exercises in legislative drafting and 
interpretation. Both women understood fundamentally the power of the law 
as a tool for justice and had cut their teeth fighting alongside movements for 
voting rights, LGBTQIA+ rights, and gender equality. I could not have asked 
for better teachers. 
But the language of equality and rights dominated my training, and the 
erasure of Indian Country left it to me to explore how I might translate the 
language of equality and rights into the language of power, sovereignty, and 
jurisdiction. I had come to law school with the general understanding that 
rights posed a threat to tribal sovereignty. “Rights” were often invoked as a 
 
 11. Toni Morrison, Black Studies Center Public Dialogue Pt. 2: A Humanist View 7 (May 30, 1975) 
(emphasis omitted) (transcript available at https://perma.cc/47KA-DRYN). 
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means to undermine the sovereignty of Native Nations—especially the rights 
of non-Natives. The federal rights of non-Natives trumped inherent tribal 
sovereignty. Contrary to the simple story, federal rights undermined justice 
in Indian Country. 
I soon learned that “equality” posed as much of a threat to tribal 
sovereignty as did rights. Equality had structured the doctrine of race 
jurisprudence, and by “reasoning from race,” the women’s rights movement 
had shaped an equality doctrine of its own.12 I had been drawn to law school 
and trained in the law by women deeply entrenched in the struggle for gender 
equality. These women had inspired me by seizing and wielding power—
often together with other women. But the tools of liberation that they 
offered—those born of the civil rights movement—were in direct conflict 
with the lessons of Indian Country. 
Most law students are familiar with the backlash against the civil rights 
movement that took aim at race-based remedial legislation. Allan Bakke still 
takes center stage in introductory courses on constitutional law, which study 
in depth the 1978 case where Bakke fractured the Supreme Court with his 
challenge to the University of California, Davis’s admission policies.13 
Fewer are familiar with the far less fractured opinion that the Court issued 
just three months earlier, foreshadowing Bakke. 
In March of 1978, the Court decided Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian 
Tribe.14 The issues in the 6-2 opinion must have seemed far more mundane 
at the time—not even controversial enough to inspire separate opinions. 
Perhaps the only notable sign of controversy would have been the unlikely 
pairing of Justice Thurgood Marshall and Chief Justice Warren Burger in 
dissent.15 But the dissent hadn’t generated enough passion even in Justice 
Marshall to exceed three sentences—one of them cribbed from the lower 
court.16 The balance of the Court joined an opinion written by Justice 
Rehnquist that was so loosely reasoned that it should have generated outrage 
on that basis alone. 
Mark David Oliphant and Daniel B. Belgarde arrived at the Supreme 
Court to challenge their convictions under the 1973 Suquamish Nation Law 
and Order Code as violating their Fifth Amendment right to due process. 
 
 12. SERENA MAYERI, REASONING FROM RACE: FEMINISM, LAW, AND THE CIVIL RIGHTS 
REVOLUTION 1–8 (2011); see also Reva B. Siegel, She the People: The Nineteenth Amendment, Sex 
Equality, Federalism, and the Family, 115 HARV. L. REV. 947, 953–56 (2002). 
 13. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978). 
 14. 435 U.S. 191 (1978). 
 15. Id. at 212 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
 16. Id. (quoting Oliphant v. Schlie, 544 F.2d 1007, 1009 (9th Cir. 1976)). 
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Oliphant and Belgarde had been indicted and convicted for the exotic crimes 
of assaulting a Suquamish police officer, resisting arrest, and for engaging 
in a high-speed car chase that ended with Belgarde’s vehicle colliding with 
a police car. But the most dispositive fact of the case was that Oliphant and 
Belgarde were white. 
The Suquamish Nation, like many Native Nations, has a constitutional 
government with tribal courts and a criminal code. Living within the 
reservation, Oliphant and Belgarde had chosen to reside within the Nation’s 
borders. They had each recognized the Nation’s government long enough to 
take accurate aim at Suquamish police officers and patrol cars. But the 
Supreme Court ruled in favor of Oliphant and Belgarde and held that the 
Suquamish Nation had no criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians—even non-
Indians who had committed crimes within Indian Country. 
For Oliphant and Belgarde, the language of rights opened the doors of 
the Supreme Court. The men structured their merits brief around the tensions 
between historical injustice and a modern liberalism born of the 1970s and 
steeped in Rawls, rights, and equality:17 
It is asserted that a sense of mea culpa permeates public policy and some 
judicial decisions by . . . remembering only the past subjugation of Indian 
tribes . . . , without consideration of the benefits, rights, privileges and 
immunities received by all people within the United States under the 
Constitution . . . . It is now argued that as to some non-Indians those rights, 
privileges and immunities while on an Indian reservation within the United 
States are being sacrificed by the application to them of the concept of 
independent Indian tribal sovereignty . . . .18 
In both Bakke and Oliphant, the Court resolved the tensions between 
present day claims to equality and historical injustice by leaning into 
equality. But in Oliphant, the Court was able to foster an uncontroversial 
 
 17. John Rawls first published his Theory of Justice in 1971, and it quickly took hold within the 
legal academy and beyond. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 102 (1971) (“The natural distribution is 
neither just nor unjust; nor is it unjust that persons are born into society at some particular position. These 
are simply natural facts.”); see also KATRINA FORRESTER, IN THE SHADOW OF JUSTICE: POSTWAR 
LIBERALISM AND THE REMAKING OF POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY (2019); Katrina Forrester, The Future of 
Political Philosophy, BOS. REV. (Sept. 17, 2019), https://perma.cc/TAT4-UD9K (describing the 
influence of Rawls as: “[L]iberal egalitarians tended to insist that what mattered were institutional 
solutions to current inequalities; past injustices weren’t relevant, and arguments that relied on historical 
claims were rejected. That meant that demands for reparations for slavery and other historical injustices 
made by Black Power and anti-colonial campaigns in the late 1960s and 1970s were rejected too. It also 
meant that political philosophers in the Rawlsian strain often read later objections to the universalist 
presumptions of American liberalism as identitarian challenges to equality, rather than as critiques 
informed by the history of imperialism and decolonization.”). 
 18. Brief for Petitioners at 26–27, Oliphant, 435 U.S. 191 (No. 76-5729), 1977 WL 189288.  
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consensus opinion by invoking and manipulating the doctrines of American 
colonialism. It created what I call the “dormant plenary power doctrine” by 
applying the worst of a Taney Court opinion.19 Yet, the modern Supreme 
Court put even Taney to shame by rejecting his deference to the political 
branches.20 The Court in Oliphant even drew on a late nineteenth-century 
Supreme Court opinion, crafted in the early spirit of American eugenics and 
scientific racism, that presumed that people of one race could never govern 
people of another race fairly.21 Yet, the language of colonialism garnered far 
less outrage and controversy than the language of rights in Bakke. Erasure is 
quite effective. 
Equality boiled down to “equality of opportunity” or being welcomed 
into the halls of power and public resources on the same terms as all others. 
To the extent that equality offered more than simple formality, it aspired to 
“integration.” Indian Country had seen a form of integration before. The 
Dawes Act, passed in 1887, began the era of allotment, or efforts to break up 
and sell off the last of Native land to non-Natives.22 One justification for 
selling off Native land for pennies on the dollar was that the “savages” might 
be better “civilized” by integrating non-Native settlers with Native people.23 
But allotment failed to civilize. Its only real achievement was the dismantling 
of institutions in which Native people wielded power—majority-minority 
institutions like Native governments. Allotment was ultimately deemed an 
abject failure and was formally repudiated by the United States forty years 
later.24 
But the blunt tool of integration lived on—still unable to distinguish 
between segregated institutions and majority-minority institutions where 
minorities wield power. It lives on today through the promise of “diversity.” 
Diversity aspires to unmake segregation by reshaping public institutions into 
 
 19. Blackhawk, supra note 8, at 1835–38. 
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remaining after distribution of allotments to the Indians were to be sold to white settlers. . . . [I]t was 
hoped that the resultant close intermingling of the two cultures would result in the Indians’ more rapid 
acceptance of the white man’s ways.”). 
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a mirror image of the public. But the deep irony is that, in a system driven 
by majority power, statistical mirroring of numerical minorities results in the 
entrenchment of minority status. Twenty percent will never wield power in 
a system that worships fifty-one percent. For Native people—who often 
constitute the statistical asterisk in every study—diversity threatens every 
institution where Native people govern. 
Equality also threatened the very foundations of federal Indian law. 
Title 25 of the United States Code—captioned “Indians”—provides laws, 
power, and resources for Native Nations and Native peoples only. Others are 
not welcomed into the halls of “Indian” power and resources on equal 
footing. In fact, the same backlash against civil rights seen in Bakke came 
first to federal Indian law through a 1974 challenge to a government hiring 
preference for Native people.25 The Supreme Court avoided an equality 
challenge by holding that being “Indian” was a political category and not a 
racial category.26 To hold otherwise, the Court recognized, would mean that 
“an entire Title of the United States Code (25 U.S.C.) would be effectively 
erased and the solemn commitment of the Government toward the Indians 
would be jeopardized.”27 Equality had the potential to effectively erase all of 
federal Indian law and its recognition of inherent tribal sovereignty. 
In my final year at Stanford Law School, I saw the first glimmer of a 
different path forward. Janet Cooper Alexander introduced me to “power,” 
and I learned the dynamics of how power worked over time and between 
sovereigns in her class on the federal courts. She was also patient enough to 
nod supportively after class while I pestered her with analogies between 
federal Indian law and all facets of public law—she took particular interest 
in the parallels between the Indian wars and the war on terror, her subject of 
specialty at the time. Rather than equality, federal Indian law had long been 
crafted in the language of power, and it was through our discussions of power 
that I finally found my way toward a solution. 
Between her supportive nods, Janet convinced me that I could bring the 
lessons of Indian Country to the academy by publishing academic articles. 
Erasure had left federal Indian law in a constant state of precarity. Fighting 
that erasure in the academy might ultimately change the law. Janet mentored 
me through my first article and helped me find my way into the legal academy. 
 
 25. Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535 (1974). 
 26. Id. at 553 n.24. 
 27. Id. at 552 (“If these laws, derived from historical relationships and explicitly designed to help 
only Indians, were deemed invidious racial discrimination, an entire Title of the United States Code (25 
U.S.C.) would be effectively erased and the solemn commitment of the Government toward the Indians 
would be jeopardized.”). 
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II. DAYS OF 2017 
It wasn’t until I looked for an academic job that I learned how difficult 
it would be to bring Indian Country into the legal academy. My first lesson 
was to learn how controversial it was to believe that law matters. Hiring 
committees quickly branded me a “formalist.” They framed my project, in 
the most generous light, as interested in the law as written and the stability 
of law over time. In the least flattering light, some questioned whether I was 
aware of my own normative presuppositions, and some even considered my 
project anti-intellectual. 
Legal realism and the critical legal studies movement reign supreme in 
the legal academy, and they remain convinced that the law is politics all the 
way down. Some even believe that the law itself is the source of 
subordination. Based on the simple story, they are right. The law had 
sanctioned slavery and Jim Crow segregation. Breaking the law, through 
protest or through the violence of war, brought about justice. But the simple 
story never holds in Indian Country. It was the breaking of law that furthered 
American colonialism, and it was through enforcing adherence to the law as 
written—in treaties and statutes—that Native Nations found justice. 
However imperfect, the recognition of inherent tribal sovereignty and the 
framework of United States law that fostered self-governance within Indian 
Country were born from the rigorous belief that law matters. 
The critical legal studies movement has been taken to task over rights 
and its claim that rights are slippery terms, devoid of meaning.28 Black 
scholars, closer to the movement, declared in passionate terms the meaning 
of rights to their communities.29 But the critical legal studies movement 
hasn’t yet been taken to task over the meaning of power to Native 
communities and the central role of law in mitigating American colonialism. 
Natives have long leveraged formal legal channels to protect the recognition 
of inherent tribal sovereignty. Non-Natives, hungry for Native land, were the 
source of subordination, not the legal system. 
But my belief in the law was as puzzling to hiring committees as my 
discomfort with equality and rights. Interest in my work was often coupled 
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with confusion with where I might fit in the pantheon of the legal academy 
or whether I might ever achieve recognition at all. My project highlighted 
the voices of minorities and took particular interest in excavating levers of 
power for the marginalized and vulnerable. But I often confessed doubt at 
the ability of rights and courts to foster that power. I focused instead on 
legislatures, the law, and distributed sovereignty through local control. 
Indian Country taught me that John Hart Ely had gotten it wrong with respect 
to courts and Native peoples.30 I witnessed firsthand that it was Congress and 
not the courts that had protected Indian Country—most recently in 2013, 
with the tiniest step toward a legislative fix for Oliphant in the Violence 
Against Women Reauthorization Act.31 Judicial activism often meant 
furthering the colonial project—at times imposing seemingly liberal values 
while ignoring the law.32 Rather than rights, it was power or local control 
that mitigated colonialism. 
Luckily, despite the confusion I carried into every interview like 
reservation dust, I still found my first academic home at the University of 
Pennsylvania Law School. 
III. DAYS OF 2027? 
It is far too soon to say whether or not I have been able to bring the 
lessons of Indian Country into the legal academy. At the time I sit and write 
this Essay, I have only just begun my third year of teaching at Penn Law. In 
the past two years, I have developed classes, mentored students, and started 
new research projects. However, more than changing the academy, the 
academy has changed me. 
I came to the academy quite convinced that constitutional law offered 
little to my project. Federal Indian law has long rejected the frame of 
 
 30. See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 135–79 
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Nation’s absence for tax and governance purposes). 
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constitutional law,33 just like it has long rejected the tool of rights. Over time, 
I came to see the heart of this rejection more clearly: After Marbury, the 
Supreme Court is the final arbiter of constitutional meaning. The Supreme 
Court has grown increasingly hostile in recent decades to the recognition of 
inherent tribal sovereignty. Calling something “constitutional law” places 
the Court as the forum of last resort. Calling something “not constitutional 
law” moves the locus of control into the political branches—the Congress or 
the executive. Federal Indian law implicates the Constitution by its very 
nature in that it implicates the power and reach of the national government. 
In the past two years, two events brought me to see this rejection as more 
strategic than accurate. 
The first occurred a few weeks after I started at Penn Law: 
Constitutional law brought me home. In the fall of 2017, the national 
government for the Fond du Lac Band of Lake Superior Ojibwe, the 
Minnesota Chippewa Tribe, called for a formal convention to rethink our 
antiquated constitution. The history is a bit vague as to whether this was the 
first formal call for a constitutional convention, but it certainly was the first 
formal call in living memory. The structure of the Minnesota Chippewa 
Tribe is a bit of a rare gem in Indian Country. Unlike other more centralized 
Native Nations recognized by the United States, the Minnesota Chippewa 
Tribe has a federal system. One constitution governs the national 
government, but that national government oversees six distinct bands that 
govern separately six geographically disparate reservations. The six bands 
of the Minnesota Chippewa Tribe have governed so independently for the 
last eighty years that few still recognize them as a federal system. 
But although the structure of the Minnesota Chippewa Tribe is a gem, 
its constitution is not. It was initially drafted and ratified in 1936—just two 
years after the passage of the Indian Reorganization Act (IRA). The IRA 
created a formal infrastructure for the recognition of Native Nations and 
established parameters by which Native Nations could engineer 
constitutional governments that the United States would recognize. 
Hundreds of Native Nations adopted written constitutions in the years 
following 1934, making it one of the most generative constitutional moments 
in American history. But many of these constitutions were modified versions 
of a “model” constitution circulated by the Bureau of Indian Affairs.34 These 
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model or “IRA constitutions” lacked separation of powers and instead 
constituted a “council” that would undertake all government functions—
executive, legislative, and judicial—without checks and balances. The 
Minnesota Chippewa Tribe had a quintessential IRA constitution. 
The federal government had also coerced the Nation in the 1960s to 
amend its constitution and to limit its membership to individuals of a certain 
“blood quantum.”35 Blood quantum identified Native individuals at a point 
in history and classified them as a hundred percent Native. Descendants of 
that individual, if they were not parented by two one hundred percent 
individuals, would each be a fraction of that earlier individual—fifty percent 
for a first-generation descendant, twenty-five percent for a second-
generation descendant, and on and on until there were no more Native 
people. Blood quantum is a nineteenth-century racial construct that the 
national government adopted within federal Indian law and policy in order 
to limit its obligations to Native Nations. If there were no Native people, 
there were no obligations. The 1936 constitution established citizenship 
criteria that resembled the birthright citizenship of the United States: 
Children of Minnesota Chippewa Tribe members were members. But the 
federal government threatened in the 1960s to unilaterally withdraw its treaty 
obligations if the Nation did not amend its membership criteria to include a 
blood-quantum requirement. 
The Minnesota Chippewa Tribe called a constitutional convention in 
late summer of 2017 to open a conversation about how the constitution might 
be amended or rewritten. My mother and I attended our first constitutional 
convention meeting that fall, and I continued to attend the meetings as they 
were held on each band’s reservation. The convention meetings were deeply 
emotional and deeply inspiring. Many members and descendants expressed 
frustration with the tribal government structure—lack of separation of 
powers, lack of clarity of the powers of each band, and the “blood quantum” 
membership criteria topped the list of common criticisms. 
A few months later, I was appointed by the council of the Fond du Lac 
Band to serve as a senior constitutional advisor to the president. The position 
pressed me to answer a range of legal questions: I researched constitutional-
convention procedure and best practices developed by other Native Nations. 
I struggled with whether the Nation should or could remove the provision, 
standard to many IRA constitutions, that required the Secretary of the 
Interior to approve all amendments before they would take effect. I waded 
deep into the murky legal waters created by drafting a constitution under the 
 
 35. See generally JILL DOERFLER, THOSE WHO BELONG: IDENTITY, FAMILY, BLOOD, AND 
CITIZENSHIP AMONG THE WHITE EARTH ANISHINAABEG 1–8 (2015). 
 ON POWER & INDIAN COUNTRY 53 
 
shadow of colonialism. More than answers, my research began to raise for 
me questions about the United States Constitution and how the national 
government wielded such power over Indian Country. 
The second event occurred in my second semester at Penn Law: 
Constitutional law came home to me. I came to the academy staunchly 
committed to studying the field of legislation. Indian Country had taught me 
to be wary of the Constitution, and my training at Stanford Law had further 
solidified the sense that constitutional litigation offered few useable tools to 
empower marginalized people. But my colleagues at Penn Law read my 
scholarship on petitioning and the First Amendment’s Petition Clause36 and 
decided that I would teach introductory constitutional law as part of my 
teaching package. 
I began my preparation for the class by surveying the field for 
casebooks in constitutional law. The Sullivan and Feldman casebook offered 
finely edited cases and spartan commentary that fostered focused attention 
on the important details of the doctrine. The Brest and Levinson casebook 
offered deep context and history. But across the range of casebooks, the 
complete erasure of Native Nations, Native peoples, and American 
colonialism was striking.37 I had entered the academy, in part, to combat the 
erasure that I had encountered in law school and beyond. Now, in my first 
year on the faculty, I was going to become complicit in that erasure simply 
because I lacked the materials to do otherwise. 
In that moment, I began crafting the article that became Federal Indian 
Law as Paradigm Within Public Law, an article I published in May 2019 in 
the Harvard Law Review.38 In it, I make the case that constitutional law 
scholars and historians have been getting it wrong because they have failed 
to center Native Nations and American colonialism in their understanding of 
the Constitution. The article isn’t a casebook, and it doesn’t identify every 
connection between federal Indian law and American public law. But it 
offers a tool to begin to combat the erasure of Native Nations and Native 
peoples within the legal academy and within the practice of law. It also 
serves as a strong call for others to join me in this effort. 
Combatting the erasure of Native Nations, Native peoples, and 
American colonialism will likely ensure that never again will a Native law 
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student sit in the front row of a classroom and have their identity erased by 
the only exposure they may have in law school to Indian Country. But 
combatting this erasure could have broader implications also, and those 
broader implications cannot come too soon. 
In Indian Country, we are often reminded how much erasure shapes the 
law. A case currently pending before the Supreme Court highlights the 
stakes: Sharp v. Murphy (previously known as Royal v. Murphy and 
Carpenter v. Murphy).39 In Murphy, the Court is asked whether certain parts 
of Oklahoma are within the borders of the Muscogee Creek Nation 
reservation.40 The law governing Murphy is well settled. In a unanimous 
2016 opinion drafted by Justice Thomas, the Court held that Congress must 
clearly and explicitly intend to diminish reservation borders.41 In Murphy, 
there is no such clear and explicit textual evidence. In fact, there is so little 
evidence supporting petitioner’s arguments that the petitioner chose to open 
its brief not with extensive documentation of congressional intent, but with 
a photo of Tulsa—a city that would be within the reservation if the Court 
upholds the Tenth Circuit’s decision and resolves the case in favor of 
Murphy.42 
During oral argument last term, the conservative Justices abandoned 
their usual commitments: Justice Kavanaugh, for example, abandoned his 
“textualism” to ask why “historical practice” shouldn’t inform the text of 
congressional statutes.43 Mr. Murphy’s attorney tried to remind Justice 
Kavanaugh of the law—that the text must be clear and explicit. But Justice 
Kavanaugh continued unabated, stating that this case was “massively” 
different because of the “number of people affected.”44 Chief Justice Roberts 
deviated from calling “balls and strikes” thrown by Congress to ponder how 
a businessperson in Tulsa might feel if the Court held that Tulsa was inside 
a reservation.45 Rather than focusing on the law, the conservatives on the 
Court seemed poised to decide the case on the imagined feelings of non-
Natives living in Tulsa—residents that the Court assumed, without polling, 
would be shocked to learn that they lived within the borders of an Indian 
reservation. In this way, erasure often becomes law. 
 
 39. No. 17-1107 (U.S. filed Feb. 6, 2018). 
 40. See, e.g., Brief for Petitioner at 2, Murphy, No. 17-1107 (U.S. July 23, 2018). Murphy addresses 
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 41. Nebraska v. Parker, 136 S. Ct. 1072 (2016). 
 42. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 40, at 3. 
 43. Transcript of Oral Argument at 55–56, Murphy, No. 17-1107 (U.S. Nov. 27, 2018). 
 44. Id. at 56–57. 
 45. Id. at 50–53. 
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Legal realists would likely be unsurprised by the conservative Justices’ 
retreat from formalism. Yet, the case has also drawn surprisingly little 
recognition from progressives. The language of power and jurisdiction that 
frames Murphy remains illegible to social justice activists, who aim their 
advocacy at equality, rights, and race. Criminal justice advocates and the 
growing movement for prison abolition should see Native Nations as 
powerful partners in the movement for reform.46 It is important to remember 
that Murphy is a capital case. Not only could a Native man escape death row, 
but the case could also recognize the power of Native Nations to oversee the 
criminal justice system within Oklahoma more generally. Many Native 
Nations lead the country in progressive criminal justice reform, and scholars 
have opened a general call to center Native Nations in our study of American 
governance and innovation.47 To date, erasure of Native Nations and 
American colonialism has had costs for progressive movements—as 
movements craft their reform toolkits too narrowly, and often overlook 
entirely the importance of power, jurisdiction, and majority-minority 
institutions. 
It may be too late for this particular case. But there is still time to combat 
this erasure before the next Murphy makes it before the Court. There is still 
time to learn the language of power and jurisdiction, and to learn to see the 
injustice in stripping power from subordinated communities. Because 
erasure does so much harm to Indian Country, federal Indian law offers the 
rare opportunity where simply learning this language and recognizing the 
jurisdiction of Native Nations can bring about justice. 
CONCLUSION 
When I was asked by the Stanford Law Review to write this Essay on 
my experience as a woman in the legal field, I immediately thought of all of 
the remarkable women who have mentored and guided me through the 
complex world of the law—a world that hadn’t been built for me or for any 
of us. Each of these mentors helped me identify those words scattered all 
around me—equality, rights, and legal change—and helped me assemble 
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those words, experience by experience, into my own story. Their lessons 
were invaluable. But they were also incomplete. 
To tell my story as a woman in the law, I have to tell that story as a 
Native woman in the law. That story is more complex than the simple story 
of rights, equality, and courts. It is instead a story of power, sovereignty, and 
legislatures. It challenges many of our taken-for-granted assumptions about 
how our government and Constitution work: By contrast to slavery and Jim 
Crow segregation, intervention by the federal government into Indian 
Country only furthered the colonial project. Rights and equality continue to 
pose a threat to the foundations of federal Indian law. 
Indian Country challenges our simple stories about American law, the 
United States Constitution, and our nation’s history. Yet, the complex story 
of Indian Country may offer additional tools in the fight for liberation, and 
these tools might offer liberation not just for Native people, but for everyone. 
The complex story might also offer an alternative vision of justice for all 
women—one that aims for power in addition to rights and understands the 
value of building and preserving institutions where women govern. 
 
REFLECTIONS OF A LADY LAWYER 
LISA BLATT† 
Kudos to law schools for focusing on women in the legal profession. 
It’s not always easy being a woman in this profession or, what someone from 
my home state of Texas once called me, “a Lady Lawyer.” That was more 
than ten years ago, when I was a little-known alumnus of the Solicitor 
General’s Office embarking on my appellate career in private practice. The 
lawyer asked me to speak at the Fifth Circuit Judicial Conference. When I 
asked why, he candidly responded: “We wanted a Lady Lawyer.” The truth 
is, I was not the least bit offended. I am a Lady Lawyer. For better or worse, 
that is how the profession defines us. And I for one prefer to own it because 
my success as a lawyer has come in no small part from incorporating my 
identity as a woman, wife, and mother into my professional status. 
I arrived at law school at the University of Texas in 1986 as an insecure, 
anxious, and very unhappy twenty-one-year-old whose main dietary staple 
consisted of lettuce that I allowed to marinate in my hot locker until 
lunchtime. It’s a small miracle that I not only survived law school but 
managed to avoid being felled by food poisoning. I had no money, and I had 
failed miserably with men. Perhaps that is why I entered law school obsessed 
with two goals: first, I wanted to do well enough to land a job to keep me out 
of poverty; and second, I wanted to get married and have kids. Those desires 
never wavered and happily dovetailed when I started in 1990 at the 
Washington, D.C. law firm of Williams & Connolly where, within the first 
few months, I simultaneously made enough money to pay off my credit card 
debt and met my future husband. 
Although now I think of myself as a lawyer who is at the same time a 
woman, wife, and mother, I started my career thinking that I had to separate 
my lawyer self from my feminine side. That was a disaster. I tried to look 
and act like the successful men (and, back then, the few successful women) 
I saw in law firms. It was the early 1990s, so that involved dressing in ill-
fitting, drab suits while trying to be polite, polished, and diplomatic—in 
other words, I tried my best not to be myself. Once I had children, I tried to 
look and act like the perfect mother outside working hours: I volunteered at 
my kids’ school and was so desperate to fit stereotypes of motherhood that I 
attempted baking (the results were not remotely edible). But none of this 
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worked. I remained full of self-doubt, second-guessing my decisions, not 
knowing whose advice to take, and feeling like a failure on all fronts. It 
became clear that being an ideal lawyer, and an ideal wife, and an ideal 
mother was beyond my limited repertoire. I realized that I needed to embrace 
who I was—full stop—and stop trying to fake my way through a 
compartmentalized life. 
Fast forward to today. I am back home at Williams & Connolly, some 
thirty years after I started there, and at a time when I have the distinction of 
having argued more cases in the Supreme Court than any other woman. I 
wear a lot of bright colors, and friends’ children know that they are not 
supposed to imitate my colorful language. So how did I get here? For starters, 
doing well at this law school allowed me to clerk for the incomparable Ruth 
Bader Ginsburg, then a judge on the D.C. Circuit. Judge Ginsburg showed 
me what it meant to be a woman not just steeped in the law, but 
unapologetically chic and equally unapologetic about devoting time to 
family. She inspired me for decades to work harder so I could feel worthy of 
having clerked for her. I am positive that I fell short during that year; my two 
co-clerks were from Harvard and were more mature, better writers, and more 
sophisticated than me. For many years after, I had anxiety nightmares about 
appearing before Justice Ginsburg in the Supreme Court without knowing 
what the case was about or without practicing my answers. 
I later gained some level of sophistication, writing skills, and maturity 
while working for thirteen years as an Assistant to the Solicitor General in 
the Department of Justice. I there argued twenty-seven cases before the 
Supreme Court and served under seven incredible Solicitors General and 
acting Solicitors General—Walter Dellinger, Seth Waxman, Ted Olson, Paul 
Clement, Greg Garre, Neal Katyal, and Elena Kagan. The Office was honest 
about why they hired me: it was 1996, they were looking for women, and as 
I said, I happen to be a Lady Lawyer. When I left that office in 2009, I 
predicted that female advocates would soon achieve parity with men because 
half the Office had been female and these women presumably would enter 
private practice just like me. And for the last ten years, the Office, under both 
Democratic and Republican administrations, consistently has hired 
exceptionally talented women. 
I was wrong. Parity is still nowhere to be seen. There is an appalling 
dearth of female Supreme Court advocates. Women argue typically between 
15%–18% of the cases before the Supreme Court in any year;1 women 
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argued a paltry 11% of the cases in 2017.2 Most of these women are 
government lawyers, public interest lawyers, and public defenders. Last 
year, of all the lawyers in private practice who appeared before the Court, 
only 8% were women.3 Corporations overwhelmingly hire men. This should 
either alarm you, depress you, or both. 
I do not have an easy fix, but I can offer some observations. First, 
Supreme Court advocacy, especially oral advocacy, is not focused on 
problem-solving, consensus-building, or mentorship—attributes people 
associate with female stereotypes. An “argument” is just that: it involves 
combative communication and intense verbal jousting. You either win or 
lose. Or, as I like to frame every case I argue, someone is going to die, and I 
don’t want it to be me. For better or worse, I think women come across as 
less combative than men. My empirical research on this is rock-solid: 
throughout elementary school, I only saw boys get in fights on the 
playground. 
Second, Supreme Court advocacy requires supreme fearlessness and 
confidence. Again, for better or worse, female lawyers either are less 
confident, or project less confidence to clients, than male lawyers. In my 
experience, it is not so much that women sell themselves too short, but that 
many men sell themselves too long. This is so even when some men who 
argue have no business standing up in the Supreme Court. My research here 
again is unassailable: only women have told me they could never see 
themselves arguing in front of the Supreme Court. 
At the same time, I know there is rank discrimination in the profession, 
even if most of it is unintentional. I have had to ask myself on many 
occasions: were I man, would these associates be complaining about the way 
I like binders prepared or cases highlighted or denigrate my judgment on 
how to strategically frame a case? I have had associates I have never met 
from other law firms send me cookie-cutter, form e-mails asking me to write 
briefs for free. I always respond the same: “I typically like to get paid for 
work, and can you please let me know all of the men you sent this email to?” 
Maybe these associates were just doing what a partner told them to do. But 
I have never received a response back after sending these e-mails. I’ve seen 
many instances where men think only of other men when it comes to oral 
argument assignments or which associate should give a firm-wide or client 
presentation. I cannot know whether any of these instances resulted from 
intentional discrimination, implicit biases, or whether I am just paranoid, or 
whether all three are in play. No one will admit even to having implicit 
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biases. Would you? 
Here is how I try to help. I try to be a role model for women. I lead my 
practice group at my law firm, Williams & Connolly, with not one, but two 
other women. I encourage women to project strength and confidence, and I 
give young women the following advice: Stop looking for your passion. Sex 
and horseback riding are passions; work should not be. I do not want a 
passionate surgeon or a passionate airplane pilot. I want someone who is 
excellent and can produce good results. The same is true of a lawyer. I want 
someone who can answer my questions, win my case, or get me out of a jam. 
I also tell women to be themselves. Just do what you are good at; 
chances are, you will generally enjoy doing something you are good at. 
Telling women to follow their passion also sets way too high of a bar for 
them, and it is a recipe for defeat and disappointment. Work is stressful and 
exhausting. I see women leave the workforce or quit their jobs because they 
weren’t successful, not because they lacked passion. You are better off going 
to work at a place that wants and needs you for a skill you have. You will 
have more control over your work and schedule. It is much easier to set 
boundaries when your colleagues need you more than you need them. It may 
have taken me a while, but I have no problem telling my colleagues to leave 
me alone because my kids are more important to me than reviewing their 
briefs, and not to schedule work meetings before 10:00, after 5:00, or on the 
weekends. 
So learn your strengths and know your weaknesses. I accepted early on 
that I would be a terrible trial lawyer, even though I dreamt of being the next 
Brendan Sullivan. I do not live only for my work. I love doing something I 
am good at that helps other people, and the pay is a real plus. And while I 
hate to lose, winning is not what gives my life meaning. It does not even fill 
me with joy. In fact, I usually am still mad that the client was sued in the first 
place or had to sue to obtain relief. I save my passion for my home and my 
hobbies, like coaching high school debate and shopping. 
I like to tell law students that picking a job is a lot like picking a spouse: 
it’s hard to know what you are getting into until it’s too late to get out. For 
instance, when I was looking for a husband, humor, brains, and love of 
children was all that mattered to me. I never thought to ask about parenting 
philosophy, religion, finances, and who would control the thermostat or TV 
remote. In terms of a profession, it also is virtually impossible to know 
exactly what you want out of a job, or whether you will get it even assuming 
you know what you want. When starting out, I cared about salary and 
whether working at a firm would keep doors open for me in case I hated my 
job. It never occurred to me to think about some basic questions, such as: 
would someone teach me how to actually practice law; how hard would I 
work; how would I be reviewed; what if I needed help; could I succeed at 
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work and have enough time to exercise, shop, go to the doctor, go on dates, 
and have children; and would I be happy? 
Looking back, I don’t know who I could have asked, how I could have 
asked them, or what I even wanted the answers to be. Instead, I chose to work 
at Williams & Connolly because some primordial instinct told me it was a 
place that would go to the ends of the earth and back for its clients. I lasted 
three years there. Although I loved the people, my reviews were only so-so. 
In retrospect, I had little clue what I was doing, and I was not cut-out for trial 
work. I discovered that appellate law allows me to use my strengths in 
empathy, storytelling, and persistence without the need to be good at multi-
tasking, organization, and face-to-face adversity with opposing counsel. 
I also don’t run away from my double X chromosomes. I do not dress 
like a man, I do not talk like a man, and I do not think like a man. I empathize 
with my clients. I put myself in their shoes and learn their business. I do not 
judge them. I do not think about what the law is or should be. I focus only 
on how to win. How do I do that? Again, I imagine someone is going to die, 
and I don’t want it to be me. And that is where my maternal instincts kick in 
on steroids. I assume my clients are being bullied (they inevitably are), and 
my job is to protect and defend them at all costs. 
Failure and humiliation are part of life. And work is no different. 
Disappointment and rejection are inevitable. I can count more jobs and more 
clients and more cases that I didn’t get than those I did. At some point, you 
can throw in the towel if you just aren’t good enough at something. But if 
you do have a skill, never let other people’s perception of you define you. 
Let me share some priceless advice that has loosely been attributed to 
Eleanor Roosevelt: you wouldn’t worry so much about what other people 
think of you if you knew how seldom they think of you. 
Here are some practical job tips. First impressions mean everything. If 
you do a great job off the bat, chances are your boss will look past your 
inevitable mistakes. It’s much harder to make up lost ground. Accept 
criticism when it’s deserved. Being too defensive encourages others to start 
battles and attack you. 
As to my approach to oral advocacy, truth is the best form of advocacy. 
A court is more likely to trust what you have to say if you acknowledge any 
shortcomings in the record or in your arguments. I have always been 
extremely direct and blunt. I also have learned to trust my judgment and 
instincts more as I age. Many colleagues have advised me not to go bold, but 
to play it safe in briefs or arguments. Thankfully, at key points in my career, 
I ignored them, and I do not regret it. To the extent I have regrets, I only wish 
I had stood my ground more often and told more people that they were idiots. 
Find mentors who will care about you and who you can turn to for 
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advice. Justice Ginsburg was key to the Solicitor General’s Office hiring me, 
and I also was fortunate to have had the backing of colleagues I had worked 
with at Williams & Connolly and the Department of Energy. But you need 
more than good references. Justice Ginsburg gave me great advice when I 
went to her about seven years into my career in the Solicitor General’s 
Office, at a time when I thought my career was a standstill. I told her I had 
been in the job years longer than most people hold that job, and I asked her 
whether it was time to do something else to advance my career. She asked 
what the Office was like, and I recounted to her in detail what my daily job 
entailed. She then said the last thing I wanted or expected to hear: “I think 
you should stay. You are good at what you are doing. And you seem very 
happy with your ability to control your schedule and spend time with your 
kids.” I remember leaving very disappointed with what I thought was a 
milquetoast response. I wanted her to recommend some sexy, new, and 
thrilling opportunity for me, but thank goodness she knew what she was 
doing. I stayed in that office for many more years, time that I needed to grow 
personally and professionally. Staying there was the best thing that could 
have happened to my career. 
I also like to say that behind every successful woman are the many men 
in her life who just got out of her way. I could not have done my job without 
a husband who supported my job and at times limited his own work so he 
could help with parenting when I was crashing in preparation for an oral 
argument. And I would have quit practicing law a long time ago were it not 
for one particular boss: Paul Clement. He was my boss for seven years at the 
Solicitor General’s Office, first as Principal Deputy Solicitor General and 
later as Solicitor General. When Paul was Solicitor General, and shortly after 
the birth of my second child in 2001, I asked Paul what previously had been 
anathema in that office—could I go part-time? Paul immediately said “yes” 
without consulting anyone else, and quickly followed it up by saying, “just 
let me know at some point what I just agreed to.” 
Several years later, still in the Solicitor General’s Office, I was ready to 
quit practicing law entirely to spend more time at home. I also was mentally 
exhausted. Paul suggested that, instead of quitting, I take a leave of absence. 
And he said something I will never forget: he told me I was good at my job. 
I took Paul up on his offer, took a half-year off, and returned to the Office 
six months later, still on a part-time basis. Paul’s flexibility and 
understanding of the challenges facing working mothers saved my career. 
For the last eighteen years, I have remained part-time. To this day, I often 
refer to Paul as the greatest feminist of his generation. Every woman should 
find a boss like Paul Clement. 
I end with a word to any Justices, Judges, clients, and lawyers in 
management who read this: please do more to hire, support, and encourage 
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talented women who want to work. Women don’t look or talk like Perry 
Mason, and you don’t want us to. We often are more creative, smarter, more 
persistent, and harder-working than men, and we actually win cases. So call 
me a Lady Lawyer. Just don’t underestimate me in Court. 
 
THE NERVE: WOMEN OF COLOR IN THE LEGAL 
ACADEMY 
KHIARA M. BRIDGES† 
The end of this academic year will mark two decades since I started law 
school, as well as the conclusion of my first decade as a law professor. In 
many ways, it is remarkable that I am in the legal academy. I am pretty sure 
that if you told the 1L version of me that she would one day stand in the front 
of a classroom of students and lecture them on an area of law in which she 
had acquired an expertise, she would have laughed at you—right before 
scurrying off to brief some cases. Nevertheless, I am a law professor, and I 
frequently lecture students on areas of law in which I have acquired an 
expertise.  The 2019–2020 academic year, which marks so many momentous 
“firsts” for women in the law, provides an opportunity for me—as the first 
(and only) lawyer in my family, as well as the first (and only) academic in 
my family—to reflect on my own path into the legal academy. It also 
provides an opportunity for me to imagine the future of women in the law 
that I hope will eventually come to pass. 
As is true for most law students, my first year of law school—especially 
the first semester—was incredibly challenging for me. I did not understand 
the language that was used in the cases that we had to read. Try as I might, I 
could not identify the issue of the case most of the time. I did not know what 
a “tort” was. I did not understand what civil procedure was all about. I 
definitely could not read the large volume of materials that were assigned 
every day as carefully and thoughtfully as everyone was telling me they 
needed to be read. Because there would be no tests or evaluations until the 
end of the semester, I had absolutely no idea how much, if anything, I was 
actually learning. And although I wanted some indication of whether I was 
gradually coming to “think like a lawyer,” I would become lightheaded at 
the mere thought of the final exam: my anxiety about being tested on what I 
had learned was almost strong enough to make me pass out. These are 
laments shared by many, if not most, 1Ls. 
However, other factors that were more unique to me made my first year 
of law school particularly trying. Before beginning my legal education, I was 
attracted to the idea of going to law school because I thought that it would 
allow me an opportunity to explore how the law interacts with—and 
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produces—race, class, and gender. I was particularly interested in the event 
of pregnancy, and I wanted to investigate why society has chosen to regulate 
it in the way that it has. I was well aware that the experience of pregnancy 
varied dramatically across socioeconomic status and race. I understood that 
society celebrated the pregnancies of class-privileged white women; 
meanwhile, the pregnancies of poor women of color were conceptualized as 
social problems that needed to be solved. I was drawn to law school because 
I wanted to explore how the law produced and sustained the different values 
that are attached to reproductive bodies. Moreover, how was this dramatic 
and obvious inequality possible in a country that purported to be committed 
to equality? Indeed, was this commitment to equality not explicitly 
articulated in the Constitution? How could we reconcile the law—indeed, 
our founding document—with what was actually happening on the ground 
in real people’s lives? 
I found the first year of my legal education to be challenging—and 
troubling—because although questions about race, class, and gender brought 
me to law school, we never talked about race, class, or gender in any of my 
classes. In fact, I do not recall race, class, or gender being mentioned in any 
of my first-year classes—with the exception, of course, of Constitutional 
Law. I know now that race, class, and gender are interwoven into the 
interstices of all of the doctrines that we learned during 1L—from the 
reasonable person standard to the adequacy of consideration. I know now 
that those doctrines are a product of race, class, and gender hierarchies. I 
know now that they function to perpetuate and legitimate those hierarchies. 
However, as a 1L, I did not have the analytical tools to excavate the unspoken 
elements of race, class, and gender in the cases that were assigned and the 
doctrines that were being explored. So, as a 1L, I took the failure to discuss 
race, class, and gender to mean that they were not significant. Indeed, what 
I ascertained from this deafening silence around race, class, and gender was 
that the phenomena that were intriguing to me—the phenomena that I 
thought organized society—were not really that important. They were 
ancillary to what really matters. Sure, one might explore race, class, and 
gender in the second and third years of law school. But they were not core 
concerns. How could they be important when one could only elect to analyze 
them? How could they be significant when law students were not required 
to gain some fluency in them in the course of their legal education? 
Simply put, my first year of law school was a profoundly alienating 
experience. Day after day, I felt as if my legal education was disabusing me 
of the foolish notion that the things that I had been convinced were critical 
to understanding why our society operates in the way that does were actually 
of any consequence. 
The turning point for me came during my second year of law school. I 
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had the good sense to register for a seminar on Critical Race Theory with 
Professor Kendall Thomas, and I had the good fortune to get in. I do not 
overstate things when I say that the course changed my life. It gifted me with 
a vocabulary that I could use to speak about the interrelationship of race, 
class, and gender—intersectionality! antiessentialism! multidimensionality! 
—and it gave me the analytical tools with which I could investigate the ways 
in which race, class, and gender structure society. But perhaps the most 
important thing that Critical Race Theory and Professor Thomas gave me 
was validation that race, class, and gender mattered. In that seminar, I 
learned that they were subjects that were worthy of intellectual investigation; 
they were subjects that serious legal minds could devote their entire lives to 
studying. By the end of the semester, I had decided that I wanted to become 
a law professor. 
Only recently have I really come to appreciate the audacity of my desire 
to enter the legal academy. I am a black woman. However, I had no law 
professors who were black women during my entire three years in law 
school. Neither did I have an Asian, Latinx, or indigenous woman as a law 
professor over the course of my legal education. The numbers that are 
available on the racial and gender demographics of the legal academy 
suggest that my experience is not at all rare.1 
During my first year of law school, all but one of my professors were 
white men. Notably, the only female professor that I had during my first year 
was a visitor; Columbia Law School had not yet hired her. The powerful 
lesson that a reasonable student might learn from the racial and gender 
demographics of the people who provided her with the foundation of her 
legal education was that women—and nonwhite women, especially—were 
incapable of doing that very thing. Women, especially nonwhite women, 
could not become experts. If the Columbia Law School faculty was 
comprised only of the giants in the various fields of law—which was how 
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School Staff and Faculty Members, Gender and Ethnicity: Fall 2013, AM. BAR ASS’N, 
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/legal_education/resources/statistics/statistics-archives (last visited 
Sept. 8, 2019) (on file with the Columbia Law Review). 
  The American Association of Law Schools (AALS) also released a report on the racial and 
gender composition of the legal academy in 2009. The numbers in that study are similar to those reported 
by the ABA. According to the AALS, in 2008–2009, Black women, Latinx women, indigenous women, 
and “Asian and Pacific Islander” women comprised 3.7%, 1.2%, 0.2%, and 1.0% of law faculty, 
respectively. See ASS’N AM. L. SCHS., AALS STATISTICAL REPORT ONƑ LAW FACULTY, RACE AND 
ETHNICITY (2009), http://www.aals.org/statistics/2009dlt/race.html. 
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the law school described its faculty, then as now—then women, particularly 
nonwhite women, were not giants. Instead, they were small. Indeed, they 
were so small that they were invisible. 
I thought the world of my professors. I do not think this was unique to 
me: I believe that many law students think incredibly highly of their law 
professors. Professors are fluent in a language that students dedicate three 
years of their lives to learning. They invariably are described as the leaders 
in their fields. They have the power to evaluate the student, identifying her 
as like or unlike themselves. And they stand in front of dozens upon dozens, 
sometimes hundreds, of students and command classrooms—expounding 
doctrine, interrogating the unlucky students who are on call, demystifying 
that which had been mystified. It is significant that I never saw a nonwhite 
woman do this. I describe my desire to enter the legal academy as audacious 
because I had to look to the mostly white men who I had seen assume this 
lofty role and say, “yeah, I can do that.”2 In retrospect, I can see that I had 
some nerve. 
We have so very much to celebrate when it comes to women in the law. 
Undeniably, women have made great strides over the past 150 years. The 
fact that the editors-in-chief of the top sixteen flagship law reviews are all 
women serves as unimpeachable evidence that significant progress has been 
made in the last century and a half. We certainly should celebrate all the 
advances that have been achieved. However, while we celebrate women’s 
advancement in the law, we should be attuned to the reality that there is still 
work to be done. Unsettling proportions of the students who graduate from 
law school every year will never have been taught by a nonwhite woman 
over the course of their legal education. That is, a disturbing number of 
lawyers have not had the opportunity to witness a black, Latinx, Asian, or 
indigenous woman command a room full of students. So many lawyers—
established and brand new—have never had the chance to bear witness to a 
 
 2. I would be unforgivably remiss if I failed to acknowledge that, in many important respects, I am 
in the legal academy today because of the support of two of my white male professors: the late E. Allan 
Farnsworth, and the former Dean of Columbia Law School, David Leebron. During my time in law 
school, they hired me as a teaching assistant for their classes, wrote letters of recommendation for me, 
encouraged me endlessly, and, in general, made the path to the legal academy more accessible to me than 
it otherwise would have been.  
  I mention this to make clear that the critique here is not that female law students of color need 
to have women of color as law professors in order for them to dream of entering the legal academy 
someday. Neither is the critique that white men and white women cannot serve as competent or adequate 
mentors to women of color who aspire to become law professors. My personal experience disproves both 
of these claims. The more modest critique that I am making here is that it took some chutzpah on my part 
to aim to assume a role that I, a black woman, had seen white men typically assume. My hope is that there 
will be more women of color among the next generation of law professors and that those women of color 
need not to have been brave beyond measure in order to seek a tenure or tenure-track job in the legal 
academy.   
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nonwhite woman’s unparalleled expertise. Too many lawyers have learned 
the lesson that reasonable people can learn from nonwhite women’s absence 
from the legal academy: nonwhite women are not in the academy because 
they are not good enough to be there. 
Progress will have been made when the discourses about the 
incompetence of nonwhite people—especially when they are not cisgender 
males—no longer circulate. I am certain that these discourses were 
responsible for producing my legal education as one marked by the complete 
absence of nonwhite female professors. How many students who will 
graduate from Columbia Law School this year—two decades later—will 
have similar experiences? What of the graduates at the fifteen other top law 
schools? 
Further, progress will have been made when female professors of color 
are as likely to be experts in race and gender as they are in fields that do not 
directly implicate race and gender. To be clear, I am a scholar of race and 
gender. I do the work that I do because I find it endlessly fascinating and 
exceedingly important. I also find it to be terribly (hopelessly?) complex. 
Race and gender (and the intersection of the two) are phenomena that are in 
constant flux—incessantly shifting across sites and historical moments. I 
enjoy studying race and gender because they are challenges—high-stakes 
puzzles that I am constantly trying to solve. However, my choice to study 
what I study, and the difficulty of studying what I study, does not erase the 
reality that the women of color who make it into the legal academy frequently 
have acquired an expertise in race or gender, or both. I am afraid that this 
suggests that the gatekeepers to the legal academy—appointments 
committees, the faculties that vote on candidates—believe that women of 
color can only be experts in matters of race or gender. I am afraid that these 
gatekeepers believe that race and/or gender are the only things that women 
of color can know with any degree of depth or sophistication.3 This, of 
course, is racist and sexist. It also unfairly limits the universe of possibilities 
for those women of color who desire careers in the legal academy. And it is 
insulting. It insults those women of color who have made the interrogation 
of race and sex their life’s work—implying, as it does, that we could not 
become experts in any other field. It suggests that we have a narrow set of 
 
 3. At the same time that race and gender are the only things that women of color are imagined to 
know with any degree of depth or sophistication, there are still discourses circulating that cast doubt on 
whether race and gender are actually topics worthy of rigorous intellectual engagement. In some 
significant corners of the legal academy, questions persist about whether theorizing race, gender, or the 
intersection of the two, is the stuff of serious academic scholarship. While thinking about corporations, 
tax, or federal courts is undeniably “serious,” thinking about race and gender (as well as sexuality, ability, 
gender identity, to name a few other denigrated subjects) is not as uncomplicatedly understood as subjects 
to which “serious” intellectual minds would devote their energies.  
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intellectual skills that have been made possible not by the work that we have 
put into developing our abilities, but rather by our social location. Our white 
male counterparts are imagined to acquire expertise in their areas of 
specialization because they are, quite simply, brilliant, and they have chosen 
to concentrate their brilliance on one of many possible topics. Meanwhile, 
women of color are imagined to acquire expertise in race and/or gender 
because, well, what else could we possibly know? 
So, progress will have been made when nonwhite female law professors 
are as likely to teach a seminar on Business Associations as they are on 
Reproductive Rights and Justice. Progress will have been made when women 
of color in the legal academy are as likely to publish an influential, oft-cited 
article on federal income tax as they are on the simultaneous over- and 
underpolicing of communities of color. Progress will have been made when 
female law professors of color are invited to speak on panels about federal 
courts as they are asked to present at conferences about civil rights and 
antidiscrimination law. 
Finally, progress will have been made when female law students of 
color who want to become law professors do not have to be audacious.  
Certainly, we will have made significant gains when audacity is not required 
to dream of becoming a woman of color in the legal academy. 
 
INCHING TOWARD EQUAL DIGNITY 
DENISE BROGAN-KATOR† 
In 2004, I was forty-nine years old and the first openly transgender 
student to attend the University of Michigan Law School.1 My path to the 
law was improbable and, frankly, undertaken not because I admired lawyers, 
but rather the opposite. But here I am, leading the work on federal and state 
policy for a national LGBTQ rights organization and collaborating with the 
true heroes in the movement. 
I got off to a slow start. I dropped out of high school when I was sixteen, 
and on my seventeenth birthday—during the Vietnam War—enlisted in the 
Navy. I served four years on a submarine in the South Pacific and Southeast 
Asia during the wind-down of that war. I was honorably discharged when I 
turned twenty-one, with a submarine insignia, or “dolphins,” tattoo but 
absolutely no idea what I would do next or how my life would unfold. 
Nevertheless, having been blessed with straight white male privilege and, 
thanks to my mom, no small measure of self-confidence, I was on my way. 
I worked various jobs, earned an accounting degree, and was certified 
as a CPA, later obtaining an MBA while working full time. My personal life 
was a picture of domestic bliss: I married my high school sweetheart, and we 
had three wonderful red-haired daughters in quick succession. It seemed like 
every year I was moving up to a better job, a better house in a better place 
(ultimately settling in Florida)—a better opportunity to live the American 
Dream. 
And then. Without warning, a feeling about myself that I could not 
control, could not ignore (although I tried), and could not suppress began to 
surface, although I had no name for it and no understanding of it. I could not 
escape the realization that the man everyone else perceived me to be was not 
really me. I was playing a male role, but it was just that: a role assigned to 
me at birth that I had been acting out but was getting harder and harder to 
perform. 
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 1. Three years later, I believe I was the first openly transgender member of the Michigan Bar. At 
the time, there were only a handful of openly trans lawyers in the country, and we all knew each other. 
Several are friends, and I am proud to know them. But to the extent we were trailblazers, that trail has 
become a highway. I just recently attended the annual Lavender Law conference (a national gathering of 
lawyers and law students who identify as LGBTQ or allies, sponsored by the LGBT Bar Association), 
and I found it remarkable how many trans-identified people were there. 
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To question my gender identity in the 1990s was, for me, like sailing 
off the map of the known world. I thought I was all alone. At first, I tried to 
navigate between the equally fraught paths of self-denial and of coming out 
to a hostile world. I attempted to maintain normalcy at work and at home, 
while exploring my feminine identity in a few relatively safe spaces.2 But 
after my wife discovered what I felt was my shameful secret, our marriage 
became tumultuous; we hung on for a few years but couldn’t make it work. 
In contrast, when my employer found out about my off-hours conduct, there 
was no equivocation; I was immediately and abruptly fired despite years of 
glowing performance reviews. 
Up to that time, I had not given much thought to the law; it was part of 
the business world in which I operated, but it had nothing to do with me 
personally. When I consulted a lawyer in 1995 about my humiliating 
termination, the law suddenly became very real and very personal. I expected 
advice on how to fight back. Instead, as I told my story, the lawyer’s 
expression changed from one of interest to one of disgust—not for what my 
employer had done, but at me. He brusquely informed me that the law 
afforded me no recourse; there were no legal protections—federal, state, or 
local—from discrimination for people like me.3 
There is nothing like being the victim of injustice to galvanize your 
resolve to advocate for change. I became involved in the push to add “T” to 
the agenda of the gay rights movement. I attended meetings, protested, 
marched, and lobbied. In the mid-1990s, I attended a lobby day in D.C. to 
 
 2. At that time, the term “transgender” was not in common use, and I did not know of it. If I had 
to give myself a label, I would have said I was a “cross-dresser,” in that I expressed my gender identity 
by presenting myself as a woman, wearing women’s clothing, a wig, and makeup. I did not identify as a 
“transsexual,” a term for someone who had made the complete transition to a female identity, and 
certainly not as a “transvestite,” who derives sexual gratification from wearing female clothing. Nor was 
I ever a drag queen, who dresses glamorously for performance purposes. I just wanted to feel like, and be 
perceived and treated as, a woman. It was only during those brief times that I was me, and fully happy. 
 3. Although my lawyer didn’t bother to actually explain it to me, the courts had uniformly held 
that Title VII’s prohibition on discrimination on account of “sex” did not apply to transgender people. 
See, e.g., Ulane v. E. Airlines, 742 F.2d 1081, 1084–87 (7th Cir. 1984). It was not until 2004 that a court 
declared that the Supreme Court’s decision in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989), 
“eviscerated” Ulane’s approach and that the term “sex” encompassed gender identity and expression 
because discrimination on that basis is impermissible sex stereotyping. Smith v. City of Salem, 378 F.3d 
566, 573–75 (6th Cir. 2004). Now, fifteen years later, the Supreme Court is deliberating whether to roll 
back those years of progress and exclude gender identity from the protections of Title VII. EEOC v. R.G. 
& G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, Inc., 884 F.3d 560 (6th Cir. 2018), cert. granted, 139 S. Ct. 1599 (2019). 
This issue may no longer directly affect me, but it is critical for thousands of trans men and women who 
are the victims of pervasive discrimination, not just in employment, but in all aspects of society. I was 
asked to speak from the steps of the Supreme Court on the day of oral arguments; I talked about my 
wrongful termination, but I also spoke from my heart about the need to stop some people from making 
other people afraid to be who they are for fear of not getting, or losing, their job. Surely that was what 
Title VII was meant to do. 
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advocate for an inclusive Employment Non-Discrimination Act (ENDA) and 
ran into my home-state senator. When I stopped him and introduced myself 
as a constituent, he smiled and asked what brought me to the capitol. As I 
explained, he looked puzzled, and I had to explain to him what “transgender” 
meant. He recoiled from me as if I had a contagious disease, and his aide 
stepped between us, obviously considering me a threat. I wish I could say 
that their prejudice was shocking, but it was just a little more extreme than I 
had come to expect. Trans people at that time were treated as pariahs, even 
within the lesbian and gay community, not to mention frequent targets for 
hate-based violence in the straight world (as we still are4). 
As demoralizing as it was to repeatedly lose employment and to be 
politically marginalized, that feeling could not compare to the fear and anger 
I felt when I next encountered the legal system. During protracted 
negotiations over alimony and visitation at the end of my divorce 
proceedings, my wife’s lawyer decided that their best strategy for leverage 
was to file a motion to terminate my parental rights—meaning I could have 
no contact with the three girls I loved more than anything—on the grounds 
that, because I was transgender, I was an unfit parent.5 Although my wife 
eventually told her lawyer to withdraw the motion, I still bear the emotional 
and financial scars from that trauma twenty-five years later. 
Meanwhile, I tried once again to find employment by hiding my gender identity. I applied for 
a position as a chief financial officer for a small software company in Tampa. As the company 
owner was about to offer me the job, he asked me: “Is there anything else I need to know?” I 
blanched but decided to tell him the whole truth. After assuring him that I would not let my 
gender identity affect my performance or embarrass him in any way, he hired me. Thanks to 
his faith in me (and my desire to reward that faith), we were able to grow the company and, 
several years later, sell it for $200 million. At the risk of understating things, this remarkable 
man changed my life. Not only was I able to transition to living full-time as Denise;6 the 
generous bonus he paid me also gave me the opportunity to take my life in a new direction, 
and I seized it. 
During my early years of activism, I had seen that it takes more than 
marching, letter-writing, and pigeon-holing legislators to change the law. As 
they say, if you’re not at the table, you’re on the menu. Who’s at the table? 
 
 4. Rick Rojas & Vanessa Swales, 18 Transgender Killings This Year Raise Fears of an ‘Epidemic,’ 
N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 27, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/27/us/transgender-women-deaths.html. 
 5. It was no idle threat. There was at least one reported decision in which a father had lost parental 
rights by transitioning; the court held she had “terminated her own parental rights as father” because she 
could not be a father and female at the same time. Daly v. Daly, 715 P.2d 56, 59 (Nev. 1986). For a 
comprehensive review of court decisions involving transgender and gender-variant parents’ parental 
rights, see Sonia K. Katyal & Ilona M. Turner, Transparenthood, 117 MICH. L. REV. 1593 (2019). 
 6. By the way, transitioning from male to female or vice versa is a lot harder than you might think. 
It is not just about changing your clothing, your hairstyle, and your name. To have what is called “passing 
privilege” (and thus move more safely through the world), most trans people have to try to change the 
secondary sex characteristics that provide visual cues about gender. Some of us, with enough money and 
other privileges, can access the various tools available to help make that happen. Those without that 
privilege are at greater risk for unemployment, trafficking, and violence. See Rojas & Swales, supra note 
4. 
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Lawyers. So, despite my previous personal experience with the legal 
profession, I decided to take the LSAT, apply to law school (in my ignorance, 
I applied to only one), and see what happened. Once again, a good person—
this time the dean of admissions at the University of Michigan Law School—
saw something in me and changed my life. 
When I entered law school in Ann Arbor in 2004, Michigan was 
consumed with the fight over Proposal 2, the proposed constitutional 
amendment banning same-sex marriage, allegedly to benefit children.7 This 
smacked of the same “save our children” refrain I had heard in Florida as a 
cover for the homophobia-driven ban on gay adoptions, the echoes of which 
hung in the air in my divorce case. While I knew that it wasn’t just 
transgender people who were unprotected from discrimination, this attack on 
same-sex couples’ ability to form legally recognized relationships with each 
other and with their children opened my eyes to the much larger struggle for 
equality being waged around me. 
During law school, I did not spend as much time in the ivory tower of 
academia (or the bowels of the underground law library) as perhaps I should 
have. Instead, I engaged with my professors, fellow law students, and the 
larger university community as much as I could. I participated in the 
university’s Speakers Bureau to share my story with students who might not 
have ever met a trans person. When I became aware that the university’s 
bylaws prohibiting discrimination did not include gender identity and 
expression, I joined a campaign to change that, speaking at meetings of the 
Board of Regents and petitioning for an inclusive nondiscrimination policy.8 
Outside the campus, I joined the board of the local LGBTQ resource 
center and got involved in the statewide LGBTQ civil rights organization. In 
the summer before my third year, I interned in D.C. at Servicemembers Legal 
Defense Network, a nonprofit providing resources to, and advocating for, 
gay and lesbian service members before the repeal of “don’t ask, don’t tell.” 
I got a taste of how LGBTQ nonprofits have to work very hard to do more 
 
 7. MICH. CONST. art. I, § 25 (“To secure and preserve the benefits of marriage for our society and 
for future generations of children, the union of one man and one woman in marriage shall be the only 
agreement recognized as a marriage or similar union for any purpose.”). I fought against this measure and 
was truly shocked when it passed with almost 59 percent of the vote, DeBoer v. Snyder, 772 F.3d 388, 
397 (6th Cir. 2014). It took ten years for a federal court to declare the law unconstitutional, DeBoer v. 
Snyder, 973 F. Supp. 2d 757 (E.D. Mich. 2014), and another year for that ruling (after reversal in the 
Sixth Circuit, DeBoer, 772 F.3d 388) to be affirmed by the U.S. Supreme Court, Obergefell v. Hodges, 
135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). 
 8. I may have been a bit overzealous in my advocacy when I led a group of students through the 
university administration building with a bullhorn demanding protection for trans members of the 
university community. But the year after I graduated, the Regents invited me back to attend their meeting 
when they voted to add gender identity and expression to the nondiscrimination policy in the university 
bylaws. 
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with less, to make tough choices about where to put their meager resources, 
and to compete for funding from funders and donors. It taught me about some 
of the challenges of working for social justice instead of profit. 
After graduation, my wife Mary—a lawyer whom I had met during law 
school9—and I started our own law practice to serve the legal needs of 
LGBTQ people in southeastern Michigan. We envisioned that the practice 
would largely involve helping LGBTQ couples navigate the lack of legal 
recognition of their relationships and help them secure ties to each other and 
their children through conventional tools such as wills, powers of attorney, 
and real estate deeds. But we quickly found out that our clients had diverse 
problems that took us to family court, to probate court, to federal court (civil 
rights litigation), and everything in between. We helped two moms get both 
their names on their child’s birth certificate, and we helped trans people get 
gender-marker changes on theirs. Inequality manifests itself in small ways—
like needing to convince a judge that a person changing her first name from 
a masculine one to a feminine one is not inherently “fraudulent”—and in big 
ways, such as needing to sue a municipality for targeting gay men with police 
sting operations and wrongful arrests. 
While practicing law, I was asked to join the board of Triangle 
Foundation, a statewide LGBTQ advocacy organization now known as 
Equality Michigan. I eventually left private practice to serve as its executive 
director, the first openly “T” person to do so at any statewide LGBTQ 
equality organization. It was then that I began to fully appreciate the politics 
that permeate the LGBTQ movement. We are a community of diverse needs 
and desires. Our movement includes everyone from the stereotypical rich 
gay couple to trans women living on the street; we are middle class, working 
class, urban, suburban, rural, every color and religion, every walk of life and 
every political persuasion. We are single, we are coupled, we are families; 
we are youth—often bullied and even homeless—we are millennials, we are 
boomers, and we are elderly. To get a majority of our community to focus 
their energies on specific goals, and to agree on strategies to effectuate those 
goals, is in itself nearly impossible. To keep dissenters from tearing everyone 
 
 9. One aspect of being transgender is that you never know who will accept you and who will reject 
you. When I came to law school, I was divorced and openly transgender, and I wondered if I would ever 
find someone who would love me for who I am. One day, during my 1L year, the profile of a lawyer 
named Mary popped up on Match.com. I messaged her, referencing our shared connection to Michigan 
Law School, and was disappointed by her response that, despite my charming profile, she didn’t think we 
“were meant to be.” (I later learned that this was solely because I was transgender, and she didn’t know 
how or what to think about that, having never before met a trans person.) But sometimes what we imagine 
our fate will be is not what fate has in store. Mary and I met as friends in real life, she thought to herself 
“she’s a woman with a remarkable life story,” and, long story short, we have now been married for 
fourteen years, thanks to the progressive marriage laws of Canada. In fact, she now tells me that she has 
an easier time dealing with the fact that I used to live as a man than that I used to be a Republican. 
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else down while we gather enough allies to achieve political victory is 
practically a miracle. 
One of the toughest challenges we face is prejudice against trans people 
(particularly trans women, like me) being used as a wedge to divide our 
community.10 When the infamous HB2 passed in North Carolina, it 
invalidated local ordinances that protected the entire LGBTQ community, 
but the primary selling point was keeping trans women out of the bathrooms. 
We saw the same thing in Houston when the voters repealed that city’s 
nondiscrimination ordinance. Whenever an expansion of civil rights laws to 
protect LGBTQ people is proposed, you can count on someone to say, right 
out loud, that they have no problem with gay people, but they just can’t abide 
“men in women’s restrooms.” No matter how I move through the world or 
how everyone who knows me perceives me, I become relegated to that 
hateful trope. 
Now, as the Chief Policy Officer at Family Equality, I am working at 
the federal, state, and local levels across the country to collaborate on issues 
affecting LGBTQ families. We do not usually get involved in litigation, 
working instead behind the scenes to have a positive impact on state and 
federal policy.11 
The most difficult task I have in my work for LGBTQ equality is 
responding to the post-Obergefell backlash against recognition of our 
relationships and our families. For LGBTQ families, Obergefell was a 
watershed moment, in that there are so many rights, obligations, and benefits 
that are based on the marriage relationship. But not every governmental 
 
 10. Perhaps the most famous example of this is when ENDA, which sought to add protections to 
Title VII based on sexual orientation and gender identity, was before Congress in 2007. In an effort to 
make it more palatable to conservatives, an amendment was proposed that dropped protections based on 
gender identity. One faction of the LGBTQ community, most notably the Human Rights Campaign 
(HRC), argued that it was better to gain employment protection for the majority of the community at the 
expense of the few; others would not abide a strategy of leaving the most vulnerable of us behind. See 
Emily Douglas, An Uneasy Alliance, AM. PROSPECT (Oct. 23, 2008), 
https://prospect.org/features/uneasy-alliance. That rift took years to heal. See Chris Johnson, 10 Years 
Later, Firestorm over Gay-Only ENDA Vote Still Informs Movement, WASH. BLADE (Nov. 6, 2017, 7:50 
PM), https://www.washingtonblade.com/2017/11/06/10-years-later-firestorm-over-gay-only-enda-vote-
still-remembered. In any event, the exclusive bill passed the House but died in the Senate. Id. It was not 
until 2019 that a new, inclusive version called the Equality Act passed the House, but it is also expected 
to die in the Senate. H.R. 5, 116th Cong. (2019); see also Catie Edmondson, House Equality Act Extends 
Civil Rights Protections to Gay and Transgender People, N.Y. TIMES (May 17, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/17/us/politics/equality-act.html. 
 11. As an exception, we were plaintiffs in the case that finally forced Mississippi to abandon its ban 
on adoption by gay couples. Campaign for S. Equal. v. Bryant, 64 F. Supp. 3d 906 (S.D. Miss. 2014), 
affirmed, 791 F.3d 625 (5th Cir. 2015). That was the last adoption ban to fall. Bill Chappell, Judge Strikes 
Down Last Same-Sex Adoption Ban in the U.S., NPR: TWO-WAY (Apr. 1, 2016, 10:38 AM), 
https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2016/04/01/472667168/judge-strikes-down-last-same-sex-
adoption-ban-in-the-u-s.  
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entity has embraced the moment. State laws and policies that were created 
based on the assumption of different-sex marriage have not been updated in 
many places so that they clearly apply equally to same-sex married couples.12 
And those who disagreed with Obergefell have transformed its holding—
that a state cannot constitutionally deprive same-sex couples of the 
fundamental right to marry—into an attack on “religious liberty.” Thus, in 
order to protect that liberty, the argument goes, no one should be forced to 
treat same-sex married couples and their families with the same dignity as 
everyone else, if doing so would amount to condoning something contrary 
to their religious beliefs. 
This concept of protecting religious liberty reached its logical extreme 
in Mississippi, where we unsuccessfully fought to defeat Mississippi House 
Bill 1523, the so-called Protecting Freedom of Conscience from Government 
Discrimination Act. Passed in 2016, the bill provides protections for persons, 
religious organizations, and private associations who choose to provide or 
withhold services discriminatorily in accordance with any of three “sincerely 
held religious beliefs or moral convictions”: (a) that marriage is and should 
be an exclusively heterosexual union; (b) that “[s]exual relations are properly 
reserved for such a marriage”; and (c) that “[m]ale (man) or female (woman) 
refer to an individual’s immutable biological sex as objectively determined 
by anatomy and genetics at time of birth.”13 So, in Mississippi, it’s perfectly 
fine to refuse service or otherwise discriminate against not only same-sex 
married couples, but also against anyone who has had gay sex, or any sex 
not between husband and wife, or against anyone who is transgender. If that 
weren’t enough, it expressly protects any person who refuses to provide 
medical or mental-health services to a trans person.14 While I used to travel 
to Ole Miss to work with law students, I honestly don’t feel safe going back 
now. 
We have had success in opposing legislation in many states seeking to 
protect faith-based discrimination against LGBTQ individuals, couples, and 
families (which we term “license to discriminate” bills), but we still face a 
tremendous challenge dealing with long-standing discrimination against gay 
 
 12. For example, the state of Arkansas refused to place the name of the same-sex spouse of a birth 
mother on the child’s birth certificate as the child’s other parent because she was not a man, arguing that 
the “presumption of paternity” on which the birth-registration law was based did not apply. After the 
Arkansas Supreme Court upheld the state’s position, the plaintiffs filed a petition for a writ of certiorari 
to the U.S. Supreme Court, which summarily reversed. Pavan v. Smith, 137 S. Ct. 2075 (2017). Family 
Equality filed an amicus brief to highlight the importance to children that both of their parents’ names are 
on their birth certificates and the real-life consequences when that protection isn’t there. 
 13. MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-62-3 (2017). 
 14. Needless to say, this horrific bill has been the subject of court challenges, but those have been 
stymied due to standing issues. See, e.g., Barber v. Bryant, 860 F.3d 345 (5th Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 
138 S. Ct. 652 (2018). 
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and transgender families in the child welfare system.15 Make no mistake, 
these attempts to prevent LBGTQ people from fostering and adopting are 
rooted in a deep-seated but wrong-headed belief that people like me 
shouldn’t be raising children, notwithstanding all the evidence to the 
contrary.16 Since Obergefell, nine states have passed legislation that protects 
the contracts of faith-based foster care and adoption agencies that continue 
turning away qualified prospective parents who do not comport with the 
agency’s religious tenets, especially LGBTQ people.17 These laws, which 
have been justified by noting the valuable service these agencies provide and 
how it would hurt children if they were “forced” to cease operations, fail to 
address the real problem. It is not a shortage of child-placing agencies; it is 
the shortage of qualified foster and adoptive homes for the thousands of 
vulnerable children in every state who are waiting for a safe, secure, and 
loving home. LGBTQ couples are seven times more likely to foster or adopt 
than other couples.18 As states such as Massachusetts, California, and 
Illinois—which prohibit discrimination by child-placing agencies—
demonstrate, the system works best when the pool of prospective foster and 
adoptive parents is as large as possible.19 
 
 15. At any given time, there are hundreds of thousands of children “in the system,”—that is, in the 
custody of the state, having been removed from their homes because of abuse or neglect. The state is 
responsible for placing children in suitable foster or group homes and often contracts with child-placing 
agencies—many of which are religiously affiliated—to recruit foster families and place children. In the 
absence of, or in some cases in spite of, laws or regulations prohibiting discrimination, some child-placing 
agencies have in the past freely discriminated against LGBTQ individuals and couples. 
 16. E.g., ABBIE E. GOLDBERG ET AL., WILLIAMS INST., RESEARCH REPORT ON LGB-PARENT 
FAMILIES 17–25 (2014), https://williamsinstitute.law.ucla.edu/wp-content/uploads/lgb-parent-families-
july-2014.pdf; REBECCA L. STOTZER ET AL., WILLIAMS INST., TRANSGENDER PARENTING: A REVIEW OF 
EXISTING RESEARCH 11–12 (2014), https://williamsinstitute.law.ucla.edu/wp-content/uploads/ 
transgender-parenting-oct-2014.pdf; Nanette Gartrell et al., Correspondence, National Longitudinal 
Lesbian Family Study—Mental Health of Adult Offspring, NEW ENG. J. MED., July 19, 2018, at 297. 
 17. The state of Michigan was sued for entering into such contracts in Dumont v. Lyon, a case 
brought by the ACLU of Michigan and a lesbian married couple that had been turned away by a 
religiously affiliated foster care agency. 341 F. Supp. 3d 706 (E.D. Mich. 2018). The federal district court 
denied the state’s motion to dismiss, ruling that the plaintiffs had stated claims for violation of the First 
Amendment’s Establishment Clause and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. 
at 733–43. The case settled in 2019 after the newly elected Michigan attorney general announced that the 
state would not defend the case. See Stipulation of Voluntary Dismissal with Prejudice, Dumont v. 
Gordon, No. 2:17-cv-13080-PDB-EAS (E.D. Mich. 2017), ECF No. 82. But a separate case brought by 
a faith-based agency challenging the settlement is now winding its way through a different federal court. 
Buck v. Gordon, No. 1:19-CV-286, 2019 WL 4686425 (W.D. Mich. Sept. 26, 2019), appeal filed, No. 
19-2185 (6th Cir. Oct. 15, 2019). 
 18. SHOSANA K. GOLDBERG & KERITH J. CONRON, WILLIAMS INST., HOW MANY SAME-SEX 
COUPLES IN THE U.S. ARE RAISING CHILDREN? (2018), https://williamsinstitute.law.ucla.edu/wp-
content/uploads/Parenting-Among-Same-Sex-Couples.pdf.  
 19. See, e.g., Brief of Massachusetts et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent, Fulton v. City 
of Philadelphia, 922 F.3d 140 (3d Cir. 2019) (No. 18-2574). 
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At the federal level, I am involved in a pitched battle over whether 
discrimination against LGBTQ couples and families by child-placing 
agencies that receive federal funds will be permitted. On one side is the 
“Child Welfare Provider Inclusion Act,” which protects agencies that 
discriminate.20 On the other is the “Every Child Deserves a Family Act”—
my organization’s signature legislation, sponsored in the House by civil 
rights icon John Lewis—which was introduced with bipartisan support to 
prohibit discrimination by child-placing agencies.21 We are optimistic about 
its chances for passage, and I hope to be around when it is signed into law. 
We are a divided nation—now, more than ever before in my lifetime—
and in many ways, the LGBTQ community has been used as a wedge. The 
local, state, and federal debates over whether to provide protection from 
discrimination to LGBTQ people, or to provide protection to those who wish 
to discriminate against us, cleave this nation in two. Masterpiece Cakeshop, 
involving a baker who refused to provide a wedding cake for a gay couple, 
was not about cake. It squarely challenged the ability of government to 
mandate equal treatment of the LGBTQ community, essentially raising the 
question whether a person or business has a constitutional right, based on 
their religious beliefs, to treat me or any other LGBTQ person unequally—
regardless of relevant civil rights laws. The Court’s split-the-baby outcome 
means that discrimination against the LGBTQ community will continue. 
Cases will continue to be filed testing whether there is a constitutional right 
to discriminate. 
I had to fight for my right to be seen and recognized as a woman—a 
fight that cost me dearly. But engaging in that fight helped me realize that 
oppression of women and of minorities is real. If my life’s journey and my 
work in the law has taught me anything, it is that regardless of what the law 
is or what the courts may say, we must keep working until it is universally 
recognized that all people, all people, are equally entitled to human dignity. 
Our voices, as women, are vital to that quest. 
 
 
 20. H.R. 897, 116th Cong. (2019). The Act would prevent any state, including those with laws 
prohibiting discrimination by child-placing agencies, from taking adverse action against such agencies if 
they discriminate on the basis of their religious beliefs. 
 21. H.R. 3114, 116th Cong. (2019); see also About the Every Child Deserves a Family Act, EVERY 
CHILD DESERVES A FAMILY, https://everychilddeservesafamily.com/about-ecdf-act. 
 
ON FIRSTS, FEMINISM, AND THE FUTURE OF 
THE LEGAL PROFESSION 
RISA L. GOLUBOFF† 
This is my inaugural attempt to write about women in the legal 
profession and my own experiences as a woman in that profession. I must 
confess that I find the endeavor somewhat uncomfortable. I have spent most 
of my scholarly career researching and writing about a thirty-year period in 
American constitutional and civil rights history. I like to know a lot before I 
write a little. Moreover, I have spent my career writing histories not my own. 
My goal has always been to amplify the voices of those whose stories and 
claims have been hard to hear. Now, lately, and I imagine into the future, I 
find myself asked to share my own story and that of others like me—women 
with status, resources, and education that give them ample opportunity to 
speak for themselves. 
As I thought about how to write on this new and uncomfortable topic, I 
realized that two guiding principles that have defined my scholarship in 
constitutional history apply here too. Both flow from the foundational 
premise that the most visible markers of constitutional change—Supreme 
Court cases, constitutional amendments—are better understood as moments 
of punctuation in longer stories than as changes themselves. The first lesson 
that flows from that premise is that change is a process, not a point in time. 
The shift from past to present is rarely instant or binary. The second and 
related lesson is that change is not made by a single person, institution, or set 
of elite actors. It is the product of the actions of many different people—
those who join a protest or write a letter to a lawyer or file a case or write a 
newspaper or law review article. Change happens when people—constrained 
and opportunistic, selfish and selfless, connected and alone—make it 
happen. 
Milestones like the Nineteenth Amendment can easily invite the 
celebration of a moment: August 18, 1920, when American women became 
voters.1 But our commemoration need be limited to neither celebration nor 
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that single moment. It should also be a time for us to recognize what 
preceded that moment and followed it, what it left to be accomplished, and 
who played critical but unrecognized roles. It can and should provide an 
opportunity to reflect on how the process of change unfolds and what part 
each of us, as individuals, in our institutions, and in the profession writ large, 
have played and can play in the future. 
I.  THE PERSONAL STORY 
It is fair to say that I did not always have a particularly robust sense of 
myself as part of a story of gender equality, in the legal profession or 
otherwise. I certainly did not, until recently, have a sense of the role I would 
or could play in attaining further gender equality in the legal profession by 
virtue of serving as the first woman dean of the University of Virginia School 
of Law. 
Growing up, it seemed to me—to the extent that I thought about it—
that Second Wave Feminism had already generally succeeded. My mother 
completed her education (through a doctorate) and went to work full time 
during my childhood. I found the world as open to me as it was to my two 
older brothers. They were my models, and what they modeled seemed 
entirely possible for me too. My mother’s question was always, “If not you, 
who?” Perhaps in answer, I joined the boys’ wrestling team in middle school. 
I had grown up boxing and wrestling with my brothers. It seemed like the 
natural next step for me and a largely uncontroversial one in my world. 
Women were equal. I could wrestle. 
For the rest of my educational career, the fact that I was a woman 
seemed mostly not to matter. My schools and my classes during college, law 
school, and graduate school in history were filled with fairly even numbers 
of men and women. I supported my friends who majored in women’s studies. 
But I studied race and class because I wanted to use my education and power 
on behalf of those systemically marginalized in our society. To me, that was 
not women—or at least not the privileged, white women who still seemed to 
dominate the feminist imagination. 
Looking back, I can see more clearly my own inklings of the unfinished 
business of Second Wave Feminism. To join that wrestling team, I was 
required to take a fitness test many of my male teammates could not have 
passed. In college, I helped found Women’s Street Theater, an organization 
that brought dramatic education about rape and sexual harassment to our 
peers on campus. I encountered belittling behavior and harassment on 
occasion and witnessed far more sex, gender, and intersectional 
discrimination, harassment, and assault around me. For the most part, 
however, gender inequality as I experienced it from my relative position of 
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privilege felt unsystematic and already a vestige of the past. I called myself 
a feminist as a political stance I chose rather than a personal burden I carried. 
Then I entered the work world, and I could see signs of continuing 
gender inequality all around me. I not infrequently found myself the only 
woman in the room, or the only woman to speak, or the only woman in a 
high-status position. When I entered the academic teaching market in 2000, 
only 6.4% of tenured faculty were women.2 Neither my law school nor my 
university—like so many others—had ever been led by a woman.3 My 
colleagues and my superiors were overwhelmingly male. 
When I became a parent, I realized that my expectations that men and 
women would share equally the benefits and burdens of work in the home 
and careers in the world were far less widely shared than I had anticipated. 
My husband was also a UVA law professor, and he and I were committed to 
co-parenting. It was hard to do. Schools, teachers, other parents, and 
children’s organizations from soccer to ballet and beyond often treated me 
as the only relevant parent for appointments, potlucks, and playdates. My 
children’s expectations for my presence in their school lives also exceeded 
their expectations for my husband. Given all of this, I should not have been 
surprised that I felt more guilt than he did when work interfered with 
family—despite the fact that co-parenting and identical jobs meant that we 
spent basically the same amount of time with our children. 
Then I became a first. I never expected to be a first. I thought the firsts 
were all behind us. Even when I joined the boys’ wrestling team, it had not 
felt like I was a first. There was no fanfare, no announcement, no sense of 
radical transformation. This new first was nothing like that one. When I 
became dean of UVA Law School in the summer of 2016, I was both the 
first female dean and the first Jewish dean in our two-hundred-year history.4 
That is a bit of an overstatement, as the school did not name its first dean 
until 1904, eighty-four years after the Law School’s founding.5 But I was the 
twelfth, and it was 2016.6 
What was particularly striking about this “first” was that aside from 
some older Jewish alumni who had attended the Law School when anti-
Semitism was clearly more pronounced, the Jewish milestone was not nearly 
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virginia.edu/about/uva-law-school-history [https://perma.cc/4G2J-PLY9]; UVA Stories: Risa Goluboff—
The Law School’s First Woman Dean (WTJU 91.1 FM broadcast 2018), https://player.fm/series/wtju/uva-
stories-risa-goluboff-the-law-schools-first-woman-dean [https://perma.cc/4774-2CHA].  
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 6. Id. 
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as salient to most people as the gender milestone. I took that then and I still 
take it now as an indication—despite the current spike in anti-Semitic 
violence in the U.S. and around the world— that perhaps in some regards we 
have come further with religious pluralism than gender equality. 
I know some “firsts” who resist the label as either unimportant or 
affirmatively retrogressive. I have embraced it, not because it is everything—
it is not—but precisely because it is a moment of punctuation in my own 
process of recognizing the ways gender has shaped my career and what it 
allows me to shape in turn. Shortly after I was named dean, my father asked 
whether I was still picking pieces of glass out of my hair. I laughed, but the 
answer was yes. The remnants left from shattering that particular glass 
ceiling remind me that change is a process, not a point in time. 
II.  THE UVA STORY 
Had Elizabeth Tompkins known the phrase “glass ceiling” when she 
became one of the first female law students at the University of Virginia 
School of Law in 1920,7 I have no doubt that she would have agreed that the 
glass shards were mighty hard to shake from her hair. Tompkins and her 
classmates Rose May Davis and Catherine Rebecca Lipop began their legal 
studies just a few weeks after the ratification of the Nineteenth Amendment.8 
This year, then, marks a milestone in my institution as well as in the nation: 
one hundred years of suffrage and one hundred years of educating women to 
be lawyers at UVA. 
Tompkins’ story epitomizes for me both how change is a process rather 
than a point in time and how individual people make change happen. As 
women pushed for the vote in 1919, so too, in the words of then-law school 
dean William Minor Lile, they “clamored” for admission to the University 
of Virginia for graduate study.9 Even that was not the beginning, however. 
By that time, UVA had already been educating, though not granting degrees 
to, teachers and nurses for decades.10 In order to get out in front of potentially 
 
 7. History of Women at UVA, (RE)IMAGING WOMEN IN STEM (2017), http://voicesand-
visibilityuva.org/about-these-portraits/women-at-uva-history [https://perma.cc/7H6H-GXG8].  
 8. Peter Wallenstein, “These New and Strange Beings”: Women in the Legal Profession in 
Virginia, 1890–1990, 101 VA. MAG. HIST. & BIOGRAPHY 193, 207 & n.30 (1993).  
 9. Dean William Minor Lile, Address to Law Alumni at the University of Virginia Centennial 
Celebration (June 3, 1921), in THE CENTENNIAL OF THE UNIVERSITY OF VIRGINIA, 1819–1921: THE 
PROCEEDINGS OF THE CENTENARY CELEBRATION, MAY 31 TO JUNE 3, 1921, at 149, 156 (John C. Metcalf 
et al. eds., 1922), https://hdl.handle.net/2027/uva.x000471619?urlappend=%3Bseq=210 [https://-
perma.cc/FZ5M-SKKT]. 
 10. See Anne E. Bromley, Six Memorable Milestones for Women at UVA, UVA TODAY (Nov. 15, 
2017), https://news.virginia.edu/content/six-memorable-milestones-women-uva [https://perma.cc/ 
C6US-K5A3]; Sierra Bellows et al., Women at the University of Virginia, VA. MAG. (Spring 2011), 
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more radical change from the legislature in 1919, the University decided to 
admit a small number of women to its graduate schools—with higher 
standards of admission—for the fall of 1920.11 
Tompkins and Davis entered the Law School as regular, degree-seeking 
students, while Lipop, the law librarian, enrolled as a “special student.”12 It 
was clear to Tompkins that admission was the beginning, not the end of her 
journey. She later recalled that it took the men in her class “one semester to 
find out that I was not after a husband and another semester to find out that 
I could do the work. After that, everything was fine.”13 “Fine” hid a good 
many remaining challenges. “Fine” did not mean all of the faculty were 
thrilled with the new female students. Even though some of her professors, 
including the dean, found her “powers of acquisition and of appreciation of 
legal principles . . . fully equal to those of the men in the front rank of the 
graduating class,”14 she found one professor so resistant that the “invisible 
wall” he had erected to her academic success was “as inevitable as the Rock 
of Gibralter [sic].”15 It was “destroying any confidence [she] ever had in 
[her]self.”16 She also lacked the intellectual community that the men in her 
class enjoyed in their fraternities, where they had “a round table and 
discuss[ed] Law every night for an hour.”17 Excluded from the fraternities, 
and with no alternatives available, she lamented, “There has been, and there 
is, no one to argue with when I leave class at noon.”18 
Upon graduation, Tompkins became the first woman to join the 
Virginia bar, and she clerked for a local law firm for two years. Though one 
of her fellow lawyers went out of his way to help her learn the ropes, the 
principal partner had “yet to offer to show [her] a single thing at the Clerk’s 
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office.”19 Once the clerkship ended, Tompkins, like other women lawyers of 
her time and for some time to come, had limited career options and trouble 
finding a permanent position. Dean Lile suggested that she hang her own 
shingle and offered his support and advice on how to do so.20 
Elizabeth Tompkins’ story is not unique to UVA or the Commonwealth 
of Virginia. When, in 1870, Ada Harriet Miser Kepley received her Bachelor 
of Laws from what is now Northwestern University—becoming the first 
woman in the United States to graduate from law school—it was illegal for 
women to practice law in Illinois.21 Though many law schools admitted 
women by 1920, others continued to exclude them as late as 1951.22 Those 
women who did manage to attend and graduate from law schools across the 
country faced many of the problems Tompkins did—discrimination, social 
and intellectual isolation, lack of mentoring, and most fundamentally, 
limited career prospects.23 This trend continued through the middle part of 
the twentieth century, with most firms refusing to hire women lawyers. 
Women who found jobs in private practice tended to cluster in fields like 
family law, tax, and estate planning. Others worked as legal secretaries, law 
clerks for judges,24 or as editors for legal publishing houses.25 
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In fits and starts across the twentieth century, women came to play a 
larger role in the life of UVA and other law schools. Marion Boyd Crockett 
’32 joined the editorial board of the Virginia Law Review in 1931, the first 
woman to do so.26 Dean Lile congratulated the Law Review’s board “for their 
fairness and courage in selecting her, in spite of sex prejudice.”27 World War 
II prompted further change, as when Frances Ames ’43 and Flora Kirley ’43 
were the only editors listed on the masthead for the January 1943 volume of 
the Virginia Law Review. Their male co-editors were serving in the armed 
forces.28 
Still a clear minority in the late 1960s and early 1970s, women 
continued to add new “firsts” as both students and faculty. In 1970, Elaine 
Jones became the first African American woman to graduate from UVA 
Law, twenty years after Gregory Swanson broke the color line at UVA Law, 
the University of Virginia, and every institution of higher education in the 
former Confederacy.29 In 1972, Linda Howard ’73 became the first woman 
and the first person of color elected as president of the student body.30 Carol 
Stebbins ’80 served as the Virginia Law Review’s first female editor-in-chief 
in 1978.31 Gail Marshall ’68 became, in 1969, the first female assistant 
professor on the full-time teaching faculty.32 Lillian R. BeVier joined the 
faculty in 1973 and later became the first tenured female law professor at the 
school.33 In 1985, Mildred Robinson became the school’s first tenured 
African American female faculty member, thirteen years after Larry Gibson 
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became the first African American junior faculty member and eight years 
after Samuel Thompson became the first African American tenured 
professor.34 
By the late 1970s—at UVA Law and elsewhere—women began 
attending law schools and entering the legal profession in more significant 
numbers. As the number of female undergraduates exploded at UVA after 
the university settled a gender discrimination lawsuit in 1970, women’s 
enrollment at the Law School grew dramatically as well.35 That same decade, 
and again in response to gender discrimination litigation, New York law 
firms agreed to abide by hiring practices that would ensure the hiring of 
women associates.36 As a result, women entered the legal profession and law 
firms in unprecedented numbers.37 
In the middle of all these moments—behind, underneath, and through 
them—were women who studied and excelled and graduated and joined a 
profession not particularly hospitable to them. Those women made it 
possible to imagine women trial lawyers, partners, leaders, and deans. They 
paved the way for my own role in UVA’s history. 
When I became dean in 2016, the response was overwhelmingly 
positive. I had expected alumnae and female students to be excited about this 
most recent milestone. They were, but they were not alone. Everyone I 
encountered seemed receptive. My presence revealed a pent-up desire on the 
part of alumni of all demographics, career paths, and political persuasions to 
discuss how to make progress for women, people of color, and others who 
have historically been marginalized in the profession. “Here is what I am 
doing to diversify my workplace,” they told me. “How can I do more?” they 
wanted to know. 
Over the past three years, I have wondered what Elizabeth Tompkins 
would make of all this. Would she be surprised to see, one hundred years on, 
that women make up nearly half our class of law students, that a woman 
heads the Virginia Law Review, that women lead 67% of our student 
 
 34. Fox et al., supra note 3, at 57; Eric Williamson, Black Law Students Mattered, UVA LAWYER, 
Spring 2018, at 50, https://www.law.virginia.edu/uvalawyer/article/black-law-students-mattered 
[https://perma.cc/Y3XK-GHQ9]. 
 35. See Jane Kelly, Going Co-Ed, UVA TODAY (Sept. 28, 2017), 
https://news.virginia.edu/content/case-full-coeducation-uva-turned-late-night-phone-call-0 [https://per-
ma.cc/8552-ZU33]; Ann Graham, College Women Encouraged to Consider Legal Training, VA. L. 
WEEKLY, Oct. 12, 1973, at 2–3 (showing women’s enrollment growing from 8.5% of the class to 17.8% 
of the class over three years); see also General Profile of the Entering Class, School of Law, 1967, 1968, 
1971, 1974, 1975, 1976, 1977 (Records of the Law School Foundation, RG 107-2013, University of 
Virginia Law Library) (showing that women’s enrollment grew from single digit percentages for the 
classes entering in 1967–1969 to 26–27% of the classes entering in 1976 and 1977).  
 36. Bowman, supra note 23, at 14.  
 37. Id. at 15.  
 ON FIRSTS, FEMINISM, AND THE FUTURE 89 
organizations, and that a woman has taken Dean Lile’s place? Or would she 
be more surprised to learn that a hundred years on women are not yet half 
the class, still far from half the faculty, and that we only just hired our first 
woman as dean? What would she make of the fact that my husband “works 
for me” as a faculty member and that together we teach a seminar on work-
life balance to men and women contemplating both families and careers?38 
Would she think all of this radical and amazing, or a long time coming and 
still not quite arrived? Most of all, what would she make of the fact that we 
are still discussing how to achieve true gender equality among lawyers and 
beyond? 
III.  THE PROFESSION’S STORY 
The stories I have shared about my own evolution and that of my law 
school can be multiplied and varied a thousand times over. They are just a 
few strands of the many that make up the history of pursuing gender equality 
in the legal academy and the legal profession over the past century. 
There is no doubt that immense progress has been made, that we are 
emphatically not the same profession we were when Elizabeth Tompkins 
became a lawyer. Recent data show that women make up 57% of 
undergraduates in the United States, roughly 50% of law students,39 and 45% 
of law firm associates.40 
Real inequalities nonetheless remain, especially in more senior 
positions in the profession. Though the percentage of female law school 
deans almost doubled from 18% to 32.5% between 2007 and 2019, it remains 
just under one third.41 Indeed, women hover around one third in many key 
indices: between 33% and 37% of federal judges (depending on the level); 
34% of state court judges; and 36% of tenure-line law professors.42 Other 
numbers are yet more dispiriting: 19% of equity partners at law firms are 
women and, across the legal sector, women generally make 78% of men’s 
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salaries.43 Between 2010 and 2018, the gender pay gap in partner 
compensation actually grew from 32% to a whopping 53%.44 
When there were literally no women in law schools, it was fairly easy 
to identify how to increase gender equality: let them in. One hundred years 
later, it is harder to pinpoint why exactly we have not achieved equality. That 
is not because people haven’t tried to explain the remaining gaps. A bevy of 
scholars, commentators, politicians, and policymakers tell us the problem is 
the marriage penalty in our income tax system or a lack of paid family 
leave.45 It is men not doing enough housework, or women leaning out when 
they should be leaning in, or men leaning in when they should be leaning 
out.46 
All of these explanations and more have something to offer. But the 
very existence of so many—and the plausibility of many of these 
explanations on their face—suggests that there is no single cause for the 
gender inequality that remains in the legal profession. As in society more 
generally, the causes are complex, interrelated, and overlapping. Women 
face explicit bias and sexism, including sexual harassment and 
discrimination.47 Implicit bias also plays a role. Leaders (who are 
predominantly white and male) are less likely to socialize with women than 
men outside of work, or to hire, promote, mentor, sponsor, and otherwise 
support those who don’t look like them.48 Men interrupt and ignore women, 
get away with behavior for which women are penalized,49 and find it easier 
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and more rewarding to negotiate aggressively.50 The structure and 
expectations of business development and the compensation mechanisms of 
many workplaces are more attuned to men’s conventional preferences than 
women’s.51 
Legal and regulatory structures and workplace policies unevenly shape 
workforce participation. Weak family leave laws and policies discourage 
two-career households, as does a national shortage of adequate, accessible 
childcare.52 Parsimonious paternity leave policies contribute to a regime that 
encourages women to take on the role of primary caregiver and discourages 
men from doing so. Additionally, there is a mismatch between child-bearing 
years and many of the most intense moments in legal careers—like tenure in 
the legal academy, making partner in private practice, or ascending to 
leadership positions in government and non-profits. Women who take time 
off to have children, or who work fewer or more flexible hours to care for 
children or aging parents, are often “mommy-tracked”53 or have trouble 
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finding on-ramps back into the profession.54 
The gendered cultural norms into which men and women are socialized 
from birth also contribute to gender inequality by shaping identities and 
expectations about family life and its relation to work. One recent Harvard 
Business School study of 25,000 graduates showed that less than 10% of Gen 
X and Baby Boomer women said they expected their own careers to take 
precedence over their partners’ careers while approximately 60% of their 
male classmates expected their own careers to take precedence.55 Many men 
and women today want both families and careers. As economist Claudia 
Goldin has noted, both families and careers seem to require someone on call 
full time. Given the many pressures and incentives mentioned above, the 
usual result is that men tend to be on call at work and women in the home.56 
I could go on with this depressing and potentially paralyzing litany of 
the legal, institutional, economic, cultural, and interpersonal causes of the 
gender inequality that continues to afflict our profession and society. And 
that is not even all. As we commemorate the Nineteenth Amendment and 
coeducation and locate those milestones in the longer story of gender 
equality, we must locate them as well within the similarly messy stories of 
the incomplete quest for equality of many different types of people. Writing 
about the position of “women” in the legal profession is in many ways 
writing with a limited view. Women are not a single, homogeneous group. 
The women UVA admitted in 1920 were all white, and it took another half 
century for African American women to join them. One must understand 
gender inequality as one aspect of the longstanding, continuing, and often 
intersectional inequalities faced by people of color, LGBTQIA+ people, 
people with disabilities, and first-generation professionals, to name a few. 
Here at UVA Law, we must write of Gregory Swanson and so many others 
who have repeatedly transformed the very definition of a UVA lawyer. 
IV.  COMING FULL CIRCLE 
Needless to say, I have come a long way from thinking of feminism as 
an abstract thing of the past unrelated to my current challenges and 
obligations. It is also clear that the divide between my commitment to 
feminism and my commitments to redressing racial and economic inequality 
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is not as large as I had once thought. These variations on equality are key 
elements of a broader goal for the legal profession: the equal flourishing of 
all people at work and at home. 
As we continue to strive toward that goal, I propose that we start with 
my initial two premises: that change is a process, not a point in time, and that 
we are all changemakers. The knowledge that we are empowered to make 
change transforms the myriad reasons for persistent inequality from a 
paralyzing obstacle to an open invitation. With so much to do, there is no 
shortage of opportunities—and therefore obligations—to act at the 
institutional level and the personal, the professional and the political. 
To fight inequality wherever we see it, we will find ourselves called to 
act in our various roles—as an employer or employee, a husband or wife or 
partner, a parent or child, a citizen, a community board member, or a voter. 
We must check our explicit and implicit biases and call others out on theirs. 
We must reshape our laws to address harassment, discrimination, and the 
persistent pay gaps that reward some people more than others. We must 
change the policies in our workplaces and the who-does-what norms within 
our volunteer organizations, our religious congregations, our children’s 
sports teams, and our own homes. 
For me, that means acting as a wife, mother, citizen, lawyer, professor, 
historian, and most of all as a dean with some ability to shape the future of 
the institution I lead. I am committed to working toward a future in which all 
lawyers and aspiring lawyers can thrive at school, at work, and in life. I am 
committed to making Elizabeth Tompkins, and all who have preceded us, 
proud of the profession we will yet become. 
 
 
CARRYING ON KOREMATSU: REFLECTIONS ON 
MY FATHER’S LEGACY 
KAREN KOREMATSU† 
Five months before he passed away, my father, Fred Toyosaburo 
Korematsu, gave me a charge: continue his mission to educate the public and 
remind people of the dangers of history. At that time, I was running my 
commercial interior design firm. I was far from a public speaker, educator, 
and civil rights advocate. However, for the previous four years I had been 
traveling with my aging father as he spoke to audiences across the country. 
On numerous occasions, I heard him tell his story and witnessed how he 
shared his passion for promoting social justice and education. These 
reflections are a tribute to and a continuation of his efforts. 
I 
When I was a junior in high school, we studied World War II in my 
U.S. Government and History class. For one assignment, the teacher gave 
each of my classmates a different paperback book relating to the war. We 
were asked to read the book and deliver an oral report in front of the class. I 
don’t recall the name of the book that I was assigned. However, what I 
clearly remember is the book report my friend Maya—who is sansei, third-
generation Japanese American like me—presented that day. 
Standing in front of the class, Maya announced the title of her book: 
Concentration Camps U.S.A. I wondered what that could be about, as I 
thought concentration camps only existed in Europe. To my surprise, she 
went on to describe a terrible time in history when, following the bombing 
of Pearl Harbor, the United States government forcibly removed 120,000 
people of Japanese ancestry from their homes on the West Coast. At first, 
they were sent to makeshift detention assembly centers (prisons) that were 
nothing more than converted horse stalls at racetracks and fairgrounds up 
and down the West Coast. Three or four months later, the Japanese 
Americans were ordered to move again and transported by rail to ten 
permanent concentration camps in desolate areas across the United States, 
where the majority were imprisoned for the duration of the war. 
Maya said that there was one man who resisted the military orders, and 
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his resistance led to a landmark Supreme Court case, Korematsu v. United 
States. The man, Korematsu, lost his case and the Court upheld his criminal 
conviction for defying incarceration. “That’s my name,” I thought as I felt 
35 pairs of eyes on me. I figured that it must be a reference to some black 
sheep in our family. All I knew was that my last name was an unusual 
Japanese name. After class, I asked Maya, “Who is the Korematsu?” 
“Your dad,” she said. 
“No way,” I replied. “Someone would have told me!” 
I ran home to ask my mother. She confirmed what Maya said: 
Korematsu was my father. When I asked why no one had told me, she said 
they had been waiting until I was older and could understand. Then she gave 
me the standard answer: you will have to wait until your father gets home 
and ask him. 
At that time, my father worked two jobs, often until late in the evening, 
so this meant a long wait. When he finally came home at 8 PM that night, I 
told him what Maya had said. His response was brief. “It happened a long 
time ago. I did what I thought was right. The government was wrong.” 
I saw the hurt wash over his face. I could only bring myself to ask one 
more question. I asked if he could vote, knowing how important voting was 
to my parents. He answered yes, and this gave me some reassurance. That 
was 1966, and we did not speak about his case again until 1982, when 
Professor Peter Irons visited my father. 
II 
My father, Fred Toyosaburo Korematsu, was born in Oakland, 
California on January 30, 1919. He was the third of four boys. His parents 
immigrated from Japan at the beginning of the twentieth century and 
purchased land in East Oakland before the California Alien Land Law of 
1913 prohibited immigrants from buying land in the state. On this land, my 
grandfather built a house and greenhouse nurseries. 
My father grew up like any other American kid. He loved spaghetti, hot 
dogs, hanging out with his friends, playing sports, and, as a teenager, driving 
cars. Like many other children of immigrants, he experienced 
discrimination. On a couple of occasions, in San Leandro, a small town 
adjacent to Oakland, proprietors swore at him, called him racist names, and 
told him to return to Chinatown “where [he] belonged.” Later, during the 
war, he tried to enlist in the U.S. National Guard and U.S. Coast Guard, but 
military officers turned him away because of his Japanese ancestry. 
Nevertheless, my father found ways to help with the war effort. He 
attended welding school and worked in a shipyard that had a contract with 
the military. Because of his smaller stature, he could get into the hulls of 
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ships to weld. He was good at his job, and his supervisor even offered to 
recommend him for a promotion to become a supervisor himself. 
On December 7, 1941, the Empire of Japan bombed U.S. naval ships at 
Pearl Harbor, Hawai’i, propelling America into World War II. My father was 
22 years old. Immediately, he wondered if his parents would be in danger 
because they weren’t American citizens. The next day, he was fired from his 
welding job because of his Japanese ancestry. 
Two months later, on February 19, 1942, President Franklin D. 
Roosevelt issued Executive Order 9066, which gave the U.S. military 
authority to forcibly remove any person from the West Coast and imprison 
them in concentration camps across America until the end of the war. The 
order didn’t specifically mention anyone of Japanese ancestry. Instead, the 
author authorized the Secretary of War and American commanders to 
designate particular areas of the United States as military areas where any or 
all persons may be excluded. 
My father had studied the Constitution in his high school U.S. 
Government class and he knew that he had rights as an American citizen. He 
questioned how he could be put in a concentration camp and stripped of those 
rights when he had done nothing wrong. He thought that the Executive Order 
was unlawful because it denied him due process. And so, he decided to 
disobey the military orders mandating his relocation and detention. 
My father changed the name on his draft card to what he said was a 
“Spanish Hawaiian” name, Clyde Sarah, to avoid being recognized as 
Japanese American. He moved to a boarding house near Oakland’s 
Chinatown. He continued to go about his business, trying to get a welding 
job and blend in. Meanwhile, all other Japanese Americans along the West 
Coast, including my father’s parents and his three brothers, were ordered to 
report to the detention assembly centers. 
III 
On May 30, 1942, about 30 days after Japanese Americans were 
forcibly removed, my father went to a corner shop in San Leandro to buy 
cigarettes. When he came out of the store to wait for his girlfriend, an Italian-
American woman, the San Leandro police showed up. They approached my 
father and asked, “Have you seen any short Japanese person around?” He 
said no. Then the military police arrived, asked my father for identification, 
arrested him, and took him to the San Leandro jail. He never found out how 
he was discovered or if someone had turned him in. 
The police didn’t know what to do with my father. They moved him 
from San Leandro to the Oakland jail and then to a federal jail in San 
Francisco. There he had a visitor: Ernest Besig, the Executive Director of the 
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Northern California affiliate of the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU). 
Mr. Besig wanted to bring a legal challenge to the constitutionality of 
Executive Order 9066 and had read about my father’s arrest in the 
newspaper. He asked my father if he would be willing to participate in a test 
case. “If need be, we’ll take this all the way to the Supreme Court,” Mr. Besig 
said. 
My father agreed. His belief in his country convinced him that, if the 
case did go to the Supreme Court, the justices would find the Executive 
Order unconstitutional. 
About two weeks later, on June 18, 1942, my father’s bail hearing was 
held in the federal district court in San Francisco. After the judge granted 
him bail, Mr. Besig wrote a check for $5,000 and gave it to the bailiff. But 
as soon as my father walked out of the courthouse onto Mission Street, he 
noticed military police standing under the glaring sun with rifles, waiting for 
him. The officers said that it was illegal for my father to be free and took him 
to the stockade at the San Francisco Presidio, where they imprisoned him for 
several days. Then, they transferred him to the Tanforan Detention Assembly 
Center in San Bruno—a racetrack where people were forced to live in horse 
stalls and endure inhumane conditions—where he joined his family and 
other imprisoned Japanese Americans from the San Francisco Bay Area. 
My father did not receive a warm reception when he arrived in the 
prison center. A group of Japanese American men held a meeting to 
determine whether he should continue to fight his legal case. They did not 
invite my father. Afterward, my father’s oldest brother told him that the 
group didn’t want him to continue his case. They feared that some harm 
might come to the rest of them and that it would make their collective 
situation even more difficult. At that time, they knew that they would be sent 
away, but they didn’t know the conditions they would experience or where 
they were being sent. 
But my father refused to take no for an answer (a trait I inherited). 
Without telling anyone, he let Mr. Besig carry on with the legal case, which 
did make its way to the Supreme Court. And on December 18, 1944, the 
nation’s highest court reached a decision. 
In a landmark, and now infamous, six-to-three decision, the Court ruled 
against my father, arguing that “military necessity” justified his 
incarceration. The three dissenting opinions are still relevant today. Justice 
Robert H. Jackson wrote, “…the Court for all time has validated the principle 
of racial discrimination in criminal procedure and of transplanting American 
citizens. The principle then lies about like a loaded weapon ready for the 
hand of any authority that can bring forward a plausible claim of an urgent 
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need.”1 Justice Frank Murphy’s dissent was similarly bitterly severe: “Such 
exclusion goes over ‘the very brink of constitutional power’ and falls into 
the ugly abyss of racism.”2 And Justice Owen Roberts came straight to the 
point. “I dissent, because I think the indisputable facts exhibit a clear 
violation of Constitutional rights . . . it is the case of convicting a citizen as 
punishment for not submitting to imprisonment in a concentration camp, 
based on his ancestry, and solely become of his ancestry.”3 
IV 
The process of reopening my father’s case started in 1982, when my 
father received a letter from Peter Irons, a political science professor at the 
University of California, San Diego. Peter was writing a book about World 
War II Supreme Court cases and planned to include my father’s case, as well 
as those of Hirabayshi, Yasui, and Endo,4 who also had challenged the 
constitutionality of the government’s treatment of Japanese Americans. He 
had been doing research in Washington, D.C. when he met Aiko Herzig-
Yoshinaga in the National Archives. Aiko had been hired by the War 
Relocation Authority to research how Japanese Americans were treated in 
the incarceration camps. She and Peter decided to share information with one 
another, and together they helped right the injustice of my father’s past. 
One day, while working in the Immigration and Naturalization 
Department Archives, Peter came across a dusty box that hadn’t been opened 
for almost 40 years. Inside, just lying on top, was a memo from the 
Department of Justice (“DOJ”) in which it admitted to withholding and 
destroying evidence relating to my father’s Supreme Court hearing in 1944. 
It was a smoking gun and exactly what Peter had been looking for. Later, he 
learned that there were originally ten copies of this memo, but only one had 
survived. To this day, no one knows how it ended up at the top of the box. 
Perhaps someone hoped that it would be found. 
With this new information, Peter wrote to my father and requested a 
meeting. Many law students over the years had requested interviews, but my 
father had never been interested. Revisiting the past was too painful. His 
Supreme Court conviction had a lasting impact on his fundamental rights 
and affected his ability to obtain employment. For instance, in 1969, his 
application for a California real estate license was denied. 
 
 1. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 246 (1944) (Jackson, J., dissenting). 
 2. Id. at 233 (Murphy, J., dissenting). 
 3. Id. at 225–26 (Roberts, J., dissenting). 
 4. Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943), conviction vacated, 828 F.2d 591 (9th Cir. 
1987); Yasui v. United States, 320 U.S. 115 (1943), convicted vacated as noted in Yasui v. United States, 
772 F.2d 1496, 1498 (9th Cir. 1985); Ex parte Mistuye Endo, 323 U.S. 238 (1944). 
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My father wanted to become a realtor to help other minorities, like him, 
who had experienced housing discrimination and were unable to purchase 
homes. He took a real estate course and passed with flying colors. But when 
he went to fill out the application, he saw that it asked whether he had ever 
been convicted of a crime. Since he had, he couldn’t receive his license. He 
was disgusted and disappointed that he couldn’t better his own life, or—
more importantly—help others. But my father was never bitter or angry or 
blamed anyone. He maintained his innocence and never gave up hope that 
he could reopen his Supreme Court case—even though legal services were 
expensive and he didn’t know who could help him. 
My father agreed to a meeting with Peter based on Peter’s follow-up 
phone call in which he revealed he had recently discovered information to 
show my father. At the meeting, my father saw the large file of evidence that 
Peter and Aiko had put together. It revealed that at the time of my father’s 
U.S. Supreme Court hearing on December 18, 1944 the Department of 
Justice had withheld, altered, and destroyed evidence that should have been 
presented to the justices before their ruling. 
On January 19, 1983, a remarkable legal team filed the papers and 
announced to the world that they were reopening my father’s U.S. Supreme 
Court case, along with Hirabyashi v. United States5 and Yasui v. United 
States.6 They were filing a petition for a writ of error coram nobis, which is 
a legal procedure used to correct a court’s “fundamental error” or “manifest 
injustice” in a trial, after the defendant has been convicted and served his 
sentence. They challenged all three decisions based on evidence of 
governmental misconduct and proof that there was no military necessity for 
Japanese Americans to be incarcerated during World War II. These 
attorneys—all working pro bono—included Don Tamaki, Lorraine Bannai, 
Eric Yamamoto, Edward Chen (now a federal judge), Leigh-Ann Miyasato, 
Dennis Hayashi, Karen Kai, Bob Rusky, Marjie Barrows, and Prof. Peter 
Irons, and were led by Dale Minami. In total, over one hundred other 
attorneys and researchers across the country worked without pay to prepare 
my father’s case. In spite of this support and even after almost forty years 
since his arrest, my father still experienced resistance from the Japanese 
American community. People said that, if my father reopened his case and 
lost, it would hurt their chances for redress and reparations from the U.S. 
government. 
Still my father did not relent. DOJ lawyers offered him a pardon if he 
would agree to drop his lawsuit, but he rejected the offer. As my mother 
 
 5. 320 U.S. 81 (1943), conviction vacated, 828 F.2d 591 (9th Cir. 1987). 
 6. 320 U.S. 115 (1943), convicted vacated as noted in Yasui v. United States, 772 F.2d 1496, 1498 
(9th Cir. 1985). 
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remarked, “Fred was not interested in a pardon from the government; 
instead, he always felt that it was the government who should seek a pardon 
from him and from Japanese Americans for the wrong that was committed.” 
I remember talking with my father about the possibility of a pardon and being 
struck by how adamant and unwavering he was in his fight for justice. 
On November 10, 1983, Judge Marilyn Hall Patel of the District Court 
for the Northern District of California formally vacated my father’s federal 
criminal conviction. It was a pivotal moment in U.S. history. Evidence of 
government misconduct showed that the “military necessity” on which the 
Supreme Court predicated its decision was nothing more than a smoke 
screen. The real reason for the government’s deplorable treatment of 
Japanese Americans wasn’t acts of espionage. Rather, the government acted 
on a baseless perception of disloyalty grounded in racial stereotypes. My 
father’s victory in federal court meant that there was no basis to reopen my 
father’s case in the U.S. Supreme Court. This left the 1944 decision intact, 
though it was almost universally discredited. 
Addressing Judge Patel, my father proclaimed these words: “As long as 
my record stands in federal court, any American citizen can be held in prison 
or concentration camps without a trial or a hearing. That is if they look like 
the enemy of our country. Therefore, I would like to see the government 
admit that they were wrong and do something about it so this will never 
happen again to any American citizen of any race, creed or color.”7 
My father remained an activist and champion for civil rights for the rest 
of his life. He became an active member of the National Coalition for 
Redress and Reparations and traveled to Washington, D.C. with my mother, 
Kathryn, to lobby for a bill that would require an official apology from the 
U.S. government and compensation of $20,000 for each surviving Japanese 
American who had been incarcerated. Although President Reagan initially 
opposed the legislation, he soon reversed his position due to Japanese 
Americans’ strong activism. On August 10, 1988, President Reagan signed 
the redress and reparations legislation into law. 
On January 15, 1998, President Clinton awarded my father the 
Presidential Medal of Freedom, the nation’s highest civilian honor. My 
father was invited to speak about his experience at numerous events, 
universities, and law schools all over the United States, including the 
University of California, Berkeley, Georgetown, the University of Michigan, 
Harvard, and Yale. In 2000, a documentary about his story, Of Civil Wrongs 
 
 7. Transcript, Motion to Vacate Conviction and Dismiss Indictment of Fred T. Korematsu, 30–32, 
Nov. 10, 1983, File 27635, Criminal Case Files, 1851-1982, U.S. District Courts for the San Francisco 
Division of the Northern District of California, RG 21, records of the District Courts of the United States, 
NARA-SF (cited as coram nabis hearing transcript, Nov. 10, 1983). 
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and Rights: The Fred Korematsu Story, premiered in San Francisco’s 
Japantown. My brother, Ken, was the co-producer and Eric Paul Fournier 
was the director. The film went on to receive two Emmys and my father 
crisscrossed the country, speaking directly to audiences at showings. 
After 9/11, my father continued to speak out. In 2003, he filed an amicus 
“Friend of the Court” brief in the Supreme Court case, Shafiq Rasul v. 
George W. Bush and Khaled A.F. Al Odah v. United States,8 on behalf of 
Muslim inmates held at Guantanamo Bay. In the brief, he warned that the 
government’s extreme “national security” measures were reminiscent of 
Japanese American incarceration. In 2004, he filed a similar brief on behalf 
of an American Muslim man held in solitary confinement in a military prison 
without trial. 
In another amicus brief, written in April 2004 with the Bar Association 
of San Francisco, the Asian Law Caucus in San Francisco, the Asian 
American Bar Association of the Greater Bay Area, Asian Pacific Islander 
Legal Outreach, and the Japanese American Citizens League, my father 
expressed his opposition to the government’s argument in Rumsfeld v. 
Padilla. The brief emphasized the similarity between my father’s unlawful 
detainment during World War II and that of Jose Padilla following the events 
of 9/11. My father again warned the government about the danger of 
repeating past mistakes. He believed that “full vindication for the Japanese-
Americans will arrive only when we learn that, even in times of crisis, we 
must guard against prejudice and keep uppermost our commitment to law 
and justice.”9 
“Stand up for what is right,” my father said often. His message endures 
all these years later. 
V 
My father passed away on March 30, 2005, at the age of 86. With his 
passing, I realized that I would commit the rest of my life to carrying on his 
legacy, but I didn’t know how. I spent the next few years contemplating what 
to do. Then, in 2009, I founded the Fred T. Korematsu Institute. 
Our mission is educating to advance racial equity, social justice, and 
human rights for all. Based in San Francisco, the Korematsu Institute began 
as a local community and education program; we inspire students and the 
public by sharing my father’s story. Soon after our founding, California State 
 
 8. Brief of Amicus Curiae Fred Korematsu in Support of Petitioners, Rasul v. Bush, et al., 542 
U.S. 466 (2004) (Nos. 03-334 & 03-343), 2004 WL 103832. 
 9. Biography, FRED T. KOREMATSU INSTITUTE, http://www.korematsuinstitute.org/fred-t-
korematsu-lifetime (last visited Dec. 16, 2019). 
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Assemblymen Warren Furutani and Marty Block recognized my father as an 
American Civil Rights hero and asked me to join them in working to 
establish a day honoring my father’s fight for justice and steadfast 
commitment to defending civil liberties and the Constitution. Our work came 
to fruition in September 2010, when California Governor Schwarzenegger 
signed the bill into law. It established my father’s birthday, January 30, in 
perpetuity as the Fred Korematsu Day of Civil Liberties and the Constitution. 
It is the first day in U.S. history named after an Asian American. 
This was a turning point for the Korematsu Institute; we broadened our 
mandate and became a national organization focused on K-12 civic 
education. As the leader of this national nonprofit, I have worked to ensure 
that the Korematsu Institute impacts and expands youth civic engagement. 
We have created and disseminated nearly 15,000 free multimedia 
Curriculum Toolkits to educators in all 50 states and 12 countries around the 
world for use in their classrooms. These toolkits include dozens of lesson 
plans for grades K-12, educational DVDs, classroom posters, a graphic 
novel, and other materials to equip young people to be civically engaged. In 
total, we have reached almost two million students. 
But our efforts don’t stop with the classroom. We also train teachers, 
host public events, and build coalition partnerships with social-justice 
education organizations nationwide. Through education, the Korematsu 
Institute supports establishing a national Fred Korematsu Day of Civil 
Liberties and the Constitution. Now, every year, on January 30, schools in 
California and across the country teach Fred Korematsu’s story, his fight for 
justice, and its ongoing relevance today. Other states, including Hawaii, 
Virginia, and Florida, as well as New York City, have followed California’s 
lead in establishing the “Fred Korematsu Day of Civil Liberties and the 
Constitution,” and several other state governors, state legislatures, and cities 
have issued similar proclamations. The effort to establish a federal Fred 
Korematsu Day of Civil Liberties and the Constitution is a reminder to all 
Americans that we must continue to fight for and uphold our civil liberties 
and the Constitution. Fred Korematsu’s legacy is “one man who made a 
difference in the face of adversity and so can you.” 
My father’s experience has inspired me to expand the Institute’s reach 
still further. Since 2012, I have presented and/or been a keynote speaker 
every year at the conference for the National Council for the Social Studies. 
In 2017, I co-chaired the national conference in San Francisco, enabling the 
Institute to reach educators from across the United States. No matter where 
they come from, they often share with me a common message: my father’s 
story, civic education, and the Korematsu Institute’s work are increasingly 
important and needed in our political climate, where Islamophobia and anti-
immigrant policies pose a threat to fundamental individual rights and civil 
104  WOMEN & LAW  
liberties. 
In the face of this dire need, I have committed our Institute to promoting 
not only the memory of forced removal and mass incarceration of Japanese 
Americans during World War II, but also the dangerous impact of present-
day attacks on civil rights and the targeting of historically marginalized 
communities. We use the past to draw attention to today’s issues, including 
mass incarceration, anti-immigrant sentiment, and Islamophobia. And we 
advocate for civil liberties for all communities. To that end, I have followed 
in my father’s footsteps, joining a number of amicus briefs, notably on cases 
arising from violations of constitutional rights following 9 /11, including 
Trump v. Hawaii,10 Hassan v. City of New York,11 Hedges v. Obama,12 
Turkmen v. Ashcroft,13 and Al Odah v. United States.14 
Today, I wear many hats as executive director, civil rights advocate, 
community leader, and living voice of Fred Korematsu. I have elevated my 
father’s legacy to demonstrate how his story is just as relevant today as it 
was when the Supreme Court handed down its decision in Korematsu v. 
United States in 1944. Since my father’s passing, I have responded to issues 
of racial profiling, immigration, civil rights violations, and many other 
challenges of our times. In recent years, requests for me to speak at events 
have tripled. There is an appetite in this country to hear about the importance 
of protecting our civil liberties from government action, especially after 
discriminatory travel bans enacted by the current president. Like my father 
once did, I find myself crisscrossing this country to speak about the 
incarceration of Japanese Americans during World War II and the 
importance of fighting for our civil liberties and social justice. I visit public 
and private schools, colleges and universities, law schools, teachers’ 
conferences, and business, media, and advocacy organizations. I speak to 
audiences that range from kindergarteners to federal judges. 
VI 
My father’s story resonates on so many levels, especially at this political 
moment when we fear that past injustices are being repeated. 
 
 10. Brief of Karen Korematsu, et al., as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents, Trump v. Hawaii, 
138 S. Ct. 2392 (No. 17-965), 2018 WL 1586445. 
 11. Brief of Karen Korematsu, et al., as Amici Curiae in Support of Appellants, Hassan v. City of 
New York, 804 F.3d 277 (3d Cir. 2015) (No. 14-1688), 2014 WL 3572026. 
 12. Brief of Karen Korematsu, et al., as Amicie Curiae in Support of Plaintiffs-Appellees, Hedges 
v. Obama, 724 F.3d 170 (2d Cir. 2013) (Nos. 12-3176 (Lead), 12-3644 (Con)), 2012 WL 6622648. 
 13. Brief of Karen Korematsu, et al., as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents, Ziglar v. Abbasi, 
137 S. Ct. 1843 (Nos. 15-1358, 15-1359, 15-1363), 2016 WL 7494903.  
 14. Brief of Karen Korematsu, et al., as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners, Boumediene v. 
Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008) (No. 06-1196) 2007 WL 737596. 
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In 2017, when President Donald Trump issued multiple executive 
orders banning immigration from predominantly Muslim countries, I noticed 
that the same kinds of stereotypes that justified the incarceration of Japanese 
Americans in World War II were being used against Muslim Americans. 
So I, along with the children of both Gordon Hirabayashi and 
Minoru Yasui, and the Fred T. Korematsu Center for Law and Equality 
submitted an amicus brief in Trump v. Hawaii15 and asked the Supreme Court 
to reject Trump’s Muslim travel ban. We pointed to our fathers’ cases as 
urgent warnings against executive power run amok. We implored the Court 
to repudiate its decisions in those three cases and create a new legacy: one in 
which blind deference to the executive branch—even in areas where the 
president must wield wide discretion—is incompatible with the protection of 
fundamental freedoms. We urged the Court to recognize that meaningful 
judicial review is an essential element of a healthy democracy and a vital 
check on overreach by another co-equal branch of government. 
On June 26, 2018, in Trump v. Hawaii,16 the Supreme Court officially 
overruled Korematsu v. United States17 after nearly 75 years. In the majority 
decision, Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr., citing language from Justice 
Jackson’s dissent to the 1944 ruling, wrote that the Court was taking “the 
opportunity to make express what is already obvious: Korematsu was 
gravely wrong the day it was decided, has been overruled in the court of 
history, and—to be clear—‘has no place in law under the Constitution.’”18 
But the Court’s repudiation of the Korematsu decision told only half the 
story. Although it correctly rejected the abhorrent race-based relocation and 
incarceration of Japanese Americans, it failed to recognize—and reject—the 
rationale that led to Korematsu. In fact, the Supreme Court in Trump v. 
Hawaii indicated that the reason it addressed Korematsu was because the 
dissenting justices—Justices Sotomayor and Ginsburg—noted the “stark 
parallels between the reasoning of” the two cases.19 
The Court’s majority disagreed. Chief Justice Roberts stated that 
“Korematsu had nothing to do with this case.”20 Trump’s executive order 
likewise had “nothing to do with” Korematsu and so the majority found it 
“wholly inapt to liken that morally repugnant order to a facially neutral 
 
 15. Brief of Karen Korematsu, et al., as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents, Trump v. Hawaii, 
138 S. Ct. 2392 (No. 17-965), 2018 WL 1586445. 
 16. 138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018). 
 17. Id. at 2423 (overruling Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944)). 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. at 2447 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
 20. Id. at 2423. 
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policy denying certain foreign nationals the privilege of admission.”21 
Pointing to the government’s stated purpose of “preventing entry of nationals 
who cannot be adequately vetted and inducing other nations to improve their 
practices,” the Court saw “persuasive evidence that the entry suspension has 
a legitimate grounding in national security concerns, quite apart from any 
religious hostility.”22 
In rejecting a racist decision, the Supreme Court then seemed to repeat 
its same faulty racist logic, rubber-stamping the Trump administration’s bald 
assertions that the “immigration travel ban” is justified by national security. 
As Justice Sonia Sotomayor explained in her dissent, “this formal 
repudiation of a shameful precedent is laudable and long overdue. But it does 
not make the majority’s decision here acceptable or right. By blindly 
accepting the government’s misguided invitation to sanction a 
discriminatory policy motivated by animosity toward a disfavored group, all 
in the name of a superficial claim of national security, the Court redeploys 
the same dangerous logic underlying Korematsu and merely replaces one 
‘gravely wrong’ decision with another.”23 
On June 27, 2018, I published an op-ed in the New York Times. I wrote 
that “my father spent his life fighting for justice and educating people about 
the inhumanity of the Japanese American incarceration, so that we would 
learn from our mistakes. Although he would have been somewhat glad his 
case was finally overruled, he would have been upset that it was cited while 
upholding discrimination against another marginalized group. The [C]ourt’s 
decision replaced one injustice with another nearly 75 years later.”24 
It is abundantly clear that our work is far from over. And like my father, 
we will never stop fighting for justice. In 2018, I joined the Stop Repeating 
History campaign with my father’s legal team, including Dale Minami and 
Don Tamaki. The campaign educates the public on the dangers of unchecked 
presidential power, drawing parallels between the World War II 
incarceration of Japanese Americans and the current administration’s 
policies targeting minority groups based on race and religion. 
The Korematsu Institute also partnered with filmmaker Abby Ginzburg 
on her documentary And Then They Came For Us, which received the 
American Bar Association's “Silver Gavel Award.” The Institute’s work 
through the film connects the story of Japanese American incarceration with 
 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. at 2421. 
 23. Id. at 2448 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
 24. Karen Korematsu, How the Supreme Court Replaced One Injustice With Another, N.Y. TIMES 
(June 27, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/27/opinion/supreme-court-travel-ban-korematsu-
japanese-internment.html. 
 CARRYING ON KOREMATSU 107 
civil liberties issues today. With funding from the National Parks 
Service/Japanese American Confinement Sites (NPS/JACS) program, we 
recently completed a curriculum writing institute to produce lesson plans so 
that this important film—along with my father’s two-time Emmy-award-
winning documentary Of Civil Wrongs and Rights: The Fred Korematsu 
Story—can be used in classrooms nationwide. Ultimately, we have 
broadened our vision to include public civic engagement education, 
promoting the urgency of voting and participating in the Census. 
VII 
Sixteen years passed between my first conversation with my father 
about his Supreme Court case and our next. When we finally spoke about it, 
my father told me that he discussed this issue with my mother from time to 
time but of course, not with my brother, Ken, or me. He did not want to 
burden us until we were old enough to understand. Once his case was 
reopened, he began speaking about it again, and I learned that his actions had 
been about more than himself and the Japanese American community. He 
told me that he did it for all Americans, because he never wanted something 
like the Japanese American incarceration to happen again, to another group 
of people. I realized how much courage my dad possessed—to disobey the 
government’s military orders, to continue his initial legal case in the face of 
opposition from the Japanese American community, and to reopen his 
Supreme Court case, despite the risk of losing all over again. I saw how much 
courage it takes to fight injustice. 
I also learned that my dad never gave up hope to reopen his case for 
almost forty years, even when he wasn’t sure how to proceed. That was a 
revelation! My dad always has been my hero, and now I want everyone to 
realize that Fred Korematsu is America’s Civil Rights Hero. 
When someone of historical prominence passes away, we don’t always 
know how their legacy will be remembered or the degree of significance we 
may attach to their experience. I never would have thought that my father’s 
1944 Supreme Court case, Korematsu v. United States, would stay (and 
become more) relevant seventy-five years later. But as I continue to travel 
this country and speak to audiences of all ages in “red” states and “blue” 
states, I realize that we are still only on the brink of seeing diversity and 
inclusion in our professions and institutions. To ensure these attainable 
ideals, I constantly promote and encourage women to step up as leaders and 
to fight for social justice in their own lives and careers. 
And so, as we approach the hundredth anniversary of the Nineteenth 
Amendment, I encourage women of all ages to make a difference by showing 
up to vote and participate in our democracy. We must be persistent and 
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advocate for ourselves—just as my father did—if we are going to see real 
change. As my father always said: “Stand up for what is right, and when you 
see something wrong, don’t be afraid to speak up.” 
 
 
RECONSTITUTING THE FUTURE: AN EQUALITY 
AMENDMENT 
CATHARINE A. MACKINNON & KIMBERLÉ W. CRENSHAW† 
“unto the Seventh Generation . . . ” 
Iroquois Law of Peace1 
A new constitutional amendment offers a new beginning. The equality 
paradigm proposed here recognizes the failures of what is, turns away from 
language and interpretive canons rooted in an unjust past, and imagines a 
fully functioning democracy as the inheritance of future generations. This 
proposal reenvisions constitutional equality from the ground up: it centers 
on rectifying the founding acts and omissions of race and sex, separately and 
together, and incorporates similar but distinct inequalities.2 It is informed by 
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prior efforts to integrate equality into the constitutional landscape that have 
been decimated by political reversals and doctrinal backlash. It aggregates 
the insights, aspirations, and critiques of many thinkers and actors who have 
seized this moment to breathe new life into the nation’s reckoning with ine-
quality. It neither looks back to celebrate amendments whose transformative 
possibilities have been defeated nor participates in contemporary hand-
wringing over equality’s jurisprudential limitations. It seeks to make equality 
real and to matter now. We argue that a new equality paradigm is necessary 
and present one form it could take. 
I. WHY REAL EQUALITY MATTERS NOW 
Equality is the foundational problem of the American Republic. White 
supremacy and male dominance, separately and together, were hardwired 
into a proslavery and tacitly gender-exclusive Constitution from the begin-
ning. All enslaved people, Native people, and women were consciously and 
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purposely excluded.3 White men of property4 intentionally designed the con-
stituting document to ensure the continued institutional existence of the en-
slavement of Africans and people of African descent,5 the exclusion of 
 
 3.  As Kathleen Sullivan observed, 
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tension between women seeking constitutional representation and men resisting it can be seen in letters 
between Abigail and John Adams in 1776. Abigail Adams pled: 
I long to hear that you have declared an independency—and by the way in the new Code of 
Laws which I suppose it will be necessary for you to make I desire you would Remember the 
Ladies, and be more generous and favourable to them than your ancestors. Do not put such 
unlimited power into the hands of the Husbands. Remember all Men would be tyrants if they 
could. If particular care and attention is not paid to the Ladies we are determined to foment a 
Rebelion, and will not hold ourselves bound by any Laws in which we have no voice, or 
Representation. 
Letter from Abigail Adams to John Adams (Mar. 31, 1776), in 1 ADAMS FAMILY CORRESPONDENCE 
(1761-1776) 369, 370 (L. H. Butterfield et al. eds., 1961) (original spelling retained). John Adams’s reply, 
combined jocularity and denial with a threatening bottom-line common to the language of misogyny then 
and now: 
Depend upon it, We know better than to repeal our Masculine systems. Altho they are in full 
Force, you know they are little more than Theory. We dare not exert our Power in its full 
Latitude. We are obliged to go fair, and softly, and in Practice you know We are the subjects. 
We have only the Name of Masters, and rather than give up this, which would compleatly 
subject Us to the Despotism of the Peticoat, I hope General Washington, and all our brave 
Heroes would fight. 
Letter from John Adams to Abigail Adams (Apr. 14, 1776), in 1 ADAMS FAMILY CORRESPONDENCE 
(1761-1776), supra, at 381, 382 (original spelling retained). 
 4. Among the property-owning white men generally recognized as “Founding Fathers,” the fol-
lowing owned slaves: Charles Carroll; Samuel Chase; Benjamin Franklin, who eventually manumitted 
his slaves and became an abolitionist; Button Gwinnett; John Hancock; Patrick Henry; John Jay; Thomas 
Jefferson; Richard Henry Lee; James Madison; Charles Cotesworth Pinckney; Benjamin Rush; Edward 
Rutledge; and George Washington. See Anthony Iaccarino, The Founding Fathers and Slavery, 
ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica 
.com/topic/The-Founding-Fathers-and-Slavery-1269536 [https://perma.cc/4Q9C-HDA9]. 
 5. “[O]f the 11 clauses in the Constitution that deal with or have policy implications for slavery, 
10 protect slave property and the powers of masters. Only one, the international slave-trade clause, points 
to a possible future power by which, after 20 years, slavery might be curtailed . . . .” David Waldstreicher, 
How the Constitution Was Indeed Pro-Slavery,  
ATLANTIC (Sept. 19, 2015), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/09/how-the 
-constitution-was-indeed-pro-slavery/406288 [https://perma.cc/SNX5-NHK9]; see also DON E. 
FEHRENBACHER, THE SLAVEHOLDING REPUBLIC 15–47 (Ward M. McAfee ed., 2001) (describing the 
role of ‘slavery in the founding of the United States and how the Constitution protects slavery); DAVID 
WALDSTREICHER, SLAVERY’S CONSTITUTION 107–52 (2009) (describing how the Constitution protects 
slavery); Juan F. Perea, Race and Constitutional Law Casebooks: Recognizing the Proslavery Constitu-
tion, 110 MICH. L. REV. 1123, 1123–25 (2012) (same). 
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women from full citizenship, and the silencing of all of their voices in au-
thoritative forums.6 Enslaved Africans were counted as three-fifths of a per-
son to give political weight to slave-owning states;7 the Electoral College 
was configured to assure the power of slave states in electing the federal 
executive officer;8 no woman or enslaved person was permitted to vote. 
Equality was not mentioned in either the debates in Philadelphia or the re-
sulting document. This raced and gendered institutionalization of power was, 
and has been, presented as the epitome of freedom and independence. 
Since the Founding, constitutional amendments and legislation—im-
pelled by armed struggle and urgent organizing—have guaranteed equality 
based on race and sex to some degree. This progress has emerged from cat-
aclysmic upheavals and decades-long agitation to address the raw expression 
of subordination built into the Constitution. Limited equality rights have, at 
times, been extended to women and people of color by judicial interpretation 
and legislation.9 Yet, retraction and resistance to these efforts hollowed out 
 
 6.  It is said that the Iroquois Confederacy’s structures influenced Franklin and the Framers, but the 
Iroquois’s recognition of women’s equality and their requirement that every decision be considered for 
its impact on the Seventh Generation were omitted. See H.R. Con. Res. 331, 100th Cong. (1988) (enacted) 
(acknowledging the contribution of the Iroquois Confederacy to the U.S. Constitution, noting Franklin’s 
admiration for the Iroquois Confederacy and its influence on the American political system). This position 
is considered inaccurate by scholars who research written records. See Erik M. Jensen, The Harvard Law 
Review and the Iroquois Influence Thesis, 6 BRIT. J. AM. LEGAL STUD. 225, 225 (2017) (dismissing “the 
Iroquois influence thesis” as “nonsense”); Elisabeth Tooker, The United States Constitution and the Iro-
quois League, 35 ETHNOHISTORY 305, 305 (1988) (“A number of writers have suggested that the League 
of the Iroquois provided the model for the United States Constitution and the ideas embodied in it. A 
review of the evidence in the historical and ethnographic documents, however, offers virtually no support 
for this contention.”); Jack Rakove, Did the Founding Fathers Really Get Many of Their Ideas of Liberty 
from the Iroquois?, HIST. NEWS NETWORK (July 21, 2005), https://historynewsnetwork.org/article/12974 
[https://perma.cc/H3AH-Q5VE]. 
 7.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3. 
 8.  At the Constitutional Convention, James Madison suggested that a direct presidential election 
“would have been a dealbreaker [sic] for the South” because slaves could not vote and the “slaveholding 
South would basically lose every time.” Akhil Reed Amar, Opinion, Actually, the Electoral College Was 
a Pro-Slavery Ploy, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 6, 2019), https://www.nytimes 
.com/2019/04/06/opinion/electoral-college-slavery.html [https://perma.cc/V5ZL-N59D]. Despite alter-
native interpretations, there is no disputing that the South “had extra seats in the Electoral College because 
of its slaves.” Id. And while the implications of the system were abundantly clear by the time the Consti-
tution was amended to modify the Electoral College, “Jefferson’s Southern allies steamrollered over 
Northern congressmen who explicitly proposed eliminating the system’s pro-slavery bias.” Id.; see also 
Alan Singer, Slavery and the Electoral College: One Last Response to Sean Wilentz, HIST. NEWS 
NETWORK (Apr. 21, 2019), https://historynewsnetwork.org/article/171783 [https://perma.cc/HS75-
QHR3] (agreeing that the Electoral College defended the institution of slavery). 
 9. Following the Civil War, constitutional amendments aimed to promote racial equality, see U.S. 
CONST. amends. XIII, XIV, XV, while Congress enacted laws intended to deinstitutionalize Jim Crow, 
see Civil Rights Act of 1875, Pub. L. No. 43-114, 18 Stat. 335; Third Enforcement Act, Pub. L. No. 42-
22, 17 Stat. 13 (1871); Second Enforcement Act, Pub. L. No. 41-99, 16 Stat. 433 (1871); First Enforce-
ment Act, Pub. L. No. 41-114, 16 Stat. 140 (1870); Freedmen’s Bureau Act of 1866, Pub. L. No. 39-200, 
14 Stat. 173; Civil Rights Act of 1866, Pub. L. No. 39-31, 14 Stat. 27; and Freedmen’s Bureau Act of 
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the ground-shifting post-Civil War Amendments, limited the interpretation 
of the Nineteenth Amendment, blocked ratification of the Equal Rights 
Amendment (ERA), and dismantled the mid-twentieth century’s modest 
equality infrastructure. Constitutional equality was effectively stripped of its 
regenerative potential. Their roots in the constitutional landscape now weak-
ened, both gender and race equality have been cast into treacherous seas—
with gender hanging onto race like a castaway clinging to a slender piece of 
doctrinal driftwood. 
Each moment of mobilization and democratic participation toward real 
equality has been met by a reflexive reassertion of the rights, values, and 
entitlements of a modestly reformed status quo. Courts in particular have 
dramatically and continuously undermined efforts to rectify race and gender 
subordination in society by rolling back what legal equality guarantees could 
have achieved. As a result, prior efforts have not produced real equality in 
social life, nor can they until the racial and gendered baselines that ground 
the constitutional order are denaturalized and uprooted. 
As a central instance, judicial interpretation has continuously hobbled 
the Fourteenth Amendment’s promising guarantee of equal protection of the 
laws.10 Indeed, the Amendment’s most far-reaching implications, which 
could have dismantled the legal infrastructure that constituted and insulated 
white supremacy, were snuffed out in their infancy. Less than twenty years 
after the formal end of slavery, the Supreme Court characterized congres-
sional efforts to remedy widespread discrimination against Black people as 
special treatment.11 A century later, courts brutally truncated the Amend-
ment’s mid-twentieth century renaissance12 by interpreting inequality so nar-
rowly that its reproduction remains largely undisturbed by any meaningful 
 
1865, Pub. L. No. 38-90, 13 Stat. 507. However, courts quickly restricted these initiatives’ potential for 
greatest impact. See, e.g., Cumming v. Richmond Cty. Bd. of Educ., 175 U.S. 528 (1899) (permitting 
racial segregation in schools); Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) (permitting racial segregation in 
public facilities as consistent with the meaning of constitutional equality); The Civil Rights Cases, 109 
U.S. 3 (1883) (holding Congress was not empowered to end private racial discrimination); United States 
v. Cruickshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1876) (holding that provisions of the Bill of Rights do not apply to state 
governments); United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214 (1876) (narrowly construing the Fifteenth Amend-
ment); The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873) (holding that the Privileges and Immun-
ities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment only protected rights of national, not state, citizenship). 
 10.  U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2. The Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause has been interpreted 
to apply constitutional equality standards to the federal government, just as the Fourteenth Amendment 
does to the states. See Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 500 (1954). 
 11. See The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 25 (repudiating the Civil Rights Act of 1875 in part for 
treating African Americans as the “special favorite” of the law). 
 12.  Courts’ interpreting prior guarantees to end legalized segregation are examples. Swann v. Char-
lotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971) (upholding policies to end de facto school segrega-
tion); Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968) (upholding Congress’s power to bar private 
racial discrimination in property sales under the Thirteenth Amendment); Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 
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legal imperatives.13 
Fatally, in Washington v. Davis, the Court decreed that nonexplicit dis-
crimination with disparate effects on racial groups must be proven inten-
tional to be unconstitutional.14 In the Court’s view, an overwhelmingly dis-
parate injury inflicted on a disadvantaged racial group was not enough to 
trigger equal protection concern even in the face of utterly predictable and 
proven outcomes.15 Only actions taken with a conscious desire to actively 
harm a vulnerable group would be held illegal.16 Discriminatory intent, so 
defined, is subjective. Evidence of it is thus largely within the control of ac-
cused discriminators, making it easy to exercise, easy to deny, and almost 
impossible to prove. Consequently, prevailing constitutional doctrine effec-
tively insulates countless decisions that actively harm structurally subordi-
nated populations. 
The Court doubled down on the intent requirement in Personnel Ad-
ministrator of Massachusetts v. Feeney, applying it to sex.17 It held that a 
preference for veterans in employment that predictably and knowingly ad-
vantaged men over women was constitutionally permissible absent proof that 
the scheme was deployed specifically to hurt women. Feeney spelled out 
with devastating clarity that decision-makers could comfortably rest dispar-
ity-producing preferences on the built-in inequalities created by myriad in-
stitutions—so long as they could plausibly deny a specific intent to harm 
women.18 By depriving women of the right to challenge disadvantages built 
 
U.S. 483 (1954) (holding de jure racial segregation in schools unconstitutional); Sweatt v. Painter, 339 
U.S. 629 (1950) (requiring state law school admit Black students under the Fourteenth Amendment); 
Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948) (holding racially restrictive housing covenants judicially unen-
forceable under the Fourteenth Amendment); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944) (holding racial 
limitations on political party membership unconstitutional under the Fifteenth Amendment); Missouri ex 
rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938) (holding that states must provide legal education facilities for 
Blacks that were substantially equal to those for whites). But these efforts have been increasingly stymied. 
 13. See, e.g., Schuette v. Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, 572 U.S. 291 (2014) (holding that 
states may constitutionally ban affirmative action by referendum); Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. 
Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701 (2007) (prohibiting use of race classifications in school-assignment 
plans); Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003) (invalidating a public university’s specific use of race in 
admissions); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (prohibiting racial quotas in 
state medical school admissions); Capacchione v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Sch., 57 F. Supp. 2d 228 
(W.D.N.C. 1999) (holding a public magnet school’s consideration of race constitutionally impermissi-
ble). 
 14.  426 U.S. 229, 240–41 (1976). 
 15. Id. 
 16.  Id. at 240 (holding that the “invidious quality of a law claimed to be racially discriminatory must 
ultimately be traced to a racially discriminatory purpose”). 
 17.  442 U.S. 256, 274 (1979) (holding that a law’s disparate impact on women must be intentional 
in order to be deemed sex based and in violation of the Equal Protection Clause). 
 18. Id. 
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on preferences for men—even those made possible by the near-complete ex-
clusion of women by law or policy—the Court largely reduced the Equal 
Protection Clause to a minimalist intervention against some explicitly dis-
criminatory articulations termed “facial.”19 
Submerged was the deeper obstacle to meaningful gender equality. Sex 
discrimination is more often accomplished by omission of socially gendered 
experiences such as pregnancy or sexual assault than explicitly expressed in 
law. The narrowing of constitutional sex equality jurisprudence to mainly 
facial discrimination further gutted the Equal Protection Clause of its sub-
stantive potential. In much the same way that the Court resisted conceptions 
of equality that disrupted the existing distribution of white rights and entitle-
ments, Feeney—considered a non-facial case—ensured that gendered base-
lines favoring men, including legal ones, would frame practices that mapped 
onto them as benign or not gendered at all. This made the inequality these 
practices imposed difficult or impossible to expose, contest, and change by 
law. 
In the Court’s sense of vindictively motivated acts consciously targeted 
“because of” group membership, most discrimination is not intentional.20 But 
discrimination is no less damaging when built into social norms and struc-
tures. Decision-makers, driven by unconscious or implicit bias in favor of 
the superiority of whites and/or men,21 may fail to perceive or appreciate the 
heavy burden their actions force on subordinated groups. No conscious intent 
is required for such bias to animate decision-making; yet existing constitu-
tional doctrine makes its recognition as discrimination extremely difficult, 
facilitating the reproduction of inequality. 
The intent requirement, paired with the formalistic policing of classifi-
cations under heightened review, together stabilize rather than dismantle the 
raced and gendered social order. Racial classifications, under prevailing ti-
ers-of-scrutiny analysis, are subject to strict scrutiny, grounded in the obser-
vation that historically they have been vehicles of racial subordination.22 Yet 
 
 19.  There is no doctrinal test for what is facial and what is not. 
 20.  Id. at 270. 
 21.  See Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Uncon-
scious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 322 (1987) (noting that most Americans are “unaware” of their 
racism and fail to acknowledge how cultural experiences influence beliefs about race); see also Charles 
R. Lawrence III, Unconscious Racism Revisited: Reflections on the Impact and Origins of “The Id, the 
Ego, and Equal Protection,” 40 CONN. L. REV. 931, 939–40 (2008) (revisiting his 1987 article and ex-
ploring how white supremacy is maintained). In the years since Charles Lawrence’s initial publication, 
much research has supported his analysis. See, e.g., Anthony G. Greenwald & Mahzarin R. Banaji, Im-
plicit Social Cognition: Attitudes, Self-Esteem, and Stereotypes, 102 PSYCHOL. REV. 4, 20 (1995); Chris-
tine Jolls & Cass R. Sunstein, The Law of Implicit Bias, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 969, 971–73 (2006); Justine 
E. Tinkler, Controversies in Implicit Bias Research, 6 SOC. COMPASS 987, 987–88 (2012). 
 22. See, e.g., Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942). 
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the history that animates the Court’s apoplectic denunciations of racial clas-
sifications has been abstracted from its material reality and gentrified with 
new occupants. Measured against a historical standard, the landmark race 
cases of the post-Warren Court era have arguably been white-rights cases23—
largely successful campaigns to arrest legislative and administrative efforts 
to remedy the contemporary consequences of the very history that justifies 
heightened scrutiny.24 The Equal Protection Clause must mean the same 
thing for everybody, the Court majestically intones. But packaged in its mis-
leading rhetoric equating colorblindness and gender neutrality—so-called 
same treatment—with constitutional equality are precisely the discordant 
protections that the Court repudiates. The Court shields the rights and enti-
tlements of those whom the Constitution has historically privileged and dis-
arms the aspirations of those it has historically excluded. 
The difficult doctrinal barriers the Court imposed on racially subordi-
nated groups are virtually absent in the jurisprudence developed in response 
to white grievances against remedial measures. Legal standing, causation, 
presumptions, and burdens of proof reveal not only a lightened burden for 
white plaintiffs; they also expose the stubborn baselines against which cor-
rective remedies are repackaged as illegitimate preferences that discriminate 
against white people. The Court’s supposed solicitude for an equality that 
means the same thing to everyone—“neutrality”—obscures its more reliable 
role in defending white supremacy. 
The gravitational pull of the foundational baselines obscures the dis-
criminatory dimensions of an Equal Protection Clause that protects and in-
sulates gendered as well as racial power, while co-opting the tools that might 
disrupt the reproduction of such inequality. The elision of gender bias is so 
deeply entrenched that it is not seen as gender-based at all. Sexual assault, 
reproductive control, and the family, for instance, are all crucial sites of the 
creation and exercise of male power, yet laws about them are overwhelm-
ingly not assessed by equality standards at all. Even where gender-based 
equality nominally exists in law, it is constrained by a fixation with classifi-
cations and their ranking into tiers of scrutiny.25 This approach effectively 
means that the more perfectly a distinction by law fits a distinction in society, 
the more “rational”—hence, less discriminatory—it is seen to be. 
The result is that the more effective a system of inequality is socially, 
the more “rational” it will be found constitutionally, rendering constitutional 
 
 23.  See Luke C. Harris, Lessons Still Unlearned: The Continuing Sounds of Silence, 10 DU BOIS 
REV. 513 (2013). 
 24.  See id. 
 25.  See, e.g., Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 438 (1985); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 
190, 211 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring). 
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law virtually useless in disrupting the conditions that most need changing to 
end gender inequality.26 Recognizing “sex” as a suspect classification would 
not solve this problem but rather would accentuate its effect, given that the 
Court looks to whether “sex” justifies a sex classification, and what it finds 
to be “sex” is frequently the reality of social sex (that is, gender) inequality. 
Requiring the sexes to be “similarly situated” before a discrimination claim 
can be brought also serves to evade the reality that social discrimination of-
ten prevents women from being situated similarly to men in the first place. 
The fundamental strategy of sex equality litigation has been to get rights for 
men in order to get them for women. Constitutional equal protection law has 
accordingly worked better for men, whose claims of sex discrimination have 
provided its foundation,27 than for women of any color. 
This basic approach—a separate and overly vigilant policing of reme-
dial racial classifications, a status-quo-oriented solicitude toward gender, 
and a failure to recognize sex inequality other than in the facial sense—rein-
forces rather than remedies cascading social harms across multiple overlap-
ping constituencies. It has not only left victims of combined discrimination 
in a quandary as to the standard that applies to them;28 it has drained the 
blood, sweat, and tears of those who sought to replace the flawed vision of 
the Founders with a constitutional order that embodies the rhetorical claims 
made in its defense. 
As a result, white and male supremacy continues and is socially resur-
gent, reinforcing brutal, sometimes lethal, disadvantages. The Founders’ 
handprints are visible across social hierarchies today despite corrective 
amendments and diligent litigation. The contemporary consequences of the 
founding formula have not been erased by gradualist improvements and 
symbolic reforms—and as things stand will not be. Material inequalities be-
tween the enslaved and those who benefitted from their enslavement, un-
 
 26. Id. 
 27.  See, e.g., Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979) (holding that a statute that required husbands but not 
wives to pay alimony violated the Equal Protection Clause); Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979) 
(striking down as unconstitutional a New York statute that allowed unwed mothers but not unwed fathers 
a veto over the adoption of that couple’s children); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (holding that a 
statute that denied the sale of alcohol to individuals of the same age based on their gender violated the 
Equal Protection Clause); Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975) (striking down a provision of 
the Social Security Act that permitted widows but not widowers to collect special benefits while caring 
for children); see also David Cole, Strategies of Difference: Litigating for Women’s Rights in a Man’s 
World, 2 LAW & INEQ. 33, 33–35 (1984) (examining effects of several leading sex discrimination cases 
brought by male plaintiffs). 
 28. See Devon W. Carbado & Kimberlé W. Crenshaw, An Intersectional Critique of Tiers of Scru-
tiny: Beyond “Either/Or” Approaches to Equal Protection, 129 YALE L.J.F. 108 (2019) (deploying an 
intersectional analysis to reveal how the tiers-of-scrutiny analysis obscures the incoherence of the stand-
ard particularly with respect to Black women). 
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compensated and unremedied, live on in yawning wealth and well-being dis-
parities, conditions that the Court considers uncorrectable societal inequal-
ity. Like their enslaved ancestors, African Americans experience greater ex-
posure to racialized surveillance and state-sanctioned violence,29 suffer 
compromised access to education,30 housing31 and health care,32 and face 
continuing obstacles to their full political participation.33 
 
 29. Young Black men are more likely to be incarcerated, and are less represented in college-student 
populations, than their white peers. E.g., Criminal Justice Facts, SENT’G PROJECT, https://www.sen-
tencingproject.org/criminal-justice-facts [https://perma.cc/89DH-TT3Z] (noting that one in three Black 
young men born in the United States in 2001 will become incarcerated, as compared to one in seventeen 
white young men); The Condition of Education 2019: College Enrollment Rates, NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. 
STAT. 2 (2019), https://nces.ed.gov 
/programs/coe/pdf/coe_cpb.pdf [https://perma.cc/PEP3-DFPG]. Black people are terrifyingly vulnerable 
to unpunished police brutality. See, e.g., Anthony L. Bui et al., Years of Life Lost Due to Encounters with 
Law Enforcement in the USA, 2015-2016, 72 J. EPIDEMIOLOGY & COMMUNITY HEALTH 715, 716 (2018) 
(highlighting that police violence disproportionately impacts young people of color). 
Although vulnerability to violence is frequently understood as male-exclusive, Black women also face 
disproportionate risks of both lethal state violence and private violence. See Kimberlé Williams Crenshaw 
& Andrea J. Ritchie, Say Her Name: Resisting Police Brutality Against Black Women,” AFR. AM. POL’Y 
F. 4–7 (2015) http://static1.squarespace.com/static 
/53f20d90e4b0b80451158d8c/t/55a810d7e4b058f342f55873/1437077719984/AAPF_SM_Brief_full_si
ngles.compressed.pdf [https://perma.cc/HK8V-WWS5]. 
 30. African Americans attend schools that are more racially segregated now than they were when 
segregation was first prohibited. See, e.g., Valerie Strauss, Report: Public Schools More Segregated Now 
Than 40 Years Ago, WASH. POST. (Aug. 29, 2013, 3:49 PM EST), https:// 
www.washingtonpost.com/news/answer-sheet/wp/2013/08/29/report-public-schools 
-more-segregated-now-than-40-years-ago [https://perma.cc/M7XE-K2JA]. See generally Erica Franken-
berg & Chungmei Lee, Race in American Public Schools: Rapidly Resegregating School Districts, HARV. 
U.: C.R. PROJECT (Aug. 2002), https://civilrightsproject.ucla.edu/research/k-12-education/integration-
and-diversity/race-in-american-public-schools-rapidly 
-resegregating-school-districts/frankenberg-rapidly-resegregating-2002.pdf [https://perma 
.cc/LQ56-F48M] (describing increasing school segregation since the 1980s). 
 31. See, e.g., Joseph P. Williams, Segregation’s Legacy, U.S. NEWS (Apr. 20, 2018, 6:00 AM), 
https://www.usnews.com/news/the-report/articles/2018-04-20/us-is-still-segregated 
-even-after-fair-housing-act [https://perma.cc/MQZ8-Z8WV] (noting that fifty years after the Fair Hous-
ing Act, designed to eliminate housing discrimination, was signed into to law, America remains nearly as 
segregated as when the law was passed). See generally Bruce Mitchell & Juan Franco, HOLC “Redlin-
ing” Maps: The Persistent Structure of Segregation and Economic Inequality, NAT’L COMMUNITY 
REINVESTMENT COALITION (Mar. 20, 2018), https://ncrc.org 
/holc [https://perma.cc/9ESA-CVR7] (describing growing housing segregation). 
 32. Jennifer Jones, Comment, Bakke at 40: Remedying Black Health Disparities Through Affirma-
tive Action in Medical School Admissions, 66 UCLA L. REV. 522, 532–33 (2019) (noting disparities in 
Black health outcomes, such as shortened life expectancies compared to whites, higher infant mortality 
rates, and higher death rates from cancer and AIDS). 
 33. See, e.g., Vann R. Newkirk II, Voter Suppression is Warping Democracy, ATLANTIC (July 17, 
2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2018/07/poll-prri-voter-suppression 
/565355 [https://perma.cc/C2T4-9HD2] (noting deep structural barriers to the ballot for minority voters). 
White women in slave-owning families and institutions not only benefitted from those systems, but were 
at times active agents within it, buying and selling enslaved people, exploiting that relation for relative 
empowerment. See STEPHANIE E. JONES-ROGERS, THEY WERE HER PROPERTY: WHITE WOMEN AS 
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The material and spiritual dimensions of lives shaped by the theft of 
land and national integrity from Native Americans and the Mexican State are 
also framed in sociopolitical discourse as natural and inevitable, rather than 
as the contemporary manifestations of a ruthlessly constitutionalized colo-
nial and imperial regime. Native peoples and their cultures continue to be 
subjected to assimilationist pressures and land, resource and child expropri-
ation—contemporary forms of genocidal practices historically inflicted by 
the U.S. government.34 Unfettered by meaningful constitutional constraints, 
Native peoples have been deprived of self-determination, jurisdiction to ad-
judicate aggression (including sexual) against them, and many treaty rights.35 
Native women are disproportionately trafficked for sex, prostituted, and dis-
appeared.36 Beyond anti-Black and settler colonialism are institutionalized 
patterns of xenophobic bias against immigrants of color, which deprive 
scores of people of basic human rights, including rights to security and fam-
ily.37 
The historical foundations upon which male supremacy rests continue 
to ground conceptions of gender equality that normalize gender hierarchy 
and frame departures from it as exceptional. Discrimination based on sex and 
gender, to the limited extent it has been constitutionally prohibited, has been 
recognized only very recently and merely by interpretation—not originally, 
 
SLAVE OWNERS IN THE AMERICAN SOUTH (2019). 
 34. See, e.g., Barbara Perry, From Ethnocide to Ethnoviolence: Layers of Native American Victim-
ization, 5 CONTEMP. JUST. REV. 231, 232–33 (2002) (exploring the various forms of institutionalized 
exploitation and marginalization of Native Americans); Lisa. M. Poupart, The Familiar Face of Geno-
cide: Internalized Oppression Among American Indians, 18 HYPATIA 86, 87 (2003) (discussing how the 
consequences of colonialism have created a government-sanctioned systematic genocide of American 
Indians). 
 35. For examples of deprivations of treaty rights, see New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 
U.S. 324 (1983) (hunting and fishing); White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136 (1980) 
(logging); Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States, 348 U.S. 272 (1955) (timber); and Johnson v. M’Intosh, 
21 U.S. (8 Wheat) 543, 588 (1823) (“Conquest gives a title which the Courts of the conqueror cannot 
deny. . . .”). Native peoples have also been deprived of legal jurisdictions in criminal law. See Alex Tall-
chief Skibine, Indians, Race, and Criminal Jurisdiction in Indian Country, 10 ALB. GOV’T L. REV. 49, 
49 (2017) (explaining that criminal jurisdiction in Indian Country depends on whether the alleged perpe-
trator or victim qualifies as “Indian”). 
 36. See, e.g., Steven W. Perry, American Indians and Crime 1991-2002, U.S. DEP’T JUST. 6 (2004); 
Sarah Deer, Relocation Revisited: Sex Trafficking of Native Women in the United States, 36 WM. 
MITCHELL L. REV. 621, 624–29 (2010) (explaining the relationship between colonization and sex traf-
ficking of Native women). 
 37. See Richard A. Boswell, Racism and U.S. Immigration Law: Prospects for Reform After 
“9/11?”, 7 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 315, 333–37 (2003) (explaining how an “anchor” immigration sys-
tem like that of the U.S. disfavors people from groups previously excluded from admission, and dispro-
portionately impacts immigrants of color). 
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textually, or historically—making its protection particularly thin and vulner-
able.38 Despite some legal progress for (mostly elite) women, male domi-
nance continues to characterize existing laws and their application.39 Laws 
responsive to women’s circumstances and the social order that subordinates 
them either do not exist or are unenforced.40 State laws against domestic vi-
olence and sexual assault have virtually never been held to equality standards 
in their design or effect.41 The federal legislation against violence against 
women was found to lack constitutional basis.42 Pregnancy is not constitu-
tionally recognized as sex based,43 limiting defenses of reproductive rights 
to those that live under other constitutional rubrics. All women on average 
are not paid equally to men—largely because they are segregated into work 
that is valued less because women are doing it, or that is seen as appropriate 
for women because it is valued less hence paid less.44 This dynamic is accen-
tuated for women of color.45 This pervasive social arrangement has been 
 
 38.  Discrimination based on sex and gender was first constitutionally recognized by the Supreme 
Court in Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971), which held that sex-differential laws must be rationally 
related to valid legislative purpose. 
 39.  See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996) (holding that an elite military college’s 
policy of excluding women violates the Equal Protection Clause); Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 
228 (1989) (finding that a firm denying accounting partnership to a woman employee because of sex 
stereotyping constitutes sex discrimination). But see Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986) 
(recognizing statutory sexual harassment as sex discrimination, a non-elite advance). 
 40. See, e.g., CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, SEX EQUALITY 3 (3d ed. 2016) (noting the “potent com-
bination of social and political mechanisms” that enforce the institutionalized subordination of women). 
 41. See Andrea B. Carroll, Family Law and Female Empowerment, 24 UCLA WOMEN’S L.J. 1, 11–
22 (2017) (detailing how state laws attempting to help domestic-violence victims actually impair some 
women’s rights). However, state statutes are held to equality standards when they are said to discriminate 
facially against men. See, e.g., Michael M. v. Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464 (1981), where a state sexual 
assault statute said to facially apply only to men who had sex with underage girls was upheld. No position 
is taken here on whether men were discriminated against by the statute, although a substantive equality 
rationale for the ruling would have been an improvement. 
 42. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 617, 627 (2000) (holding that Congress exceeded its 
authority under the Commerce Clause and the Equal Protection Clause in enacting the civil remedy pro-
vision of the Violence Against Women Act of 1994). 
 43.  Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 496–97 (1974). 
 44.  MACKINNON, supra note 40, at 253–56. Women also provide most of the unpaid caretaking 
work for their own families. Wendy A. Bach, The Hyperregulatory State: Women, Race, Poverty, and 
Support, 25 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 317, 323 (2014). 
 45.  For instance, in 2018, the median income of Black women was only 65.3% of the median in-
come of white men, whereas white women earned 81.5% of what white men earned. Ariane Hegewisch 
& Heidi Hartmann, The Gender Wage Gap: 2018 Earnings Differences by Race and Ethnicity, INST. FOR 
WOMEN’S POL’Y RES. (Mar. 7, 2019), https://iwpr.org/wp-content 
/uploads/2019/03/C478_Gender-Wage-Gap-in-2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZG6Y-8HFY]; see also Kath-
erine Richard, The Wealth Gap for Women of Color, CTR. FOR GLOBAL POL’Y SOLUTIONS (Oct. 2014) 
http://www.globalpolicysolutions.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/10 
/Wealth-Gap-for-Women-of-Color.pdf [https://perma.cc/JH74-M7F6] (finding that in 2012, Black 
women and Latina women earned 64% and 54% of wages of white men, while white women earned 78% 
of wages of white men). 
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found not to violate existing equality laws.46 Women, within and across ra-
cial groups, are comparatively impoverished and economically insecure. 
They are violated with impunity, exploited economically and sexually, and 
deprived of social stature and human dignity. The intersectional effects of 
race and gender are facilitated within the U.S. sociolegal system, cumula-
tively stacking the deck against women of color, depriving them of the most 
basic means to articulate meaningful claims within existing constitutional 
doctrine. 
The vitiation of equality on the bases of race and gender extends to re-
lated forms of hierarchy. Discrimination based on sexual orientation en-
forces compulsory heterosexuality, a means of maintaining male supremacy. 
Even in the face of the striking legal progress for lesbian women and gay 
men in recent years, their rights are restricted to areas in which state or fed-
eral statutes have been invalidated by the courts—for example, by prohibit-
ing laws criminalizing sodomy47 and by requiring recognition of same-sex 
marriage48—or under statutes guaranteeing sex equality.49 However, in some 
jurisdictions, same-sex partners can still be married on Sunday and fired on 
Monday for the same reason.50 Discrimination against transgender people, 
another kind of gender-based discrimination, is frequently brutal and lethal, 
 
 46. See, e.g., County of Wash. v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161, 179–80 (1981) (allowing a comparable 
worth claim so long as women prison guards’ pay rates are proven intentionally discriminatory); Am. 
Fed’n of State, Cty. & Mun. Emps. (AFSCME) v. Washington, 770 F.2d 1401, 1406–07 (9th Cir. 1985) 
(holding that Title VII permits Washington to set wages according to historically sex discriminatory mar-
ket practices). 
 47.  Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003). 
 48.  Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2604–05 (2015). 
 49.  42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2018). See, e.g., Zarda v. Altitude Express, Inc., 883 F.3d 100, 112–13 
(2d Cir. 2018) (holding that sexual orientation discrimination is a subset of sex discrimination prohibited 
under Title VII), cert. granted, 139 S. Ct. 1599 (2019); Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll., 853 F.3d 339, 
345 (7th Cir. 2017) (same). 
 50. Whether the Title VII prohibition on sex discrimination applies to sexual orientation or 
transgender status is pending before the Supreme Court, to be decided during the 2019 Term. See Altitude 
Express, Inc. v. Zarda, 139 S. Ct. 1599 (2019) (cert. granted); Bostock v. Clayton Cty., 139 S. Ct. 1599 
(2019) (same); Harris Funeral Homes, Inc. v. EEOC, 139 S. Ct. 1599 (2019) (same). This issue has par-
ticular impact on the intersection of sexual orientation, gender identity, and race. A recent study analyzing 
over 9,000 sexual-orientation and gender identity discrimination charges found an “overrepresentation of 
Black charging parties,” which, combined with allegations of race discrimination, “suggests that the in-
tersection of these stigmatized identities could shape experiences of employment discrimination for this 
group.” M.V. Lee Badgett et al., Evidence from the Frontlines on Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity 
Discrimination, UNIV. OF MASS. AMHERST: CTR. FOR EMP’T EQUITY (July 2018), 
https://www.umass.edu/employmentequity/evidence-frontlines-sexual-orientation-and 
-gender-identity-discrimination [https://perma.cc/8VVF-DQAM]. 
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causing unemployment,51 homelessness,52 and vicious stigmatization without 
meaningful systemic relief.53 
Inequality is not inevitable. Indeed, it takes considerable force to main-
tain, given the fact that all peoples are human equals—meaning, at minimum, 
that no racial and/or gendered group is actually superior or inferior to an-
other. Human hierarchy based on sex and/or race is not only a political con-
struction created to confer power on some over others. It is predicated on the 
lie of natural hierarchy: the fiction that the actual basis, origin, and founda-
tion of the present socially tiered status of sex- and race-based groups is sex 
and/or race itself, rather than the power interests of those who dominate on 
those grounds—grounds that are themselves constructed by these same po-
litically interested configurations. Failure to order societies to correspond to 
the reality of equality has resulted in the intensification of inequality over 
time, making it appear to be “just there” to many, reinforcing the ideology 
of its natural basis. The law’s participation in obscuring the fact that the ex-
isting system is one of imposed social hierarchy rather than natural differ-
ence—or, in any event, that such “differences” as exist are equal—has ra-
tionalized and legitimated inequality. 
As a result, despite the focused and determined efforts of committed 
movements, communities, organizations, lawyers, and some scholars, led by 
generations of valiant activists, the United States remains a deeply unequal 
society. Its laws, against formidable interventions for change, have largely 
operated to maintain that inequality. This must end. 
  
 
 51. Sandy E. James et al., The Report of the 2015 U.S. Transgender Survey, NAT’L CTR. FOR 
TRANSGENDER EQUALITY 140–41 (Dec. 2016), https://transequality.org/sites/default/files 
/docs/usts/USTS-Full-Report-Dec17.pdf [https://perma.cc/5RTJ-TKLX]. 
 52.  Id. at 110. 
 53.  Some circuits have recognized transgender discrimination as sex discrimination under Title VII. 
See, e.g., Glenn v. Brumby, 663 F.3d 1312 (11th Cir. 2011); Smith v. City of Salem, 378 F.3d 566 (6th 
Cir. 2004); Rosa v. Park West Bank & Trust Co., 214 F.3d 213 (1st Cir. 2000); Schwenk v. Hartford, 204 
F.3d 1187 (9th Cir. 2000). The best decision conceptually is the breakthrough case of Schroer v. Billing-
ton, 577 F. Supp. 2d 293 (D.D.C. 2008). Other courts refuse to cover gender identity discrimination under 
Title VII’s prohibition on sex discrimination. See, e.g., Oiler v. Winn-Dixie La., Inc., No. 00-3114, 2002 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17417 (E.D. La. Sept. 16, 2002). Trans individuals continue to face “extraordinary” 
levels of physical and sexual violence, with more than one in four trans people reporting that they have 
faced a “bias-driven assault” and even higher rates for trans women and trans people of color. Issues:  
Anti-Violence, NAT’L CTR. FOR TRANSGENDER EQUALITY, https://transequality.org/isues/anti 
-violence [https://perma.cc/BH5H-ZRMW]. 
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II.  NEW EQUALITY AMENDMENT DRAFT 
The Equality Amendment 
Whereas all women, and men of color, were historically excluded as 
equals, intentionally and functionally, from the Constitution of the 
United States, subordinating these groups structurally and systemi-
cally; and 
Whereas prior constitutional amendments have allowed extreme ine-
qualities of race and/or sex and/or like grounds of subordination to 
continue without effective legal remedy, and have even been used to 
entrench such inequalities; and 
Whereas this country aspires to be a democracy of, by, and for all of 
its people, and to treat all people of the world in accordance with hu-
man rights principles; 
Therefore be it enacted that— 
Section 1. Women in all their diversity shall have equal rights in the 
United States and every place subject to its jurisdiction. 
This language provides affirmative equality rights to all women, rather 
than prohibiting states from denying women equal rights, whether intention-
ally or inadvertently, facially or by impact. Because women are not exclu-
sively, or even principally, made or kept unequal to men by the actions of 
states, but rather by the social order—its structures, forces, institutions, and 
individuals acting in concert—this Section has no state-action requirement. 
The state does not so much act to deny equality of rights through law as it 
fails to guarantee freedom from these violations, and fails to provide legal 
claims against them or precludes those claims altogether. Equality is power-
fully denied to women through law abdicating an equality role, for example, 
in domestic violence, sexual abuse and exploitation, and unequal pay for 
work of comparable worth. Law allows these violations to happen, and to 
continue to happen, until they form the substrate of the normal. The negative 
state—the state as embodied in a constitution that supposedly guarantees 
rights best by intervening in society least—has largely abandoned women to 
social inequality imposed on them by men. This Section therefore affirma-
tively envisions equality as a right, permitting legal claims for discrimination 
against nonstate actors and state actors alike who deny equal rights to 
women. 
Marginal improvements can be made in women’s conditions by ad-
dressing sex as an abstraction, as in Section 2 of this Amendment. But ab-
stract equality enshrines dominant groups as the standard, failing to rectify 
discrimination for those who do not meet it. Inequality, meanwhile, itself 
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denies access to the means of meeting dominant standards and creates the 
illusion that those standards are neutral or meritocratic, when they are simply 
dominant. Substantive equality, in contrast, begins with recognizing the con-
crete historical situation of subjected, violated, and denigrated people, called 
by name: women in all their diversity.54 This concrete language is particu-
larly useful for avoiding failures to address the situation of women who are 
multiply subjected, who under the abstract equality approach are open to the 
dodge that their discrimination is based on factors other than sex.55 Here, 
they are women. Women encompass characteristics of virtually every social 
group: women’s diverse qualities and inequalities substantially make up 
what a woman is. When used through or with sex or gender to discriminate 
against them, that is discrimination because they are women, therefore what 
discrimination against women as such looks like. 
Section 2. Equality of rights shall not be denied or abridged by the 
United States or by any State on account of sex (including pregnancy, 
gender, sexual orientation, or gender identity), and/or race (including 
ethnicity, national origin, or color), and/or like grounds of subordina-
tion (such as disability or faith). No law or its interpretation shall give 
force to common law disadvantages that exist on the ground(s) enu-
merated in this Amendment. 
Section 2 provides for negative rights that are predicated on discrimi-
natory state action, state or federal. Once rights are provided unequally, a 
legal claim of discrimination can arise. This Section adapts in its first sen-
tence the basic language of the ERA proposed in 1972, passage of which 
would itself be an improvement.56 Notably, the first clause of Section 2 is 
 
 54. The first time the idea of substantive equality was spoken in public was 1989. See CATHARINE 
A. MACKINNON, BUTTERFLY POLITICS 110 (2017). See generally MACKINNON, supra note 40 (develop-
ing the concept of substantive equality across U.S., comparative, and international law and theory); Cath-
arine A. MacKinnon, Substantive Equality Revisited: A Rejoinder to Sandra Fredman, 15 INT’L J. CONST. 
L. 1174 (2017) (arguing that hierarchy of power is the fundamental dynamic of inequality); Catharine A. 
MacKinnon, Substantive Equality: A Perspective, 96 Minn. L. Rev. 1 (2011) (arguing that reality of sub-
stantive inequality should be incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment’s equal protection guarantee). 
 55. See generally KIMBERLÉ CRENSHAW, ON INTERSECTIONALITY (forthcoming 2020); Kimberlé 
Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrim-
ination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 139, 139–40, 166–67; 
Kimberlé Crenshaw, The Urgency of Intersectionality, TEDWOMEN (Oct. 2016), 
https://www.ted.com/talks/kimberle_crenshaw_the_urgency_of_intersectionality 
[https://perma.cc/J4V5-E994]; Kimberlé Crenshaw, Why Intersectionality Can’t Wait, WASH. POST 
(Sept. 24, 2015, 3:00 PM EST), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/in-theory 
/wp/2015/09/24/why-intersectionality-cant-wait [https://perma.cc/X3LL-GWCH]. 
 56. For the conventional articulation of the interpretation of the 1972 ERA, which may yet be rati-
fied, see generally Barbara A. Brown et al., The Equal Rights Amendment: A Constitutional Basis for 
Equal Rights for Women, 80 YALE L.J. 871 (1971). 
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identical to the Nineteenth Amendment and the 1972 ERA, but for its sub-
stitution of “equality of rights” in place of the right to vote.57 Some of the 
equality theory animating the Equality Amendment—for instance, its sub-
stantive and concrete rather than formal and abstract approach, and its un-
derstanding of intersectionality as a necessary component of sex—could be 
used in interpreting the 1972 ERA, should it be ratified and come into force. 
The language of the Equality Amendment locks in its distinctive approach, 
meaning, and application. Providing such explicit instruction to courts makes 
it less likely that the standard symmetrical approach to equality will be re-
flexively applied and the asymmetries—that is, the actual social inequalities 
that need to be remedied—will remain ignored. The express reference to sub-
ordination in the Equality Amendment provides more substantive language 
that otherwise could be reduced to anti-classification (as if classification is 
the only injury of subordination, when it is merely one tool of it), or to anti-
stereotyping (as if being typecast as a member of a group of which one is a 
member is the essence of inequality, when it is merely one tool of it, and 
only sometimes). Hierarchy is inequality’s real injury. And, of course, the 
Equality Amendment applies beyond sex itself. 
Pregnancy, gender, sexual orientation, and gender identity are grouped 
under “sex” because they are all facets of the unified but diverse system of 
inequality that privileges maleness and masculinity over femaleness and 
femininity, enforcing sexual rules and gendered myths, roles and stereo-
types, and punishing noncompliance. Discrimination against transgender or 
nonbinary persons based on gender or sex, including nonconformity, would 
be covered. Similarly, ethnicity, national origin, and color are grouped under 
“race” because they are complexly but inexorably racialized in the United 
States, privileging whiteness and punishing as lesser anyone seen as not so-
called white. 
Adaptability is part of the ingenuity, the genius, of inequality. Section 
2’s “like grounds” clause is thus open-ended, while maintaining race and sex 
as the substantive touchstones for the covered inequalities. The “like 
grounds” clause permits recognition of as yet unknown or unanticipated 
forms inequality can take. 
This Amendment is designed to cover lacunae in existing law. Disabil-
ity is expressly covered because of inadequacies in existing legislation and a 
general failure to recognize that it is social assumptions, not individuals’ par-
ticular abilities, that result in the deprivation of resources and dignity and 
extreme marginalization of disability discrimination. Like every inequality, 
discriminatory deprivations are distinctive to this ground: distinctively 
 
 57. U.S. CONST. amend. XIX. 
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wrenching, extreme, irrational, and cumulatively and systemically disad-
vantaging. 
Although many constitutional and statutory provisions exist to protect 
spiritual beliefs and practices, including those fundamental to the Founding, 
failures to protect minority religions make clear the need to include this pro-
vision expressly.58 All groups are entitled to constitutional rights, but domi-
nant religions have less purchase here, as they would need to show subordi-
nation, a substantive term relative to evidence, similar to that suffered by 
women and people of color, who lack adequate coverage by existing law. 
One possible like ground, adequately litigated, could be social and eco-
nomic class. But race and sex discrimination together and separately do a 
great deal of class work. Just how much of class disadvantage would be left 
if race and sex inequality were adequately addressed is an open question. In 
addition, class as a factor, for women especially, is often vicarious and pro-
tean, its features calling for full concrete development. 
Of course, the Equality Amendment’s language does not imply or per-
mit an intent requirement. This is because discrimination is not a moral fail-
ing of individuals but a pervasive social practice of power—epistemic, prac-
tical, and structural. No one need intend to perpetuate discrimination for it to 
persist. Therefore, no showing of intent is required to legally undo and rem-
edy it. 
The last sentence of Section 2 prohibits interpretive piggybacking on 
existing long-term discrimination that is built into the common law. Consider 
that Section 1 would prohibit as a denial of equality much social discrimina-
tion that is not now prohibited and is embodied in common law. A cardinal 
example of denying force to common law disadvantages predicated on ine-
quality is Shelley v. Kraemer, in which state court decisions upholding ra-
cially restrictive covenants were denied enforcement under the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s equal protection guarantee.59 This ruling has been largely con-
fined to its facts; its larger animating principle is captured in Section 3. 
Section 3. To fully realize the rights guaranteed under this Amend-
ment, Congress and the several States shall take legislative and other 
measures to prevent or redress any disadvantage suffered by individ-
uals or groups because of past and/or present inequality as prohibited 
by this Amendment, and shall take all steps requisite and effective to 
abolish prior laws, policies, or constitutional provisions that impede 
 
 58. See, e.g., Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018) (upholding the Trump Administration’s 
“Muslim Ban”); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) (quashing a Muslim detainee’s claims of discrim-
ination and mistreatment). While text matters in interpretation, conflicts between provisions cannot be 
entirely precluded by drafting. 
 59. 334 U.S. 1, 23 (1948). 
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equal political representation. 
The word “shall” affirmatively requires legislative and administrative 
authorities to implement this Amendment. There is no option not to, although 
the text of the Section leaves its precise implementation open. 
The distribution of political power built into the Constitution impedes 
democratic progress, making it far easier to sustain conditions made uncon-
stitutional by this Amendment than to dismantle them. The undemocratic 
protection, promotion, and insulation of an unequal socioeconomic order—
slavery—continues to structure the political system under which leadership 
is elected, undermining the capacity for change in accordance with this 
Amendment. It must be dislodged from the Constitution’s foundation. Sec-
tion 3 leaves to Congress the task of evaluating the Electoral College, for 
example, but giving more weight to voters in some states than in others in 
presidential elections would likely invalidate it. Upon ratification of this 
Amendment, Congress would be required to take up the question under this 
Amendment’s approach. 
Section 4. Nothing in Section 2 shall invalidate a law, program, or ac-
tivity that is protected or required under Section 1 or 3. 
Undoing discrimination is not discrimination. Promoting equality un-
does inequality. Section 4 repudiates the premise that classification per se is 
the injury of inequality and embraces the understanding that group hierarchy 
is the essence of inequality’s injury.60 Accordingly, this Section requires that 
any law, policy, or practice qualifying as protected or required under Sec-
tions 1 and 3 may not be eliminated under Section 2. Currently, for example, 
affirmative-action plans and policies can be constitutionally challenged as 
discriminatory based on the notion that the Equal Protection Clause prohibits 
treatment based on categories or classifications rather than imposed relations 
of superiority and inferiority among groups or precluded opportunities of 
certain groups.61 So long as the requirements of Sections 1 and/or 3 are met, 
and it is recognized that the Equality Amendment supersedes the Equal Pro-
tection Clause (and Fifth Amendment Due Process as to the federal govern-
ment) in the equality arena, as it should, this reverse engineering of inequal-
ity into equality guarantees would be over. 
 
 60. This proposed section parallels Section 15(2) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, 
which states that the equal-rights protection found in Section 15(1) “does not preclude any law, program 
or activity that has as its object the amelioration of conditions of disadvantaged individuals or groups.” 
Can. Const. (Constitution Act, 1982) pt. 1 (Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms), § 15(2). 
 61. John Valery White, What is Affirmative Action?, 78 TUL. L. REV. 2117, 2124 (2004). 
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III.  RECONSTITUTING THE FUTURE 
The proposed Equality Amendment embraces an intersectional ap-
proach to equality, prioritizing race and gender for historical as well as con-
temporary reasons. This year’s Nineteenth Amendment Centennial, com-
memorating women’s right to vote, must not obscure the reality that not all 
women became full citizens upon the Amendment’s passage. As the suffrage 
struggle for the Nineteenth Amendment demonstrates, the political processes 
used to change laws deeply influence the substantive changes that those laws 
can produce. The fight for the vote for all women was intertwined with at-
tempts to repeal the Fifteenth Amendment, which prohibits states from deny-
ing the right to vote based on race, color, or prior servitude,62 because of 
white racist fears of enfranchising Black women.63 The suffrage movement 
often excluded African American women from its marches and speaking 
platforms, despite their determined support for the right to vote.64 Historical 
disempowerment of women of color by some women’s suffrage organizers 
and entities contributed to a demobilization that has undermined their full 
participation in the political process, and thus real democracy, today. The 
Equality Amendment is therefore predicated on recognizing the full inter-
connection between race- and gender-based subordination and is designed to 
deinstitutionalize it in all of its forms. But in recognition of the relationship 
between the politics of lawmaking and the law that politics makes, it will be 
the political mobilization, if pursued by the politics that animate this text, 
that produces its passage, as much as anything in its wording, that guarantees 
that the dual erasure of women of color is not replicated. 
The Equality Amendment has been needed all along. But it is needed 
now as much or more than ever. Without equality, democracy is in peril: real 
equality provides the voting power to break the glass ceiling, guaranteed 
rights that raise the floor for all citizens, and recognition of the reality that 
inequalities intersect and overlap, making it impossible to rectify one alone. 
All Americans deserve equality guarantees that cannot be taken away or dis-
regarded. And in a true democracy, each citizen should have an equal right 
to vote and have their vote count equally. Only the Constitution can provide 
this power and protection. But no constitutional amendment alone can guar-
antee these results. History shows that law is subject to retrenchment as well 
 
 62. U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1. 
 63.  See Kimberly A. Hamlin, How Racism Almost Killed Women’s Right to Vote, WASH. POST (June 
4, 2019, 6:00 AM EST), https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2019/06/04/how 
-racism-almost-killed-womens-right-vote [https://perma.cc/H7PP-P8A8]. 
 64. See, e.g., ANGELA Y. DAVIS, Racism in the Woman Suffrage Movement, in WOMEN, RACE, AND 
CLASS 70, 70–86 (1981). 
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as advance, particularly when emerging from and overlaid upon a noninter-
sectional power grid. This is not a reason to succumb, but a challenge to 
create the conditions for change. 
Most Americans believe that the Constitution already guarantees equal 
rights.65 Unlike most constitutions in the world, it does not.66 It is the respon-
sibility of “We, the People” to adapt the Constitution to the society we live 
in; to grow in our recognition of problems and potential solutions; to 
strengthen our democracy in an intimately interconnected world. Neither too 
vague nor too prescriptive, this proposal, offered as a beginning, aspires to 
sketch a path, to clear terrain to open a space for everyone to fill and, finally, 
to be heard. 
Generations past have fought and died for equality, bringing us to this 
moment. The perceptions, principles, and language of this proposal can be 
used as a guide to legal and political action in every realm. Having broken 
the code by which U.S. equality law and theory has been constrained from 
fulfilling its promise, we are determined to be the last generation to fight for 
it. We can all be framers. 
 
 65. A 2016 poll commissioned by the Equal Rights Amendment Coalition suggests that eighty per-
cent of Americans believe that the Constitution guarantees equal rights to men and women. Nicole Tor-
toriello, Making the Case for the Equal Rights Amendment, ACLU VA.  
(Jan. 3, 2019, 1:00 PM), https://acluva.org/en/news/making-case-equal-rights-amendment 
[https://perma.cc/K8JG-Y2YA]. 
 66.  See Catharine A. MacKinnon, Gender in Constitutions, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF 
COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 397, 404 (Michel Rosenfeld & András Sajó eds., 2012). 
 
 
LAW SCHOOL IN A DIFFERENT VOICE 
MELISSA MURRAY† 
INTRODUCTION 
Almost twelve years ago, I was living in Northern California and 
eagerly awaiting the birth of my first child. Like many first-time parents, I 
sought advice and counsel from more experienced parents. Much of the 
advice I received only served to stoke my bubbling anxieties about 
parenthood, but one piece of advice left me truly puzzled. “Get a doula.” A 
doula? What on earth was a doula? I flipped through all of my parenting 
magazines. There were several column inches about the best lactation 
pumps, baby carriers, and strollers, but precious little about doulas. What I 
did find only amplified my confusion. A doula, one magazine advised, was 
a companion for new mothers, helping them have a more satisfying labor 
and birth experience. This revelation only prompted more uncertainty. Why 
did I need a doula if I already had an obstetrician, a team of medical 
professionals, and a husband whose duty, if not by law then by custom, was 
to hold my hand and be an amiable birth companion? 
After further inquiry, I learned that the term “doula” derives from the 
Greek word for “women’s servant.”1 Indeed, for centuries, doulas have 
served women in childbirth by providing physical, emotional, and 
educational support before, during, and after labor.2 According to the 
American Pregnancy Association, the doula’s “purpose is to help women 
have a safe, memorable, and empowering birthing experience.”3 As my doula 
put it (yes, I succumbed to the pressure), the doula’s role was to approach 
birth from a different perspective: the woman’s. The doula’s work was not 
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 1. See Doula, OXFORD ENG. DICTIONARY, www.oed.com/view/Entry/248791 (last visited Nov. 8, 
2019); Having a Doula: Is a Doula for Me?, AM. PREGNANCY ASS’N, 
https://americanpregnancy.org/labor-and-birth/having-a-doula (last visited Nov. 8, 2019) (“[D]oula is a 
Greek word meaning women’s servant.”). 
 2. Having a Doula: Is a Doula for Me?, supra note 1. 
 3. Id. 
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necessarily to advocate for her patient, but rather to empower and encourage 
the patient to advocate for herself and her own goals and aspirations for 
managing labor and delivery. And in supporting the woman through labor 
and delivery, the doula empowers her charge to take on the many challenges 
of parenthood with confidence. 
Twelve years later, I can barely remember the details of childbirth, but 
I find myself frequently reflecting on the work of doulas. To be clear, I am 
not a doula, nor am I about to give birth. But I have had an opportunity to 
think deeply about what it means to support and empower women at a critical 
time in their lives: as they begin their careers as lawyers. As importantly, I 
have thought deeply about what it means to cultivate more broadly the 
conditions under which women can achieve success in law school and in 
their professional careers. 
Just a year ago, I left Northern California to join the faculty of New 
York University School of Law. In addition to my role as a law professor, I 
also assumed the helm of the Birnbaum Women’s Leadership Network 
(BWLN).4 The BWLN’s mission is focused on cultivating and developing 
the leadership potential of N.Y.U.’s law students, supporting the Law School 
“as an environment that nurtures women’s achievement,” and engaging the 
legal profession “to better enable women lawyers to fulfill their potential.”5 
It is a broad mission—and one that can, at times, seem overwhelming. But 
at bottom, the goals of developing leadership potential and cultivating the 
conditions under which women can thrive is not that far off from the work 
of doulas. 
In this short essay, I reflect on the progress that women have made in 
the legal profession over the last fifty years, while also considering areas of 
concern for women’s professional representation. With these challenges in 
mind, I discuss the BWLN’s efforts to create a more inclusive culture within 
the legal academy and the profession. 
  
 
 4. BWLN Leadership, BIRNBAUM WOMEN’S LEADERSHIP NETWORK, 
https://www.law.nyu.edu/centers/birnbaum-womens-leadership-network/about/leadership (last visited 
Nov. 8, 2019). 
 5. About the BWLN, BIRNBAUM WOMEN’S LEADERSHIP NETWORK, 
https://www.law.nyu.edu/centers/birnbaum-womens-leadership-network/about (last visited Nov. 8, 
2019). 
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I.  FROM MYRA AND PORTIA TO THE PRESENT 
The name Myra Bradwell is unlikely to be well known to most 
Americans, but for students in my Constitutional Law and Family Law 
classes, Bradwell’s experience is a fundamental part of the doctrine we 
discuss and a touchstone for their own experiences in law school. Born in 
Manchester, Vermont in 1831, Bradwell worked as a schoolteacher before 
marrying James Bradwell in 1852.6 In 1855, the Bradwells moved to Illinois, 
where they raised their family and James Bradwell launched a successful 
career as a lawyer, jurist, and legislator.7 
As her husband’s professional star rose, Myra Bradwell occupied 
herself with her own professional pursuits. In 1868, she launched the 
Chicago Legal News, a weekly legal periodical.8 Serving as editor, Myra 
Bradwell grew the magazine into the most important legal publication in the 
western United States.9 In her spare time, Bradwell was also active in the 
women’s suffrage movement.10 
It was not long before Myra Bradwell began to harbor her own 
aspirations for a career in the law. In 1869, she sat for and passed the 
qualifying exam for admission to the Illinois bar.11 However, when she 
applied for admission, the Illinois Supreme Court, which oversaw the 
licensing of lawyers, rejected her application on the ground that women were 
not contemplated in the statute prescribing the rules for admission to the 
bar.12 The Illinois court also noted that as a married woman, Bradwell was 
incapable of forming contracts in Illinois, an essential aspect of legal 
practice.13 
 
 6. George W. Gale, Myra Bradwell: The First Woman Lawyer, 39 A.B.A. J. 1080, 1080 (1953) 
(providing details about Myra Bradwell’s personal and family life). 
 7. See id. at 1080–81; Nancy T. Gilliam, A Professional Pioneer: Myra Bradwell’s Fight to 
Practice Law, 5 L. & HIST. REV. 105, 106 (1987) (discussing James Bradwell’s career path from lawyer 
to probate judge and state legislator). 
 8. Gilliam, supra note 7, at 106. 
 9. See Gale, supra note 6, at 1080–81 (noting that the publication became “the most important 
legal publication west of the Alleghenies”). 
 10. Id. at 1081 (describing Myra Bradwell as working “diligently and ever-lastingly for the 
woman’s suffrage movement and freedom for women”). 
 11. Id. at 1080. 
 12. In re Bradwell, 55 Ill. 535, 538 (1869) (holding that the Court could “not admit any persons or 
class of persons [to the bar] who are not intended by the legislature to be admitted, even though their 
exclusion is not expressly required by the statute”), aff’d, 83 U.S. 130 (1872); see also Gilliam, supra 
note 7, at 110–11 (providing further detail about Myra Bradwell’s arguments and the Court’s decision). 
 13. Myra Bradwell’s inability to form binding contracts served as the basis for the Illinois Supreme 
Court’s initial order denying her application to the bar. In re Bradwell, 55 Ill. at 535–36; Gilliam, supra 
note 7, at 109. In a subsequent order, the Illinois court rejected Bradwell’s arguments that recent changes 
in state law loosening the restrictions of coverture allowed married women like her to make contracts 
independently of their husbands and therefore enter the legal profession. In re Bradwell, 55 Ill. at 536–
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Bradwell challenged her exclusion all the way to the United States 
Supreme Court, where the Court, in one of its earliest decisions exploring 
the scope and substance of the recently ratified Fourteenth Amendment, 
concluded that the right to practice law was not among the privileges and 
immunities protected under the Constitution.14 If the Court’s majority had 
focused on constitutional text in upholding the Illinois court’s disposition of 
Bradwell’s case, Associate Justice Joseph Bradley focused on an entirely 
different constitution. As Bradley put it, “[t]he constitution of the family 
organization, which is founded in the divine ordinance, as well as in the 
nature of things, indicates the domestic sphere as that which properly belongs 
to the domain and functions of womanhood.”15 On this account, the state’s 
ability to exclude Bradwell from the legal profession did not proceed from a 
crabbed interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantees, but rather 
from the basic assumption that women belonged in the home, and not in the 
legal profession. 
I teach Bradwell’s case, Bradwell v. Illinois, in Constitutional Law and 
Family Law. In Constitutional Law, the case—and Bradley’s concurrence, 
in particular—reflects the paternalism that once characterized the Court’s 
treatment of sex discrimination. In Family Law, the case mirrors the 
“separate spheres” ideology that once characterized—and in some areas, still 
characterizes—the legal regulation of the family.16 
 
37. 
 14. Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130, 139 (1872) (“[T]here are privileges and immunities belonging 
to citizens of the United States . . . which a State is forbidden to abridge. But the right to admission to 
practice in the courts of a State is not one of them.”). 
 15. Id. at 141 (Bradley, J., concurring). 
 16. In the decades following Bradwell, the Court openly espoused the idea that women were ill-
suited to work outside the home. See, e.g., Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 422 (1908) (upholding a 
maximum-hours requirement for women workers because “her physical structure and a proper discharge 
of her maternal functions—having in view not merely her own health, but the well-being of the race—
justify legislation to protect her from the greed as well as the passion of man”); Radice v. New York, 264 
U.S. 292, 294 (1924) (allowing states to prohibit women from working night shifts in restaurants because 
the loss of sleep might “bear more heavily against women than men . . . considering their more delicate 
organism”). As late as the mid-1900s, “the lawbooks of our Nation were rife with overbroad 
generalizations about the way men and women are.” Sessions v. Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. 1678, 1689 
(2017) (invalidating a 1940 immigration statute that favored unwed mothers over unwed fathers based on 
the assumption that unwed mothers would bear responsibility for nonmarital children); see also Hoyt v. 
Florida, 368 U.S. 57, 61–62 (1961) (upholding a state law that required men, but not women, to serve on 
juries because “[d]espite the enlightened emancipation of women from the restrictions and protections of 
bygone years . . . woman is still regarded as the center of home and family life”), abrogated by Taylor v. 
Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975); Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464, 466 (1948) (upholding a state licensing 
scheme that only allowed women to serve as bartenders if their husband or father owned the 
establishment), abrogated by Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 210 & n.23 (1976). Even today, the law 
resists efforts by women to market their labor while fulfilling their family obligations. See, e.g., Coleman 
v. Court of Appeals of Md., 566 U.S. 30, 65 (2012) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (criticizing the plurality of 
the Court for failing to see that guaranteed self-care leave was a “key part” of Congress’s effort to “make 
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But Bradwell v. Illinois may have had just as much to say about law 
school and the legal profession. At bottom, Bradwell’s unsuccessful effort to 
be admitted to practice—and the Court’s rejection of her claims—makes 
clear that, at least as conceived, the law was not intended to be a profession 
hospitable to the “fairer sex.” Not only were women not contemplated in the 
rules governing entrance to the profession, but the very nature of legal 
practice was also deemed incompatible with the demands of family life, 
which reflected both women’s true natures and desires and the legal 
impediments of wifedom. 
Nevertheless, she persisted. Despite Myra Bradwell’s setback, some 
states permitted women applicants to the bar, though avenues for legal 
training for women were limited because most law schools restricted their 
enrollments to men.17 Some women were fortunate to find practicing lawyers 
who were willing to engage them as apprentices and “tutor” them in the 
vagaries of the law. Indeed, in 1908, local attorney Arthur Winfield MacLean 
agreed to tutor two Boston women eager to sit for the Massachusetts bar 
examination.18 MacLean’s generosity led other aspiring women lawyers to 
seek him out, eventually prompting him to formalize the arrangement as the 
Portia Law School.19 Named for the heroine of Shakespeare’s The Merchant 
of Venice,20 the Portia Law School became the first law school devoted 
exclusively to the legal education of women.21 
But even if some law schools were hospitable—indeed, oriented 
exclusively—to women, female graduates found the legal profession less 
receptive to their professional aspirations. Many white-shoe law firms 
refused to hire Portia graduates, insisting instead on recruiting only from Ivy 
League law schools,22 many of which did not admit or enroll women, at least 
 
it feasible for women to work while sustaining family life”); Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 
U.S. 721, 731 (2003) (finding that the Family and Medical Leave Act was an appropriate congressional 
response to evidence that states had unfairly administered family leave policies based on “the pervasive 
sex-role stereotype that caring for family members is women’s work”); Borelli v. Brusseau, 16 Cal. Rptr. 
2d 16, 19 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993) (holding that a husband could not agree to compensate his wife for in-
home caregiving because “a wife is obligated by the marriage contract to provide nursing type care to an 
ill husband”). 
 17. See Karen L. Tokarz, A Tribute to the Nation’s First Women Law Students, 68 WASH. U. L.Q. 
89, 92, 94–95 (1990) (noting that Washington University Law School was the first to admit women in 
1868 but that other law schools did not admit women until much later, and therefore it was typical at the 
time for women to have not attended law school prior to being admitted to the bar). 
 18. PHILLIP K. HAMILTON, NEW ENGLAND SCHOOL OF LAW 7 (2008). 
 19. Id. 
 20. Law School History, NEW ENG. L. BOS., https://student.nesl.edu/engaged/history.cfm (last 
visited Nov. 1, 2019). 
 21. HAMILTON, supra note 18, at 7. Today, the Portia Law School survives as New England Law | 
Boston. Law School History, supra note 20. 
 22. See generally JUDITH RICHARDS HOPE, PINSTRIPES & PEARLS 152 (2003) (explaining that even 
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not in significant numbers.23 And even as World War II prompted elite law 
schools to reconsider their positions on admitting women, the profession 
remained stubbornly closed to women for more than a generation.24 
Justices Sandra Day O’Connor and Ruth Bader Ginsburg, graduates of 
Stanford Law and Columbia Law, respectively, openly recounted their 
struggles to obtain law firm employment upon graduation.25 Ten years later, 
when Harvard Law graduated a record number of women (fifteen!26), 
women’s employment prospects were still uneven. As Judith Richard Hope 
recounts, six months after graduation, most of the group, which included 
Elizabeth Hanford Dole (a future Cabinet member and U.S. Senator27) and 
Patricia Schroeder (a future member of Congress28), encountered countless 
rejections in their quest to secure permanent employment.29 For some, the 
 
in the 1960s, some firms only hired from all-male, mostly-Ivy-League social clubs); KAREN BERGER 
MORELLO, THE INVISIBLE BAR: THE WOMAN LAWYER IN AMERICA 1638 TO THE PRESENT 90 (1986) 
(noting the limitations on the numbers of female law students “meant that channels to the larger firms 
served by Columbia, Yale, and Harvard were cut off”).  
 23. The first women graduated from the University of Pennsylvania Law School in 1883, Cornell 
Law in 1893, Columbia Law in 1930, and Harvard Law in 1953. Women, Leadership, & the Law, U. PA. 
CAREY L. SCH., https://www.law.upenn.edu/academics/specialty/women (last visited Nov. 12, 2019); 
Cornell Law School: Historical Timeline, CORNELL L. SCH., 
https://www.lawschool.cornell.edu/about/timeline/index.cfm (last visited Nov. 6, 2019); The History of 
Columbia Law School, COLUM. L. SCH., https://www.law.columbia.edu/about/history (last visited Nov. 
1, 2019) (noting that Columbia enrolled its first women students in 1927); Aidan F. Ryan, Harvard Law 
School Celebrates 65 Years of Female Graduates, HARV. CRIMSON (Sept. 19, 2018), 
https://www.thecrimson.com/article/2018/9/19/hls-celebration-65. While one woman allegedly entered 
Yale Law in 1884 by using only her initials on her application, the school did not have any further woman 
graduates until 1920. Judith Schiff, Yale’s First Female Graduate, YALE ALUMNI MAG. (Sept./Oct. 
2013), https://yalealumnimagazine.com/articles/3742-yales-first-female-graduate. 
 24. Many firms hired women at the start of the War, but after it was over, many women left after it 
became clear that they would never make partner. See Cynthia Grant Bowman, Women in the Legal 
Profession from the 1920s to the 1970s: What Can We Learn from Their Experience About Law and 
Social Change?, 61 ME. L. REV. 1, 5–7 (2009) (explaining that many law firms filled wartime vacancies 
with women lawyers but stopped recruiting women after the War in favor of veterans). 
 25. See EVAN W. THOMAS, FIRST: SANDRA DAY O’CONNOR 43–44 (2019) (recounting O’Connor’s 
frustrations at graduating in the top ten percent of her class and being rejected by every law firm she 
applied to); Sandra Day O’Connor, Portia’s Progress, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1546, 1549 (1991) (“I myself, 
after graduating near the top of my class at Stanford Law School, was unable to obtain a position at any 
national law firm, except as a legal secretary.”); Nina Totenberg, Does Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg Have 
Any Regrets? Hardly, NPR (July 18, 2019, 7:00 AM), https://www.npr.org/2019/07/28/745304221/does-
justice-ruth-bader-ginsburg-have-any-regrets-hardly (quoting Justice Ginsburg as saying, “I got out of 
law school, I have top grades, [and] no law firm in the city of New York will hire me”). 
 26. RICHARDS HOPE, supra note 22, at 151. 
 27. DOLE, Elizabeth Hanford, U.S. H.R.: HIST., ART & ARCHIVES, 
https://history.house.gov/People/detail/12577 (last visited Nov. 7, 2019). 
 28. SCHROEDER, Patricia Scott, U.S. H.R.: HIST., ART & ARCHIVES, 
https://history.house.gov/People/Listing/S/SCHROEDER,-Patricia-Scott-(S000142) (last visited Nov. 7, 
2019). 
 29. RICHARDS HOPE, supra note 22, at 151 (explaining that most of the graduating women did not 
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rejections diverted them to more fruitful paths—government service and 
politics.30 For others, the rejections merely confirmed the sense that, despite 
the narrow opening that had allowed them the chance to attend Harvard, the 
doors to the legal profession would remain closed for the foreseeable future. 
Today, the doors to law school are open wider than ever to women. In 
2016, women made up 51.3% of matriculating J.D. students.31 As 
importantly, women graduate from law schools and enter the profession at 
rates that are on par with their male counterparts.32 
But even as women have reached parity in law school admission and 
graduation rates, the empirical portrait in other areas of the profession is less 
rosy. Men are more likely to achieve the traditional measures of law school 
success—graduation honors,33 law review membership and leadership,34 and 
judicial clerkships.35 Women law students also recount feelings of alienation 
and heightened anxiety during law school.36 
 
have permanent jobs lined up six months before graduation). Schroeder moved to Denver, where no firm 
would hire her as a trial lawyer, so she worked for the National Labor Relations Board. Id. at 155. After 
earning the second-highest bar exam score in Ohio, Hope received no offers from firms except to serve 
as a secretary, so she moved to Washington, D.C., where she leveraged offers from the U.S. Department 
of Justice to eventually clinch a job with Williams & Connolly. Id. at 169–74. When Dole graduated a 
year later and Hope recommended her for a position at Williams & Connolly, her boss said they could 
only have “so many” female Harvard graduates at a time, so Dole ended up at the Department of Health, 
Education, and Welfare. Id. at 175. 
 30. See supra note 29 and accompanying text. Other classmates who entered government service 
are Marge Gibson Haskell (Department of Defense), Sonia Faust (Corporation Counsel of Honolulu), and 
Liz Daldy Dyson (probation officer). RICHARDS HOPE, supra note 22, at 164–65. 
 31. AM. BAR ASS’N, A CURRENT GLANCE AT WOMEN IN THE LAW 4 (2019), 
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/women/current_glance_2019.pdf. 
 32. Id. at 2, 4 (stating that women make up nearly 46% of associates at law firms and receive fifty 
percent of J.D.s awarded). 
 33. See, e.g., THE WOMEN’S ADVOCACY PROJECT, SPEAK NOW: WOMEN, EDUCATION, AND 
ACHIEVEMENT AT THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW SCHOOL 39 (2018), 
https://www.law.uchicago.edu/files/2018-05/wap_final.pdf (noting that between 2014 and 2017 at the 
University of Chicago Law School, men received 63% of all honors awarded at graduation while women 
received 37%). 
 34. MS. JD, WOMEN ON LAW REVIEW: A GENDER DIVERSITY REPORT 1, 4 (2012), https://ms-
jd.org/files/lr2012_final.pdf (reporting that law reviews at “Top 50” law schools are made up of about 
43% women and only 29% have female editors-in-chief). But see Susan Kelley, Ladies First: Law Review 
Elects Historic All-Female Board, CORNELL CHRON. (Feb. 27, 2019), 
https://news.cornell.edu/stories/2019/02/ladies-first-law-review-elects-historic-all-female-board 
(reporting that the Cornell Law Review elected its first all-female board in 2019). 
 35. Tony Mauro, Shut Out: SCOTUS Clerks Still Mostly White and Male, NAT’L L.J. (Dec. 11, 
2017), https://www.law.com/nationallawjournal/sites/nationallawjournal/2017/12/11/shut-out-scotus-
law-clerks-still-mostly-white-and-male (finding that men are twice as likely as women to be a Supreme 
Court clerk). But see A Demographic Profile of Judicial Clerks – 2006 to 2016, NALP (Oct. 2017), 
https://www.nalp.org/1017research (showing that about 47% of federal judicial clerks and 53% of state 
judicial clerks were women in 2016).  
 36. See Dara E. Purvis, Female Law Students, Gendered Self-Evaluation, and the Promise of 
Positive Psychology, 2012 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1693, 1702–03 (2012) (explaining how female law students 
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The phenomenon is similar on the other side of the classroom podium. 
Within the academy, women comprised just 23% of tenured and tenure-track 
law professors in 2013.37 Happily, 30% of law school deans are women, a 
number that has increased remarkably in the last ten years.38 That said, 
women’s representation among the leadership of the top fifteen law schools 
lags behind this general trend. Among the top fifteen law schools, a 
significant number have never had a woman dean.39 
Women are also less represented on the pages of the leading law 
reviews and journals. In a random sampling of the top ten law reviews, 
women comprised just 20% of published authors.40 The disparity in women’s 
representation in law review publications has important downstream 
consequences: In the legal academy’s “publish or perish” culture, well-
placed publications are a crucial factor for tenure decisions and lateral 
promotions. 
The prospects for women in other areas of the profession are even more 
grim. Although women comprise 48.7% of law firm summer associates and 
45.9% of law firm associates, they comprise just 22.7% of law firm 
partners.41 And while women are better represented in in-house counsel 
positions, they are not well-represented in C-suite positions. In 2018, just 
30% of Fortune 500 companies’ general counsels were women.42 
Women have fared (slightly) better in public service, though they still 
 
experience feelings of alienation); Lani Guinier et al., Becoming Gentlemen: Women’s Experiences at 
One Ivy League Law School, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 44 (1994) (reporting that, in a study of law students 
at the University of Pennsylvania Law School, women were more likely to report symptoms of anxiety). 




 38. Cynthia L. Cooper, Women Ascend in Deanships as Law Schools Undergo Dramatic Change, 
24 PERSPECTIVES 8, 8 (2016).  
 39. To date, among the top fifteen law schools, the University of Chicago, N.Y.U., the University 
of Michigan, the University of Pennsylvania, Cornell, and the University of Texas have never had a 
woman dean. Yale, Virginia, Northwestern, and Georgetown have each had a woman dean. Harvard, 
Columbia, Duke, and UCLA have had two women deans. Stanford and Berkeley have each had three 
female deans, though at Berkeley two of these women served in an interim or acting dean capacity. In 
terms of racial and ethnic diversity, only three women of color have served as deans of top-fifteen law 
schools (Stanford, Berkeley, and UCLA), and one of these women (the author) served in an interim 
capacity. 
 40. Lawprofblawg, Are Law Review Articles a Waste of Time?, ABOVE THE LAW (Apr. 17, 2018, 
12:46 PM), https://abovethelaw.com/2018/04/are-law-review-articles-a-waste-of-time. Female law 
students are also published at lower rates than their male classmates. Nancy Leong, A Noteworthy 
Absence, 59 J. LEGAL EDUC. 279, 279 (2009) (“In recent years, female law students at top-fifteen-ranked 
law schools have authored only 36 percent of all student notes published in their schools’ general-interest 
law reviews.”). 
 41. AM. BAR ASS’N, supra note 31, at 2.  
 42. Id. at 3. 
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lag behind men in terms of representation. Women make up one-third of the 
composition of the United States Supreme Court—a significant 
achievement.43 However, in terms of advocacy before the Supreme Court 
bar, women are underrepresented. During the Supreme Court’s October 2017 
term, only 12% of advocates arguing before the Court were women, 
reversing a trend line that had seen a rise in women arguing before the high 
court.44 Women are also underrepresented in the ranks of the Justices’ inner 
circles. Between 2005 and 2017, only one-third of Supreme Court clerks 
were women.45 
Women are also less well-represented in the lower federal courts. In 
2017, women comprised 36.8% of active federal circuit court judges and 
34% of active federal district court judges.46 This underrepresentation is 
likely to increase in the coming years. As of this writing, although the Trump 
Administration has successfully appointed a broad slate of federal judges, it 
has nominated few women (and women of color) to federal judgeships.47 The 
picture is even more troubling in state judiciaries, where women are vastly 
underrepresented relative to their representation in the state population.48 
These data paint a striking portrait—one that is hard to reconcile with 
the narrative of women’s social and professional progress. As the data show, 
over the last forty years, there has been a steady increase of women entering 
law schools and the legal profession. Yet, the data also makes clear that 
despite this progress, women continue to lag significantly in terms of their 
representation in the upper echelons of the academy and the profession. The 
question, going forward, is how to remedy this gap in professional 
achievement. 
II.  CHANGING THE FACE OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION 
Women’s equal representation in law school populations does not 
 
 43. Id. at 5.  
 44. Mark Walsh, Number of Women Arguing Before the Supreme Court Has Fallen Off Steeply, 
A.B.A. J. (Aug. 1, 2018, 2:30 AM), http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/women_supreme_court_bar. 
 45. Mauro, supra note 35.  
 46. AM. BAR ASS’N, supra note 31, at 5. 
 47. Of the 154 judges nominated by Trump and approved by the Senate, only thirty-six are women, 
five of whom are not white. Biographical Directory of Article III Federal Judges, 1789-Present, FED. 
JUD. CTR., https://www.fjc.gov/history/judges/search/advanced-search (last visited Nov. 5, 2019) (select 
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translate into equal representation in all parts of the law school experience, 
nor is it reflected in various aspects of the profession. What can be done to 
ensure that women not only matriculate to law school in equal numbers, but 
also enjoy access to professional opportunities in the same numbers as their 
male counterparts? 
These are the questions that the Birnbaum Women’s Leadership 
Network asks. Founded in 2017, the BWLN seeks to develop N.Y.U. Law 
students’ leadership skills, while also supporting the Law School in 
cultivating an environment that nurtures women’s achievement and 
success.49 But creating the conditions for a successful law school experience 
is only one part of the equation. The BWLN also focuses on research and 
initiatives aimed at engaging the legal profession to better enable women 
lawyers to fulfill their potential.50 
When I joined the BWLN as a faculty co-director in 2018, I did so 
because its mission was explicitly focused on identifying drivers of women’s 
unequal position in the profession and identifying productive solutions. Of 
particular interest to me was the BWLN’s leadership training program. In 
Fall 2018, the BWLN announced the launch of the Sara Moss Women’s 
Leadership Training Program, a week-long leadership development 
program, named in honor of Sara Moss (N.Y.U. ‘74), a BWLN founding 
supporter.51 The program provides training in effective communication, self-
awareness and resilience, seeking and receiving feedback, and professional 
development, among other key leadership skills.52 In January 2019, the 
program welcomed its first cohort of fellows, an impressive group of twelve 
students eager to develop their leadership skills and advance their 
professional goals.53 
Of course, a leadership program that serves a select cohort of students 
does not address the broader systemic issues that women face in law school 
and in the profession. To this end, the BWLN has also focused on providing 
broader programming aimed at helping all students find their footing in law 
school and beyond. This fall, the BWLN hosted “Suddenly Silent,” a 
program open to all N.Y.U. Law students addressing classroom anxieties and 
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the underrepresentation of women’s voices in classroom discussions.54 Using 
improvisational comedy techniques, the program offered students new 
methods for managing classroom stress, so that they could “speak up and 
stand out.”55 Similarly, last winter, the BWLN sponsored a workshop, also 
open to the entire N.Y.U. Law community, designed to help young lawyers 
from underrepresented groups develop skills for negotiating salary and other 
compensation.56 
While many of our programmatic efforts focus explicitly on skills-
building, we are also committed to fostering a supportive community for 
women law students and their allies at the law school. In Fall 2018, in the 
throes of the Brett Kavanaugh confirmation battle, the BWLN hosted an 
informal lunch for students and faculty to discuss and process this national 
event. This fall, at the beginning of the term, we sponsored a “movie night,” 
complete with popcorn, candy, and a screening of RBG, a documentary 
chronicling the life and jurisprudence of Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg.57 
In a related vein, our annual symposia provide meaningful opportunities 
to learn about issues that are critically important to advancing women’s equal 
citizenship. In January 2019, we celebrated the tenth anniversary of the Lilly 
Ledbetter Fair Pay Act with a series of panels on the Act itself and its impact 
ten years on.58 This year, in Spring 2020, we will celebrate the centennial of 
the Nineteenth Amendment and women’s suffrage and consider the work 
still needed to achieve a bold and inclusive vision of women’s citizenship. 
Although much of the BWLN’s work is focused on developing leaders 
and cultivating a climate in which women law students can flourish, we are 
looking beyond N.Y.U. to consider the inequities that exist in the legal 
profession. To this end, the BWLN is actively working with law firms and 
other organizations within the legal profession to coordinate programming 
and identify opportunities to address issues of women’s professional 
advancement. These efforts, within and outside of the legal academy, are 
crucial to ensuring that women are able to realize their ambitions as law 
students and lawyers. 
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CONCLUSION 
There are times when I look out at my classroom and marvel at the 
changes that have happened in the twenty years since I first matriculated at 
law school. But my time in the classroom also makes clear how much more 
work there is to do. Many law schools are putting in the effort to recruit 
women students and to appoint women faculty, but the issue is not simply 
numbers. To truly change the academy and the profession, we must do more 
than teach law and legal concepts. We must take seriously the charge to 
develop leaders who are equipped to confront and dismantle the most 
persistent vestiges of inequality in our profession and in our society. We 
must cultivate a law school environment and professional culture in which 
everyone can—and is encouraged to—succeed. 
This is hard work—the kind of work that requires an interface between 
the academy and the profession. In other words, this work requires a doula—
someone whose work is to empower women at the beginning of their careers 
in the hope that these experiences will fuel their future success. 
 
 
EXPERIENCE ON THE BENCH 
REBECCA R. PALLMEYER† 
Just five years after I began practicing law, I took a position as an 
Administrative Law Judge in our state’s quasi-judicial civil rights agency. 
Several years later, I was confirmed as a U.S. Magistrate Judge. In 1998, I 
was confirmed for a seat as a U.S. District Judge, a position I have held ever 
since. Thus, for most of my professional life, I have been called “Judge 
Pallmeyer.” I cannot imagine a job I would find more satisfying or one for 
which I am better suited than this one. I am keenly aware of my good fortune. 
Being a judge is the ideal career for me for many reasons, some of them 
bound up in the fact that I am a woman. Let me attempt to explain this. In 
the 1980s, psychologist Carol Gilligan famously wrote that women speak 
with a “different voice.” Gilligan, and the feminist theologian Mary Daly, 
represent one of two schools of thought concerning women’s abilities—
sometimes referred to as “difference feminists,” in contrast to what are 
referred to as “equality feminists.” On the one hand, the “equality feminist” 
side, are those who contend that in all relevant ways, women’s brains are 
much the same as men’s. That is, women are equally “hard headed,” equally 
capable of both deep thought and pettiness, no more or less capable than men 
in any intellectual direction. Gilligan and her progeny argued that women are 
equal, but different—that they have unique and special capabilities. They are 
more nurturing, she argued. They are more motivated to find consensus. 
They are oriented toward community and family over individual goals and 
rights. 
As between these two views, I come down hard on the side of the 
“equality feminists.” I generally share the view, sometimes attributed to 
Justice O’Connor, that a wise old man and a wise old woman will reach the 
same conclusion in deciding cases. I have always been wary of the view that 
my brain is different. And I remain frustrated by the fact that in many areas 
of the law, considered more challenging (and all too often more lucrative)—
securities, antitrust, patents—the bar skews male. Women are every bit as 
smart and analytical and imaginative as men. Further, I suspect they are no 
more likely to adopt some “communitarian” rather than zero-sum solution to 
a binary conflict. 
But let’s assume for the moment that “Men are from Mars, and women 
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are from Venus.” If differences often attributed to gender are valid, then I 
suggest that women are particularly well-suited to the role of judge in many 
ways. In the modern federal court, judges are encouraged to be “active case 
managers”—meeting regularly with counsel, setting schedules, enforcing 
deadlines, and often brokering agreements or pushing compromise of one 
kind or another. Judges joke that discovery disputes remind us sometimes of 
playground squabbles, complete with complaints of “it’s not fair!” and “s/he 
started it!” Who better to straighten these disputes out than one who, a 
generation or two earlier, would have been encouraged to be a primary 
school teacher? To the litigants, perhaps a gentle reminder about courtesy 
comes more naturally from a woman. 
If the stereotypical woman is less aggressive and more agreeable than 
her male counterpart, then what would be more appropriate than assigning 
her to preside over a trial? The judge has prepared well, set a schedule, ruled 
on the in limine motions, and considered and ruled on the jurors’ excuses. 
But once the trial is underway, the judge’s role is largely passive. She rules 
on objections as they come up but does not inject herself in favor of either 
side. She is sensitive to the jurors’ concerns. She is seen as approachable and 
generous—qualities that, I would argue, make her a more effective judge. 
The job of judge suits the purportedly “fairer sex” in other ways as well. 
The work is not physically challenging. It is performed indoors, ordinarily 
in comfortable temperatures, during reasonable work hours. The time 
commitment is significant, but the judge sets the hours. We federal judges 
have private bathrooms and closets in our chambers, perks that other 
professional women would treasure. And while many professional women 
struggle with the expense and complications of dressing for work, we judges 
enjoy the uniform of utmost authority: In our black robes, we are always 
dressed for success. 
Like so many professions, law is one in which women struggle for 
credibility. The robe (indeed often referred to as a “gown”) provides the 
judge with instant cred. Walk into the courtroom wearing the ultimate basic 
black dress, and a room full of people will rise to its feet. A woman judge, 
even one who is brand new to the bench, is called “your honor” and treated 
with deference. Her jokes draw laughs, and her pronouncements generate 
respect. She always gets the last word. Nor is the instant cred artificial for 
long; a year or two after taking the bench, a federal district judge will have 
more trial experience than most of the lawyers who appear before her. Bar 
organizations, eager to display their own inclusiveness, clamor for women 
judges to speak at conferences and serve on panels. The experience quickly 
enhances the judge’s profile. 
For most Americans, the courts remain the most respected government 
institution. In the courtroom and in chambers, the judge is the authority 
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figure and, if not fawned over, is nearly always accorded respect. The 
significance of this, for a woman judge, cannot be overstated. I have presided 
over dozens of cases alleging discrimination or harassment based on sex. Of 
course, not all of these cases are meritorious. But even when the challenged 
conduct is not truly actionable, and always when it is, I am struck by the 
offensive, hostile, and even violent behavior experienced by working 
women. Women whose very presence on a plant floor or factory is deemed 
an affront are tested, bullied, verbally abused, and sometimes assaulted. As 
recently as this year, I have had two cases in which a plaintiff has presented 
credible evidence that she was fired minutes after, and in direct response to, 
disclosing to her supervisor that she was pregnant. Even in purportedly 
enlightened professional settings, women are judged or misjudged on the 
basis of their appearance, interrupted at meetings, overlooked for leadership 
roles, and denied recognition. Almost every woman I know can recount an 
incident in which her suggestion or idea fell on deaf ears, only to be received 
with enthusiasm when repeated (sometimes just seconds later) by a man. 
Today, we hear men who cite the “#MeToo” movement in refusing to meet 
with a woman, even to give her an assignment or feedback—thus using the 
experience of women as victims as an excuse to victimize them further. 
Women judges are not completely immune from these insults, but we 
are largely so. Our pay is set by statute; we are not able to ask for a raise, but 
neither are we subject to any nagging concern that a man in the same position 
is earning more money. Litigants undoubtedly talk about us behind our 
backs. Lawyers may interrupt or push back against women judges more than 
they do with men. In the end, though, the judge gets the “last word,” and few 
men or women have the temerity to express any open disrespect. Fewer still 
are the times a man will sneer, in her presence, at a woman judge’s body, or 
voice, or mannerisms. In short, we are taken seriously, as is our right. 
I personally benefit from all of these features of the job. I came to the 
bench qualified by a well-trained mind, common sense, and a willingness to 
work hard. I now have vast trial experience, but I could not make that claim 
when I took the bench. Perhaps I would not be able to make the claim even 
today were it not for the practice, in the federal district court, of random 
assignment. In our court, when a new judge is sworn in, the Clerk of Court 
creates that judge’s case assignments from a random draw of cases pending 
in the court. The new judge starts work on cases old and new, challenging or 
straightforward, significant or trivial. Then, as new cases are filed, these new 
cases are assigned at random. That means that if a “heater” case gets filed 
the day a new judge takes the bench, she or he has an equal chance of drawing 
that case, regardless of the new judge’s complete lack of experience. 
It is easy to see the problems such a system creates. An inexperienced 
judge may be thrust into a case in an unfamiliar area of the law. The judge’s 
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uncertainty may result in delays as she learns the law, or confusion if the 
lawyers attempt to take advantage of the knowledge gap. And a judge who 
has significant expertise in a particular practice area may not be the one to 
whom a difficult case in that area is assigned. 
But if the random assignment system has its downsides, many women 
lawyers who practiced with a private firm, as I did, will also immediately 
recognize its value. What we want most is to have that equal chance. As a 
young lawyer at a Chicago law firm, I recall being “next in line” for a juicy 
piece of litigation, and was excited when, just at that time, our firm landed a 
challenging commercial litigation assignment on the west coast. To my 
dismay, the associate-level work was assigned to a male colleague two years 
my junior. I summoned up courage to ask the partner in charge why I had 
been passed over this work, and he did not challenge my assertion that I was 
due up for the project. Instead, he told me that he and the other partners had 
decided (without consulting me) that I would not want to take on a case that 
would require so much travel “because you are married.” 
You know the punch line: the younger male associate was married as 
well. The firm was concerned enough about my young colleague’s happiness 
that it arranged to rent a spacious apartment for him and fly his wife to the 
west coast office every weekend. The young man’s career was launched. The 
experience he had with that case qualified him as one of the firm’s star 
litigators. And months later, when there was a lull in the action, he and his 
wife were able to take a European vacation using the airline miles they had 
racked up. 
I have gotten over my resentment about this incident. My junior 
colleague who got the great assignment has gone on to have a successful 
career, but so have I. He is well-compensated as a partner at a local law firm 
(not the same one where we started practice), and I am now the Chief Judge 
of the federal district court in Chicago. I left the law firm relatively soon after 
the incident I have described. That incident was not the reason for my 
departure, and I am not one who believes that “everything happens for a 
reason.” Still, it might well be that, had I advanced more rapidly in the law 
firm, I would not have left when I did, and would not have achieved the 
success in the judiciary that I have so valued. 
For that reason and others, while the incident is in the rear-view mirror, 
I have not forgotten it. I hope assumptions such as those that excluded me in 
those early days are now being set aside. In most private practices, though, I 
know the significance and importance of attracting and servicing “big” 
clients, who generate challenging issues and can be counted on to pay their 
large legal bills. Doing so is difficult for any young lawyer who lacks 
connections, and had I stayed in private practice, it would have continued to 
be a challenge for me. 
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How fortunate I am to work in a position where past connections do not 
matter. Random assignment is a gift. I am as likely to draw the high-profile 
case as my male colleagues are, and that has been true since I took the bench. 
As a result of random assignment, I have presided over the “big” cases: the 
public corruption trial of a sitting Illinois governor, multi-defendant 
gang/drug-distribution cases, “bet the farm” patent infringement cases, 
multi-district products liability litigation, and large-scale bankruptcy and 
commercial disputes. I have also had my share of the “little” cases, some of 
which make a heartbreaking difference to the human beings affected: 
criminal charges of illegal entry into the United States, individual 
employment discrimination cases, claims of excessive force against police 
officers, and challenges to the conditions of confinement in prisons and jails. 
One of the memorable “little” cases was one involving an eight-year-
old boy (“N.R.”) and a box of crayons. You recall that the events of 
September 11, 2001 had a huge effect on the nation. One immediate effect 
of 9/11 was a “zero tolerance” policy for many things, including weapons in 
schools. N.R.’s family situation was complicated, and he had just moved in 
with his grandmother. The grandmother was raising a couple of other 
grandchildren as well, including a kindergartener who was a cousin of 
N.R.’s. N.R.’s teacher gave the grandmother a list of school supplies that 
N.R. and his classmates were expected to bring, including art supplies. N.R. 
didn’t have what he needed, so his grandma did what many adults would do 
under the same circumstances: she gave N.R. a box of crayons and markers 
that belonged to his cousin. When N.R. got to school that morning, and the 
teacher told everyone to pull out their boxes of crayons, N.R. did so. And 
among the crayons in this box that N.R.’s grandma had taken from his cousin 
was a spent shell casing—that is, a bullet shell. 
We don’t know where the shell came from, or what the grandmother 
knew, but I was quite sure that N.R. had nothing to do with it. N.R. 
compounded his trouble by showing the bullet shell to a classmate, not to the 
teacher. But the classmate showed the shell to the teacher, the teacher took 
things to the next level, and eight-year-old N.R. was expelled from the third 
grade. By the time N.R.’s family brought the case to court, nearly three 
months had passed. And what was truly startling to me is that N.R. had been 
out of school that entire time, getting just one hour of education once a week, 
with a tutor at the local public library. 
Most of us remember what we were doing in the third grade: we were 
learning to multiply and divide. We were working on a science project, or 
memorizing spelling words. And most of us also know that if you miss these 
things in the third grade, things slide downward in a hurry. The idea that this 
little boy had missed more than one third of the third grade haunted me. I 
ordered the school district to begin providing him with five hours of tutoring 
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every day, to make up for the time he was missing in school, until I could 
rule on the family’s challenge to the school district’s “zero tolerance” policy. 
When the school district’s lawyer asked how soon the school would have to 
get this tutoring underway, I said, “Tomorrow.” 
You may not be surprised to learn that this was all it took. The school 
district did not have funds to pay for a private tutor every day for N.R. They 
put him back in the classroom. The case ended about a week later. 
I have handled the “big” cases; I am known for them. Random 
assignment has given me plenty of public attention. But in many years as a 
federal judge, I can’t think of a case that I found so satisfying as one 
involving one little boy and one odd little episode with a box of crayons. I 
realized that N.R. might well get into more trouble down the road. But 
because the court was there, and because people have to do what I tell them 
to do, this little boy was not turned out of the education system at age eight. 
I have been extremely fortunate in my professional life. I served as law 
clerk to Judge Rosalie Wahl, the first woman justice of the Minnesota 
Supreme Court. Before her appointment, Justice Wahl had devoted her 
practice to representing indigent criminal defendants at a law school legal 
clinic. Her appointment to the state’s highest court drew the predictable 
criticism: that she did not have relevant civil or commercial experience to be 
effective. The criticism emerged again two years after her appointment, 
when the Justice was required to run for election statewide to a full ten-year 
term, but Justice Wahl brushed it off. She assured voters she had learned on 
the job and would continue to do so, “just like the men did.” I, too, learn on 
the job, just as the men do. I, too, have cases both large and small in which I 
make the decisions. 
Justice Wahl referred to herself as my “mother in the law,” and indeed 
that is what she was. Justice Wahl’s intellect, decency, and integrity made 
her the ideal role model for me, and her calm confidence in my abilities 
continues to motivate me, years after her death. She would be proud and 
delighted that I am now the Chief Judge of the federal court in Chicago, the 
first woman to serve as Chief in this district. In the federal courts, the role of 
Chief is filled by the judge of the court who has the greatest seniority but has 
not yet reached the age of 65. So the very fact that I am now Chief Judge is 
a function of the fact that I didn’t have to campaign for the position or win a 
popularity contest with my colleagues. 
For several years, I have been part of the faculty for a labor and 
employment law seminar conducted by the American Law Institute in Santa 
Fe, New Mexico. Santa Fe is a great venue in part because during the days 
of the seminar, we are often able to tour the federal courthouse or the New 
Mexico Supreme Court building, which was built by the WPA and is on the 
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National Historical Register. Since 1942, the New Mexico Supreme Court 
has honored its former chief justices with a portrait that hangs on the second 
floor in a room now known as the Hall of Chief Justices. The Chief Justice 
in that state is selected by her fellow justices, but by tradition, every justice 
takes a turn in that position–except for Justice Mary Walters, the first woman 
to serve on the Court. Justice Walters served on the New Mexico Supreme 
Court from 1984 to 1988, but when her turn to be Chief rolled around, she 
was passed over by her colleagues. Years later, Justice Pamela Minzner 
became the first woman to serve as Chief Justice. Justice Minzner took action 
to right the wrong done to her predecessor in a significant way: she moved 
Justice Walters’s portrait into the Hall of Chief Justices, naming her an 
honorary Chief Justice. 
My own photo hangs in the Chief Judge’s courtroom in the Dirksen 
Courthouse. My status as Chief is, as I’ve explained, a function of seniority. 
But it is also a function of the decision of my predecessor to step down 
several months before the conclusion of his own term, and before my 65th 
birthday. Judge Ruben Castillo announced his decision on March 8, 2019—
International Women’s Day. Judge Castillo was ready to leave; but he chose 
to do so deliberately to ensure that the court would not wait years longer to 
be led by a woman judge. What an honor it is to fill this role at a time in 
history when all of our institutions are under challenge. The judiciary is the 
one I am called to, and have been blessed to serve. Theodore Roosevelt said, 
“Far and away the best prize that life has to offer is the chance to work hard 
at work worth doing.” I’m not sure Teddy Roosevelt was right; my family 
and friends are dear prizes as well, but the chance to work hard as a federal 
district judge is for me the work most worth doing. 
I am the first woman to serve as Chief of this court, but I will not be the 
last. Women and men will follow me in this role. They may well find it quaint 
or slightly ridiculous that there was a time when my appointment seemed 
groundbreaking. My responsibility is to ensure that those who follow me get 
the same chances that I have had, and that the court continues to administer 
justice with an even hand. Judges must continue to work hard on the cases 
they are assigned, large and small. To carry out this responsibility is an 
extraordinary honor. It is indeed “work worth doing.” 
 
KAFKA’S COURT: SEEKING LAW AND JUSTICE 
AT GUANTANAMO BAY 
ALKA PRADHAN† 
“Why do you wear a hijab?” asks a prominent journalist. 
“Why do you wear a hijab?” asks the mother of an FDNY firefighter 
who selflessly ran in to save lives before the second tower fell. 
“Why do you wear a hijab?” asks a second-year law student, holding a 
“Feminist” coffee mug. 
“Practicing law at Guantanamo Bay” often seems oxymoronic. The 
detainee camps there were created in 2002 for the specific purpose of being 
outside the law. Nearly eighteen years later, the judges at the slow-moving 
military commissions still can’t decide whether or which parts of the 
Constitution might apply to the forty men who remain there. Human rights 
are for all humans, I lecture my students, but if the jailers don’t recognize the 
humanity of their charges and no outsider can make them, is it true? 
The detainees at Guantanamo are presented as a monolith—hardened 
terrorists who want to kill Americans. The first impression, shaped by people 
like Donald Rumsfeld and Dick Cheney who also controlled all information 
about the men, has become truth in the minds of the public. I have 
represented over a dozen men at Guantanamo. Unlike Rumsfeld or Cheney, 
I have sat in rooms with them, shared meals with them, been given pregnancy 
and parenting advice from them, and tightened my jaw as some of them cried 
over their mothers, brothers, or children dying in faraway homes while they 
remained locked up at Guantanamo. No one gets family visits at 
Guantanamo. One client had a son he had never met. Another lost a young 
son to shelling in Syria while he was at Gitmo. One wrote frantic letters with 
a right hand that cramped constantly from his early torture, trying to 
participate somehow in the preparations for his daughter’s pending marriage. 
His letters all arrived after the wedding, words of advice inexplicably 
covered in censor ink. 
One of my favorite clients, a gentle man who would apologize for 
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taking me away from my family to visit him at Guantanamo, wrote love 
letters to his wife every day. He would quietly tear out pictures of flowers 
and animals from Department of Defense-approved magazines and enclose 
them with his letters to her. He begged her to wait for him and against my 
advice, agreed to a release deal that would put him in great danger when he 
left Guantanamo—in the hopes of reuniting with her faster. Upon release, he 
was illegally disappeared for nearly six months. It was the last straw for his 
long-suffering wife, who refused to rejoin him afterwards. 
It has been reported that all of these men took up arms against the 
United States, that they all pose a threat to Americans and that is why we are 
forced to hold them forever, outside of the United States, in the equivalent 
of a gulag. That statement is unequivocally false. Here are some truths: We 
have held nearly eight hundred men at Guantanamo; the majority should not 
have been detained at all. If they had been white and from France or Norway 
or Germany, the extraterritorial prison at Guantanamo would never have 
been allowed to exist. And it certainly would not have lasted for eighteen 
years with no end in sight. 
The only truth that all of the detainees have in common is that they were 
tortured by Americans. We lied about that, too, and still do. These weren’t 
“enhanced interrogation techniques.” They were brutal, medieval acts, some 
of them the same as those committed at the Tower of London and at Salem—
and yes, at Bergen-Belsen. Men were killed in our torture program. Those 
who survived were physically and psychologically maimed for life. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
When I decided at the ripe old age of sixteen that I was going to practice 
human rights and humanitarian law, I would have never guessed that I would 
be litigating against my own government. I was newly returned from a high 
school summer program at Oxford University, where one of the speakers was 
Patricia Viseur Sellers, then a prosecutor specializing in gender-based war 
crimes at the ICTY.1 She was an American lawyer, like I wanted to be, 
helping to shape the then-brand-new field of international criminal law. And 
she was a woman, and her skin looked like mine. 
I grew up primarily in a comfortable, homogeneous suburb in Ohio, the 
type of place captured well by TV shows like One Tree Hill or My So-Called 
Life. What those shows lack, however, are the female Indian-American 
characters whose self-deprecating comments and loud laughs are meant to 
preempt the jokes about their clothes (“not Abercrombie”), faces (“too dark 
to see in photos”), religions (“my parents don’t want me coming over if you 
 
 1. International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia. 
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have an elephant god on your wall”), countries of origin (“shithole,” long 
before the President said so), and home-packed lunches (“stinks of curry”). 
I wouldn’t let myself feel bullied. I made the jokes before they opened 
their mouths, embraced the punch lines, left them feeling awkward. I did it 
for the newer immigrant kids too, the ones who didn’t understand the joke. 
“The joke is how we look to them.” Twenty years later, I find myself nodding 
along when my client, Ammar, talks about his feeling of being an outsider 
as a teen refugee in Iran. I was infinitely more privileged than Ammar, but 
minority teen angst is a bonding agent. 
My grandfather worked for the United Nations, and I spent many long 
summers in Geneva around family friends who were all international civil 
servants. I read about the Balkan Wars, the Rwandan genocide, the India–
Pakistan nuclear arms race, debated the merits of sovereignty versus 
humanitarian intervention in my high school American Politics and 
Government class. When I saw Ms. Sellers speak, it felt like I’d found my 
place. As she explained, no one invented human rights—they exist inherent 
in every human being. But without people to defend those rights with sword 
and shield, there is no way to temper the chaos of politics and war. I wanted 
to do that. 
When we grow up in America, though—and especially when we study 
law in America—we are taught that we are the good guys. Sometimes that is 
true. We helped to shape much of the world after World War II and we led 
the charge on the international law that now chafes on our Department of 
Defense at Guantanamo Bay. Our Constitution is magnificent and deeply 
flawed, and magnificent again for how it creates the institutions—Congress, 
Presidency, Courts—to help resolve those flaws. 
But the Constitution, written in a time of state power, didn’t know what 
to do with the 9/11 attacks, and neither did the institutions.  Caught paying 
too little attention to intelligence about a non-state actor (Al Qaeda), 
Congress and the Executive overcorrected. Sweeping powers were 
employed, the normal rules of intelligence gathering in secret and war-
fighting in public were suspended. The United States didn’t want to follow 
the laws it had helped to write. 
We now know some of the mistakes that we made. We didn’t 
understand the nature or diversity of the parties on the ground in 
Afghanistan. The rendition and torture program didn’t generate useable 
intelligence and may have wasted years in the search for Bin Laden. But we 
have still never reckoned with the effects of those mistakes. We still do not 
discuss the impact on our national security of our allies withdrawing from 
joint operations because of our detainee torture. The government still 
strenuously argues that Guantanamo detainees should have no constitutional 
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protections at all in territory controlled by the United States and in 
courtrooms over which the flag flies. We don’t seem to see how those 
mistakes—torturing people of color, creating separate courts for Muslim 
men outside of the Constitution—have undermined the security we sought 
so desperately to ensure. 
II.  IN THE COURTROOM 
For much of the four years that I have represented Ammar in the 
purpose-built courtroom at “Camp Justice” (the legal compound at 
Guantanamo Bay), I have been the only female attorney of color. One of only 
a handful of females in the courtroom at all, in fact. During my first oral 
argument, I paused on the word “Abbottabad.” Abbottabad is a town in 
Pakistan where Osama bin Laden was eventually found and killed by U.S. 
forces in 2011. It is constantly mispronounced in the press, including by 
President Obama. Nearly two decades after the war began in Afghanistan, is 
it truly too much to ask that we learn to pronounce “Afghanistan,” “Taliban,” 
“Iraq,” “Abu Ghraib,”—and yes, “Abbottabad,” correctly? Disrespecting a 
culture and a people because five of them are accused of committing crimes 
(even heinous ones) is antithetical to rights-based justice. So I paused, and 
explained to the judge in two sentences the history of Abbottabad and that I 
was going to pronounce it the way Pakistanis pronounce it. To me, it seemed 
like a perfectly rational thing to do. The judge, to his credit, accepted the 
explanation gracefully. To my right, however, there was a chorus of snorts 
from the prosecution through the rest of my argument. 
Many courtrooms are still male-dominated, and I hear the same 
commentary at the purpose-built courtroom at Guantanamo as my female 
colleagues do around the world. I’ve been called “hysterical” for talking 
about Ammar’s traumatic brain injury at the hands of the CIA. The 
prosecutors have retorted that I “don’t understand” litigation. One male 
prosecutor commented that I “needed to get back to my children” after a 
particularly contentious week of hearings. These are standard unimaginative 
lines that can be dismissed. 
Where it gets weird is the “terrorist sympathizer” label. My skin is 
brown, and I am the only woman of color who stands up at the podium and 
argues in the purpose-built courtroom at Guantanamo. I wear a hijab when 
Ammar and the other four defendants are in the courtroom, so observers 
sometime conclude that I am Muslim. The sister of a 9/11 victim, her 
unimaginable pain resurfacing after a day of arguments about the flaws that 
are holding up the trial, told me, “You’re on their side. You’re not 
American.” Another family member said baldly that the prosecution-
appointed minders informed them that I was there to promote “the terrorists.” 
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An observer once asked me, oblivious to both the absurdity and the offense, 
whether I enjoyed projecting a “Mata Hari” vibe. (When I asked if he knew 
that Mata Hari’s prosecutor cited her gender as evidence against her, he made 
a hasty exit. Also, I assure everyone that I am fully clothed in the courtroom.) 
All of my defense colleagues take fire for representing our clients. But with 
me, the “joke” is, once again, how I look. 
This time, I don’t preempt the comments. The reason is the “purpose-
built” courtroom. The courtroom sits surrounded by barbed wire and signs 
saying “Expeditionary Legal Complex.” It was built deliberately outside of 
our legal system, with an obscure clause in its statute allowing for evidence 
derived from Ammar’s black site torture. The purpose for which it was built 
is to execute Ammar as quickly as possible.  The purpose of the taunts and 
the roadblocks by the government—spying on our meetings, withholding 
funding, refusing discovery—is to stop us from defending him. In real terms, 
if we get distracted by preempting the punchlines about us, Ammar will be 
killed without anyone to fight the corrupt system that is prosecuting him. 
We’re not in Ohio anymore, Toto. 
It is possible to be a great defense lawyer without being very close to 
your client, but not at Guantanamo. Because these men were so 
dehumanized, they trust almost no one. They live isolated, away from press 
and observers and family, in a secret camp in Cuba. The first thing we do, if 
they’ll let us, is get to know them. Learn what their childhoods were like, 
how many siblings they have. If they like dates from Kuwait or from Dubai 
better, if there is a special dish their mother makes during Ramadan. Whether 
they ever played cricket or soccer or watched Bollywood films, which are 
ubiquitous in the Middle East. How they modify the prison meals with 
yogurt, mint, garlic, or hot sauce to make them palatable. Only after we 
reconstruct their personhoods can we defend them in a court designed to 
reduce them to one-dimensional monsters. 
During every interaction, we have to try to avoid retriggering their 
trauma. Certain music played at the black sites rewired Ammar’s brain such 
that he feels he is going to be killed when he hears it. Another prisoner is 
reduced to panic whenever he is transported in a blacked-out van—which is 
every time he goes to a legal meeting or medical appointment. One of the 
tortures visited on these men was sexual humiliation by female interrogators 
and guards. Sexual humiliation is cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment 
for any person, but takes on another dimension with Muslim men because of 
the specific tenets of their religion. To eliminate the trigger for that 
humiliation, I wear a hijab in the courtroom. 
I am not naturally comfortable in a hijab. I don’t really like putting 
anything on my head (wearing even a fascinator for Ascot was a pain). I have 
to pin it securely in place to make sure it doesn’t fall off when I speak at the 
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podium, because I tend to use my hands a lot in describing the government’s 
failures to abide by any sort of fair trial standards. It gets warm under that 
hijab in the 100-degree Guantanamo heat, on top of wearing the required 
pantsuit. Some of the other women in the courtroom choose to wear full 
abayas, which would feel too physically restrictive for me. I am not Muslim 
and sometimes feel self-conscious about adopting, for practical purposes, a 
custom that holds religious and cultural meaning for many women around 
the world. But if a hijab can (and does) allow that trauma trigger to relax 
enough to let me do my job in that courtroom, then it is fully worth it. And 
ironically, just that little bit of “otherizing” visited upon me and my 
colleagues by American observers of our hijabs or abayas, allows me to 
better understand our country’s use of Guantanamo as a massive experiment 
in dehumanization. 
Even more ironically, I receive more respect and consideration from 
Ammar and my previous clients, as their American female attorney, than 
from my prosecution colleagues. No detainee has ever refused to meet with 
me because I am a woman. When I talk about Ammar’s diagnosed traumatic 
brain injury, they call it “honest,” not “hysterical.” When I was in the depths 
of a fight with the State Department to negotiate conditions of repatriation 
for a client, he called me his “tiger lawyer” after the character in Kung Fu 
Panda (one of the Department of Defense-approved movies at Camp 62). 
During my pregnancy through half of 2018 while attending hearings at 
Guantanamo, I received well-wishes from Camp 7,3 combined with 
questions about when I’d be back after the baby’s birth. Drinking ginger tea 
made for me by Ammar to combat my nausea so that I’d be recovered in 
time for oral arguments, I promised that I’d be back, and I was. It turns out 
that if you offer respect and humanity to people, it comes back tenfold. 
CONCLUSION 
My path has diverged greatly from that of my inspiration, Patricia 
Sellers. Instead of international courts, I cite the Convention Against Torture, 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and the Geneva 
Conventions in an illegal military commission in Cuba. I chose defense 
rather than prosecution, but I tried to follow her example as a human rights 
 
 2. Camp 6 is the facility for detainees considered to be “low value.” Detainees in Camp 6 were 
almost all captured in Afghanistan post-9/11, and most were cleared for release by the Bush and Obama 
administrations. Camp 6 detainees have traditionally had slightly more access to communal recreation 
and entertainment items (movies and books) than detainees in any other facilities at Guantanamo.  
 3. Camp 7 is the facility for detainees deemed to be “high value.” The detainees in Camp 7 were 
all held by the CIA in black sites around the world for three or four years before being brought to 
Department of Defense custody in September 2006. Until 2017, the detainees at Camp 7 were held in 
near-solitary confinement. All of the defendants in the 9/11 case are held at Camp 7.  
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defender, whatever the job title. I don’t question the patriotism of my work; 
as Judge Tatel said recently in a D.C. Circuit decision excoriating the 
government for its handling of the Nashiri case at Guantanamo: “[C]riminal 
justice is a shared responsibility,” among prosecution, defense, and 
judiciary.4 Without a strong defense bar, justice crumbles, and particularly at 
Guantanamo. 
Ms. Sellers was once asked in an interview how important the Akayesu 
case was in international legal history, and she could not emphasize enough 
how progressive the decision had been. I feel the same way about the 9/11 
case,5 for the opposite reason: international legal history will record lessons 
of the injustices we perpetrated. The Guantanamo Bay military commissions 
have allowed the charging of ex post facto “war crimes,” insisted on the 
existence of a “war” extending back to 1996 to cover jurisdiction over all of 
the detainees, hidden the most important evidence of the defendants’ torture, 
and then enforced a governing statute that allows the use of torture-acquired 
evidence. I play a small part in spotlighting these gross legal violations 
through litigation and press and Twitter. And someday, the public will 
understand why we fought our own government so hard in the 9/11 case, 
why we spent months and years of our lives in a forgotten corner of Cuba—
and why we wear the hijabs. 
 
 4. In re Abd Al-Rahim Hussein Muhammed Al-Nashiri, 921 F.3d 224, 239 (D.C. Cir. 2019).  
 5. United States v. Khalid Sheikh Mohammad, Walid Muhammad Salih Mubarak Bin Attash, 
Ramzi bin al Shibh, Ali Abdul-Aziz Ali, and Mustafa Ahmed Adam al Hawsawi. “Ammar al Baluchi” is 
Ali Abdul-Aziz Ali’s family name.  
 
A PERSONAL ESSAY 
NITZA I. QUIÑONES ALEJANDRO† 
Amidst the string of hearings and trials that normally fill my schedule, 
I finally sat down with my law clerk for the few-hour niche of time we had 
set aside to interview potential summer interns. Tired from the long day, 
when I asked the last law student if she had any questions for us, I hoped she 
would keep her response short and sweet. She paused for a moment, then 
shyly asked, “So, how did you get to be a federal judge?” With a loaded 
question like that, I had two possible responses: a canned response about 
how careers are full of twists and turns, how hard work and persistence pay 
off, etc., or an honest answer. The former never entered my mind. My 
exhaustion vanished and, in one moment, years of memories flashed through 
my head. I smiled and told her, “I never expected to be where I am today.” 
h 
 I was born in Puerto Rico, the daughter of a First Sergeant in the 
United States Army and a homemaker. I grew up on a series of military 
bases, attended the finest schools, and was surrounded by a community of 
military families. I recognize now how fortunate I was to have grown up in 
a world where the only apparent distinction between individuals was military 
rank. Throughout my adolescence, I never would have predicted that 
someday it would matter in my professional and social interactions that I was 
a woman, that I was Latina, or that I was gay. 
My decision to go to law school was not part of a grand plan. When I 
graduated from college, where I had studied business and statistics, I was 
eager to join the workforce. My excitement to begin applying for accounting 
jobs was surprisingly met with disapproval from my mother. As I was 
looking into job openings and daydreaming about becoming a working 
professional, my mother eventually expressed her disapproval: “Yo esperaba 
más de ti.” I expected more of you. Her words stung. Here I was, twenty-one 
years old, about to graduate from college with honors at the top of my class 
and, rather than praise, I was met with disappointment. To provide context, 
I am the youngest of three children and, at that time, my sister was pursuing 
a master’s degree in urban planning and my brother was in dental school. 
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 †  I am eternally grateful to my law clerks, most notably Allison Vélez, for both encouraging me 
to participate in this project and devoting many hours to the research and composition of this essay. This 
was truly a team effort and without their immeasurable contributions, my story would not have been told 
here. 
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From my mother’s perspective, my siblings had blazed the trail towards 
higher education, and I needed to follow it. 
In hindsight, I realize there were countless other young women facing 
a similar conversation with their mothers, but who were instead chastised for 
wishing to pursue a career at all, as opposed to becoming a homemaker. I 
now know I was fortunate that my mother’s disappointment stemmed from 
her desire to see me pursue something more—like an advanced degree—to 
break through glass ceilings in the world’s most elite professions, rather than 
from a desire to see me fulfill traditional gender roles. The sting of my 
mother’s disapproval, while painful at the time, successfully guilted me into 
applying for graduate studies—a decision that would lay the groundwork for 
a career I would treasure for the rest of my life.  
h 
In my class at the University of Puerto Rico School of Law, there were 
approximately twenty-five women and one hundred men. While this 
statistical disparity certainly did not surprise me, the divide I felt most 
prominently was not between genders, but rather between the students who 
came from families of lawyers and those of us who would be first-generation 
attorneys. This professional disparity was not only significant numerically, 
but also significant in its practical effects. Those of us who weren’t fulfilling 
a legacy were unfamiliar with the jargon that permeates the legal world, did 
not know the logistics of how court systems worked, and certainly did not 
know how to network without any personal connections in the field. I 
unexpectedly found myself in a discrete minority and, because of that 
classification, I felt disadvantaged. 
During my first semester of law school, I genuinely contemplated 
dropping out. Between the academic difficulties (like receiving the first “D” 
of my life) and the practical challenges, it was hard for me to see a successful 
future on that path. My mother’s words, however, haunted me: “Yo esperaba 
más de ti.” Failure was not an option in the Quiñones Alejandro family. What 
would my family think of me if I gave up now? 
I decided to be pragmatic about my future. I would remain in law school 
for at least one more semester—in order to give things a chance to improve, 
and so that I could say I completed a full year of study—and I would get a 
job. In fulfillment of this brilliant plan, I got a part-time job at a legal services 
clinic in San Juan. It was at that tiny office, surrounded by an overworked 
attorney and desperate clients, that a spark ignited within me. I felt, for the 
first time, that I was where I was meant to be. 
Working at the clinic was my first opportunity to have hands-on experience helping people. I 
was not doing any of the “fancy” lawyering that the supervising attorney was, but even in 
doing research, writing assignments, and logistical tasks, I felt the impact of the gratitude that 
our clients expressed so vehemently. Tasks as simple as helping to fill out forms, scheduling 
meetings, or taking notes during interviews were met with deep appreciation from the clients. 
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I remember thinking, “If this is the kind of impact I already have, imagine what I could do if 
I finished law school… imagine what I could do with that education, degree, and experience 
under my belt. I could really help people.” Inspired with that sense of purpose, I embraced the 
challenge of completing law school, eager for the opportunities I hoped would follow. 
h 
The canned answer I could have given to the internship candidate would 
not have been a dishonest one. Careers are full of twists and turns. Hard work 
and persistence do often pay off, and they certainly have for me. The problem 
with the canned answer was not its veracity, but that it condenses dozens of 
life experiences into generic, cliché phrases, and in so doing, those 
experiences lose their cogency. It is more beneficial to elaborate on and share 
such experiences than to condense them into nondescript phrases. The salient 
moments that come to mind when I am asked to reflect on my career 
collectively convey this sentiment: one can be competitive without being 
aggressive, and determined without being unyielding. The stories that follow 
illustrate some of those moments. 
h 
After graduation, I followed my passion for public service to the 
mainland United States and took a position at Community Legal Services of 
Philadelphia (“CLS”). After two rewarding and fulfilling years at CLS, I 
transitioned to my first federal job as an attorney advisor at the Social 
Security Administration (“SSA”) in Philadelphia. While working at the SSA, 
I was contacted by the Department of Veterans Affairs (“VA”) about an 
opportunity to join their team. I was excited by the chance to expand my 
legal experience and, having grown up in military communities as the 
daughter of an army veteran, I was thrilled at the idea of serving the veteran 
community. I would be the first female attorney in that office, a perspective 
the agency was itching to obtain and one I was keen to provide. My eagerness 
hit a wall, though, when it came time to discuss salary. In my current position 
at the SSA, my federal pay scale level was GS-11,1 and within a few weeks, 
I would be promoted to a GS-12. The VA offered me this great, exciting 
position at the not-so-great, not-so-exciting pay scale level of a GS-9, which 
was two levels below my current level and three levels below what I was 
about to obtain at the SSA. I was shocked. They had seemed so positive and 
intent on hiring me throughout the interview process at the VA, but that was 
not the message of their offer. 
At that moment, I had three options: 1) decline the offer, 2) accept the 
offer at the reduced pay grade, or 3) demand a higher salary. I knew what I 
 
 1. Most federal government employees’ salaries are governed by the General Schedule (“GS”)—
a national pay scale comprised of levels and steps that determines an employee’s salary according to 
various criteria, such as level of education, years of experience and government service, and level of 
difficulty of the position. Each federal agency classifies its positions within the GS.  
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was worth, and I knew that I would be a valuable addition to their team. I 
went with the first option. While I was honestly offended by their offer, I did 
not want to respond with anger or a sense of entitlement and demand more 
money. It was not the actual dollar amount that was so offensive; rather, it 
was the fact that they expected me to keep nodding and smiling when they 
casually shifted the tone from “Welcome aboard!” to “This is such a great 
opportunity for you, you shouldn’t mind taking a pay cut!” I do not know 
what actually motivated that offer, but the message it sent was clear—they 
thought they could get me for less than I was worth. I could not imagine that 
they would have made such a proposal to a man. If they were not going to 
respect my qualifications, then that was not a workplace I wanted to join. 
When I politely declined the offer, they made a second offer to bring 
me in as a GS-11. I stood my ground. I told them that unless I would be paid 
at the level I was about to obtain at the SSA, I would not accept their offer. 
I did not raise my voice, I did not lecture them on how demeaning their initial 
offer was, I did not tell them I was worth more, and I did not ask the question 
at the forefront of my mind: would you have dared treat a male attorney the 
same way? They came back after I had said, “No, thank you” to the GS-11 
offer, asking me to reconsider, and this time I concisely explained why I was 
again declining. I knew that they likely would not ask again, that there 
probably would not be another counteroffer, and that I was potentially 
turning down a wonderful opportunity, but I decided that I had to be firm. A 
few days later, I received a call offering me the position at the GS-12 level. 
I am thankful for that call because it enabled me to slide my foot in the door 
of another men’s club, to broaden my practice area, and to spend years doing 
a job I loved, serving a community I was passionate about. But I am also 
thankful that I found the strength to say no, twice, when the opportunity was 
attractive but the offer was unfair. Before even setting foot in the office, I 
had sent a clear message: I know my worth. 
h 
In 1990, six vacancies opened up on the Philadelphia Court of Common 
Pleas. For one of the most diverse cities in the country, Philly’s judiciary did 
not look much like its citizens. The Hispanic Bar Association of 
Pennsylvania (“HBA”) was one of a few organizations that set out to change 
that disparity. Determined to get Hispanic representation on the bench, the 
leaders of the HBA met with Governor Robert P. Casey’s representatives 
and expressed their mission. Governor Casey agreed to consider an HBA-
recommended candidate for a nomination, as long as the individual went 
through the established nomination process. 
When the leadership of the HBA met to identify a potential candidate 
to recommend, I never thought that I would be that candidate. There were 
many reasons why other attorneys would have been great choices, but as we 
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discussed potential candidates, it became clear that there were just as many 
challenges that would make it difficult for most of my colleagues to run. For 
me, running would require resigning my position at the VA, which meant 
living without any income. However, I realized this was an invaluable, albeit 
unexpected, opportunity to expand my commitment to government service, 
while simultaneously helping nudge the door open for others in the Latino 
legal community. So I volunteered to run, with the full support of the HBA 
behind me. 
After being scrutinized and vetted by the Governor’s nomination 
committee and the Philadelphia Bar Association, Governor Casey 
announced my nomination at a banquet held by ASPIRA, a nonprofit 
organization dedicated to Hispanic education. My delight and excitement 
were short-lived, though, as I learned that the Pennsylvania Senate was 
refusing to confirm me. The explanation I received was two-fold: 1) no one 
knew who I was and 2) I had not done anything for the Democratic party. I 
was frustrated. I had been a federal employee for most of my legal career—
I was a political unknown because the law required as much.2 As a career 
government employee, my priority had always been serving the community 
around me, not serving a political party. I took several deep breaths and 
decided that my aspirations were more important than the reasons offered to 
oppose me. I would run despite the Senate’s doubts. I chose to view the 
explanation as motivation, rather than fighting words. I was not going to 
make a scene about the Senate refusing to confirm the first Hispanic 
nominee, I was just going to win the election instead. 
The victory I hoped for would not just be for me. It would be for the 
HBA, for Hispanics, for Philadelphians, and for women. Which is why I 
refused when my advisors suggested I abbreviate my name on the ballot. 
They suggested that, rather than use my full given name, “Nitza I. Quiñones 
Alejandro,” I should eliminate “Quiñones” and run only as “Nitza I. 
Alejandro.” Why? Because Alejandro sounded more Italian, more white. My 
advisors believed strangers would be more inclined to vote for me if I seemed 
less Latina. That logic was unacceptable. I was not trying to get elected at all 
costs, and certainly not at the cost of sacrificing my identity. In Puerto Rico, 
it is tradition for children to take the last names of both parents, honoring 
both their father and mother. While changing my name may have been a 
strategically sound political suggestion, it was not a suggestion I was willing 
to take; that was not the way I wanted to win. I was a proud member of the 
Latino community, and that was how I would run. 
My decision to run unconfirmed and unendorsed was further hindered 
 
 2.  The Hatch Act prohibits federal employees from participating in certain partisan political 
activities. 5 U.S.C. § 7321 et seq. 
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by the fact that I knew nothing about campaigning. I did a lot of research and 
surrounded myself with strong, intelligent friends who were eager to help 
run my campaign, but I was constantly reminded of my disadvantage. In 
Philadelphia, the city is divided up into political wards. A huge part of 
campaigning for city offices is visiting the various wards, speaking to the 
people, and promoting oneself. Since I had no party support or stamp of 
approval from the Senate, and little finances, I was completely disconnected 
from any official communications about these essential events. When and 
where were the ward meetings? How much time would I get to speak? Did I 
have to register to speak ahead of time? I did not have the answers to these 
questions, but every endorsed candidate did. 
Whenever I could find such a meeting, I would show up. Most of the 
time, the organizers were either, at best, surprised, or at worst, annoyed, to 
see me. My lack of political affiliation meant I spoke last, after every other 
candidate had shared a similar message—justice and impartiality are 
important, and they are the best candidate for the job. Thirty-two of us were 
running for sixteen judicial seats. Only five candidates, including myself, 
were women. While we were technically adversaries vying for a few 
precious spots, in my mind, we were colleagues first and foremost. I was 
disappointed to realize that not all of the candidates shared my view, but I 
found a friend in a man who, at the end of each ward meeting, would whisper 
to me the date and location of the next one. That small act of discrete 
kindness, from a member of the in-club to an outsider like me, has stuck with 
me all these years. 
After all of the campaigning, the election results spoke for themselves. 
All five female candidates not only won seats on the bench, but had five of 
the six highest vote totals of all candidates. I was overjoyed to have won, but 
I also felt a deep satisfaction that so many qualified, impressive women were 
taking this step alongside me. Sometimes progress happens one step at a 
time, but sometimes it happens in five powerful strides at once. 
h 
I learned a great deal during the campaign and election process, but 
nothing could have quite prepared me for the weight of responsibility that I 
felt once I actually began working as a judge on the Philadelphia Court of 
Common Pleas. I do not think of myself as a “powerful” person, but I 
remember when I took the bench for the first time, I instantly became starkly 
aware of the immense power that we judges have—not only the power to 
resolve disputes and determine the fates of the accused, but also to give shape 
to the laws that govern us. From that first day, I knew that with that power 
came the immense responsibility to get things right. 
The disadvantages I had faced as a candidate without political 
connections quickly faded, replaced only by my lack of judicial experience. 
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I was initially assigned to the criminal division. Having never practiced 
criminal law, my knowledge of the practice area was basically equivalent to 
what I had learned in law school. Obviously, that needed to change. So, I 
studied. I read the entire criminal bench book, cover to cover, before my first 
day in the courtroom. I knew I had done everything I could to prepare, but 
that did not stop my heart from nearly beating out of my chest when I first 
put on my black robe, entered the courtroom, and took my place in front of 
a room full of lawyers, defendants, witnesses, and members of the public, all 
on their feet with their eyes on me. I survived, of course, and the nerves 
subsided after that first day, but the weight of the awesome responsibility 
and my obligation to be prepared, attentive, and impartial endures to this day. 
The responsibilities of the position itself were not—and are not—the 
only pressure that I felt. As the first female Hispanic judge in the 
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, I feared that any failure or mistake of mine, 
however small, would be held, not just against me, but also against other 
Hispanic attorneys who aspired to be judges in the future. For fear that my 
shortcomings would impede others’ chances in the future, I could not give 
anyone a reason to say the Hispanic judge could not cut it. In my mind, I had 
to be better, smarter, more consistent, and more thorough than my peers. 
Whether that pressure actually existed outside of my own head, I do not 
know. But for me, the pressure was very real. 
While I experienced no disrespect or condescension from my fellow 
judges while on the state bench, I could not say the same for every attorney 
that appeared in front of me. In particular, some of the more seasoned 
attorneys occasionally sought to take advantage of newer judges. During one 
of my first civil trials, a well-known local attorney asked to conduct a re-re-
direct examination. Opposing counsel objected to this third round of 
interrogation as not permitted by the applicable rules, which I knew to be 
correct. I called counsel to side bar and placed the Pennsylvania Rules of 
Civil Procedure in front of the attorney seeking the additional line of 
questioning. “Counsel,” I said, “find the rule that allows you to do re-re-
direct, and I’ll let you do it.” “Ahh, I know I can do it,” he said, with more 
grumbling. “I’ll appeal you to the Superior Court!” In response to his angry 
threats and foot stomping, I calmly told him that he had the right to appeal 
my decision and I asked again for him to show me where in the book this 
supposed rule was written. He could not, but continued to argue with me. 
After a moment, I said it was time to return to the courtroom. “The objection 
is sustained,” I announced for the record. As I was leaving court that day, 
another experienced attorney, who later became a federal judge, approached 
me and whispered, “I’m proud of you.” As he turned away, I smiled, because 
I was proud of me, too. 
I quickly learned to command the respect of the attorneys in my 
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courtroom with similar small gestures. When counsel would get combative 
in my courtroom, I would interrupt—not with a gavel or exclamation of my 
own—but with a story of my mother. I would say that when I was a child, 
my mother always said, “En mi casa, nadie levanta la voz más alta que la 
mía.” In my home, no one raises their voice above mine. Then I would say, 
“This is my courtroom.” That, often, was enough. 
h 
After years of service as a state court judge, I decided to pursue my 
aspiration of a federal judicial appointment. I loved being a judge and I felt 
that my years on the state bench and fifteen years of experience as a federal 
employee made me ideally suited for the federal bench.  After a few 
unsuccessful attempts, I applied for consideration again in 2012.  At that 
time, I—like many people in this country—was riding the wave of 
excitement that rippled from the election of our first minority president, 
President Barack Obama. His landmark victory was an inspirational moment 
for positive social change. For the first time, it felt safe enough, or maybe I 
felt brave enough, to explicitly disclose my sexual orientation to the 
nomination committee. 
I like to think I never hid the fact that I was gay. For years I had been 
myself with my closest friends and select colleagues, but I certainly did not 
wear it on my sleeve or shout it from the rooftops. I was comfortable with 
who I was, and that felt like enough. Frankly, I did not think it was anyone 
else’s business. I knew, though, that many people I interacted with 
professionally had no idea. That was about to change. 
I had not been living in active fear of people treating me differently if 
they knew that I was gay, but in the new social climate, for the first time, I 
was okay with being a part of the narrative of acceptance—a small, quiet 
part. I was not a crusader. Although I did not plan to make speeches or march 
in a parade, I thought that maybe the sheer fact that a gay woman could 
obtain a position like a federal judgeship would be another sign to this 
country that times were changing, and that our differences do not have to 
separate or preclude us. 
One morning in November 2012, months after my decision to share my 
sexual orientation with the nomination committee, I was sitting at the kitchen 
table enjoying my morning coffee and perusing the newspaper with my 
kittens, Diego and Frieda, when my phone rang. It was a dear friend and 
colleague who sat with me on the state court. “Congratulations!” she yelled. 
I had no idea what she was talking about. “You got the nomination! It’s in 
the paper.” I looked down at the black and white pages in my hands. 
Somehow, when flipping through the paper, I had missed it. But there it was. 
I had been nominated. This was really happening. 
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Seven months later, after a drawn-out confirmation process, another 
slew of articles hit with news of my confirmation. While the public 
announcements were exciting, the headlines shocked me. In big, bold, black 
letters: “A Philadelphia Judge Will Become the First Openly Lesbian Latina 
in the Post.” I was speechless. But, in my head, I thought, “Well… I guess 
I’m out to the whole world now.” 
When discussing the moments I learned of my nomination and 
confirmation with others, people always assume I must have been so excited, 
thrilled, proud, or happy. While I did eventually experience all of those 
emotions, they were not the first feelings to surface. My name was in print—
tiny print—below the much larger print labeling me as a Latina lesbian. What 
about my twenty-one years on the state bench? My thirty-five years as a 
public servant? My accomplishments and hard work? Those were the things 
that had motivated me to seek a federal appointment. Those were the things 
that qualified me to join the federal bench. Yet those facts were absent from 
the headlines, which relegated my accomplishments and qualifications to 
three immutable characteristics. While I was, and always will be, proud of 
the fact that I am Latina, gay, and a woman, I had never defined myself by 
any of those characteristics. The visual juxtaposition of those adjectives and 
any words referring to my merits was jolting. In the story of my life, I viewed 
those traits as facts to be mentioned somewhere in the narrative, but not in 
the title, not as a headline. 
In the following days, while I scrambled to manage the reactions of the 
members of my family and of my partner’s family who had not already 
known that we were gay or a couple, it finally began to sink in that this was 
really happening. As the excitement and happiness grew, the shock of the 
form of the announcement wore off. I knew that regardless of the headlines, 
I had earned this moment through a lifetime of hard work. 
h 
Everyone is nervous when they start a new job. New people, new office, 
new responsibilities. On top of all the normal nerves, though, I had some 
extra jitters when I took the federal bench. The headline was out there. 
Before I could actually meet my new colleagues, a newspaper had made a 
first impression for me. I wondered how I would be received, especially 
because some members of the federal bench, like me, belong to an older 
generation. Soon enough, though, my anxieties were put to rest. 
Shortly after I made the transition to the federal bench, I attended our 
District’s Judicial Retreat with my partner, Jenny. It certainly helped calm 
my nerves that Jenny can make friends anywhere she goes, but what really 
relaxed me was seeing how sincerely interested my new colleagues were in 
getting to know us—both of us. At one point in the evening, another judge’s 
wife suddenly said, “You two just look so nice together, let me take your 
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picture!” I sort of giggled as she whipped out a camera and Jenny leaned into 
me for the photo. Days later, she sent me a framed copy of that photo with a 
note welcoming me into this federal family. That photo sits on my desk at 
work. When I look at it, I see us happy. I see unspoken acceptance. It still 
brings a smile to my face when I remember the relief I felt when I was 
warmly welcomed to a bench that does not look very much like me. 
h 
When I reflect on my career, as I was prompted to by the curious 
internship candidate, I feel fortunate to have seen such an evolution of 
acceptance and equality in the legal profession. The world we work in today 
feels so different from the world in which I spent the first formative years of 
my career—a world in which I never imagined I would become a federal 
judge. I delight in the victories, big and small, that have opened the door to 
this profession a little wider for women, Latinos, ethnic and racial minorities, 
and people of different sexual orientations. Nevertheless, the other side of 
the door remains fairly homogenous. When a new judge joins the bench in 
District Court, the sitting judges come together to attend the new judge’s 
investiture. We don our equalizing black robes and gather together to 
welcome the new addition. At these events, I look around at our group and I 
become acutely aware that there are so few women and so few people of 
color among us—of the thirty District Court judges in the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania, only six are women, and only seven are ethnic or racial 
minorities. But this recurring realization does not dishearten me. Rather, I 
am optimistic that my bench, and the judiciaries, law offices, and state bars 
across the country, will continue to diversify. As I answered the young, 
aspiring female attorney sitting in front of me during that interview, and as I 
share these stories now, I hope that my optimism is contagious. I hope that 
learning of my challenges and successes left that young woman, and will 
leave future generations, excited about how far we have come and the 
potential that lies ahead. I, for one, cannot wait to see what comes next. 
 
 
THE NINETEENTH AMENDMENT: THE 
CATALYST THAT OPENED COURTHOUSE 
DOORS FOR WOMEN ON THE FEDERAL BENCH 
JUDGE ANN CLAIRE WILLIAMS (RET.)† 
I was incredibly honored and blessed to serve as a federal judge for 
nearly thirty-three years, first on the United States District Court for the 
Northern District of Illinois and next on the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Seventh Circuit. The 100th anniversary of the Nineteenth 
Amendment is especially meaningful to me because it not only opened the 
voting booth to women, it opened the courthouse doors for women to become 
federal judges. 
No woman had served as a federal judge prior to the Nineteenth 
Amendment. Indeed, few women judges sat on any court before it was 
ratified. No woman had been elected judge before the Nineteenth 
Amendment passed, and there were certainly no Article III lifetime, 
presidentially appointed women federal judges. 
The Nineteenth Amendment changed that. As Judge Florence E. Allen 
later reflected, “With the winning of the vote women gained the right . . . to 
assume their part in public and professional life.”1 Allen embraced that right 
in full. 
In 1906, thirteen years before the passage of the Nineteenth 
Amendment, Allen was the music critic for the Cleveland Plain Dealer and 
a teacher at a school for girls.2 Never one to be idle, she also took graduate 
courses and obtained a Master of Arts degree in Political Science.3 A 
professor asked her, “Why don’t you study law?”, which she said “came like 
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a revelation[.]”4 That was the beginning of her dream to become a lawyer. 
But her hometown law school did not admit women, so Allen attended 
the University of Chicago Law School.5 She was then drawn to New York 
City by the opportunity to assist new immigrants with the New York League 
for Protection of Immigrants.6 She decided to complete her last two years of 
law school at New York University School of Law.7 Allen struggled to 
support herself during law school by lecturing on music at public schools 
and in libraries.8 She was only able to rent a gown for commencement 
exercises because her sister sent her $10.9 It was at graduation that Allen 
learned, to her “amazement,” that she had graduated second in the 1913 NYU 
School of Law class.10 Yet she received no offers from New York law 
firms.11 So she went back home to Cleveland, where she made $25 in her 
first month as a lawyer.12 As she said, “I had no clients. And I had no money.  
But I had great hopes[.]”13 
Allen also had great hopes and dreams that women would soon have the 
right to vote. In the decade before the Nineteenth Amendment was ratified, 
Allen spent countless hours fighting for women’s suffrage.14 An amendment 
to the State Constitution of Ohio was proposed in 1910 that gave the full 
right to vote to women, and Ohio became a women’s suffrage battleground.15 
Allen helped form a Campus Suffrage Club at Western Reserve University 
and, while in law school, served as assistant secretary to the prominent 
suffragist Maud Wood Park.16 Park encouraged Allen to travel throughout 
Ohio and to organize local counties.17 
Travel and organize Allen did, lining up a schedule of ninety-two 
speeches in eighty-eight Ohio counties.18 She took advantage of every 
opportunity to speak, including in a circus tent and before and after a band 
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concert.19 Allen also performed significant legal work on behalf of women’s 
suffrage and displayed her fine advocacy skills when she convinced a train 
conductor to speed up a train so she could make it on time to an argument in 
the Supreme Court of Ohio.20 
On August 18, 1920, the Nineteenth Amendment was ratified. Allen’s 
friends in the Woman Suffrage Party encouraged her to run for a judgeship.21 
The primary had already been held, so she needed to get enough signatures 
to have her name placed on the ballot. Within two days, party members 
gathered 2,000 signatures.22 
On November 6, 1920, in the first election in Ohio in which women 
could vote other than on local matters, and backed by all the Cleveland 
newspapers, Allen became the first woman elected to a court of general 
jurisdiction in the United States when she was elected to the Cuyahoga Court 
of Common Pleas.23 Three years later, she became the first woman in the 
United States elected to a state’s highest court when she was voted onto the 
Supreme Court of Ohio.24 The people she met throughout Ohio as she 
campaigned for women’s suffrage remembered her and even formed 
“Florence Allen Clubs” when she was running for Ohio Supreme Court 
justice.25 
Allen’s “firsts” did not stop there. In 1934, President Franklin D. 
Roosevelt appointed her to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth 
Circuit, making her the first woman Article III federal judge.26 None of the 
other judges favored her appointment. One went to bed for two days when 
her appointment was announced.27 She believed that her insistence on sitting 
for argument the day after a fall which required the removal of one and a half 
teeth and bandages across her face, along with her diligent work, led her male 
colleagues to respect her.28 Later in her long and very distinguished career, 
she became the first woman to serve as Chief Judge of any federal district or 
appellate court and the first woman to serve on the United States Judicial 
Conference, the policy-making body of the federal judiciary.29 She became 
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my inspiration each time I appeared before the U.S. Judicial Conference as 
Chair of the Court Administration and Case Management Committee. 
I am indebted to Florence Allen, who fought for women’s suffrage and 
opened the door for me and 447 other women, out of a total of 3,734 
appointed in history, to serve as lifetime-tenured federal judges.30 Over fifty 
years ago, Allen wrote in her autobiography, “This battle for the rights of 
full citizenship is a matter of such ancient history that we are inclined to 
accept the privilege of the vote as if we had always had it, forgetting what 
we owe to the hard-working and courageous women who devoted their lives 
to this cause.”31 These words strike me as true regarding women on the bench 
as well. 
On the 100th anniversary of the Nineteenth Amendment, it is my 
privilege to pay tribute to Allen and some of the many hard-working and 
courageous women in the federal judiciary who were “firsts” in their courts 
and who personally impacted my life. Although lesser known than iconic, 
groundbreaking Supreme Court Justices and my friends Sandra Day 
O’Connor, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Sonia Sotomayor, and Elena Kagan, these 
other extraordinary, hardworking, and courageous women judges opened 
doors in federal courthouses around the country so that they were not so 
heavy for judges like me to walk through. I am so grateful for the role that 
each played in my life. 
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“Women have within them . . . [the] power of working 
for something which they see not, something which they 
only hope and dream will come to pass.”32—Florence 
Allen 
Dreaming big. Many of the women judges who were “firsts” in their 
courts dreamed big dreams, even when they had few, if any, women role 
models. Judge Phyllis Kravitch, who was born in Savannah, Georgia, in 
1920, was one of those dreamers. When she was growing up, most prominent 
white lawyers in Savannah would not accept a court appointment to defend 
an African American person in a criminal case.33 But her father did.34 
Aaron Kravitch believed “equality under the law meant there were no 
color lines.”35 That meant he was usually the lawyer appointed in unpopular, 
highly publicized cases representing African Americans.36 As a result, when 
she was twelve years old, Phyllis was the only girl in her scout troop not 
invited to a birthday party.37 
In her words: 
[M]y father’s way of consoling me, because I was quite upset about it, was 
to explain the Constitution and the Sixth Amendment, and finally realizing 
it wasn’t getting through to me, he said, “When you’re a little older, you’ll 
understand that there are more important things in life than birthday 
parties.” I didn’t understand it at the time, but as time went on by, I knew 
exactly what he meant.38 
Inspired by her father, Phyllis began to dream of becoming an attorney 
herself. But when she was a teenager watching one of his cases, her father 
pulled her aside and said, “The judge wants you to leave. He doesn’t think 
this is any place for a young woman.”39 Undeterred, Phyllis found one of her 
father’s African American employees, who took her to the segregated 
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balcony where African Americans were allowed to watch court.40 There she 
hid and watched her father’s cases.41 She ultimately became one of the first 
woman trial lawyers in the South.42 She was the first woman in the South, 
and third nationwide, to become a federal appellate judge when she was 
appointed by President Jimmy Carter to the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Fifth Circuit in 1979. She dreamed big. 
Judge Constance Baker Motley, who was born in 1921, also dreamed 
big. She decided she wanted to be a lawyer at fifteen years old. No one 
thought this was a good idea. Her mother wanted her to be a hairdresser.43  
Connie later reflected: 
With very little opportunity for employment or advancement by blacks or 
women, there were those who actively discouraged me from thinking about 
the law. For some reason, this lack of encouragement never deterred me. In 
fact, I think the effect was just the opposite. I was the kind of person who 
would not be put down. I rejected the notion that my race or sex would bar 
my success in life.44 
She went on to become the first woman lawyer at the NAACP Legal 
Defense Fund, the first African American woman to argue in the United 
States Supreme Court, where she won nine out of ten cases outright, and the 
tenth when the Supreme Court later reversed itself,45 the first African 
American woman to serve in the New York State Senate, and the first woman 
Manhattan Borough president.46 Her firsts did not stop there. In 1961, she 
became the first woman of color appointed to any federal district court in the 
country, and the fourth woman Article III judge when President Lyndon B. 
Johnson selected her to serve on the United States District Court for the 
Southern District of New York.47 She was also the first woman of color Chief 
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Judge.48 She made her big dreams come true and opened the doors for the 
fifty-nine African American women, thirty-one Latina women, sixteen Asian 
American women, and one Native American woman Article III judges who 
followed.49 
“I never totaled [the number of decisions I wrote]. . . . I 
never had time—whenever I finished with one group of 
cases, I just went right to the next batch.”50—Florence 
Allen 
Working hard. That was the only way Judge Patricia Wald knew how 
to work. Her father left her family when she was two years old, and she was 
raised by her mother and other relatives.51 All worked at a local factory, 
including Pat who greased ball bearings on the night shift during summers 
as a teenager.52 She earned a scholarship to college and a fellowship to law 
school, where she graduated with excellent credentials equivalent to those of 
a male Yale Law School classmate.53 When a law firm offered him a higher 
salary, she turned down the firm’s offer and instead clerked for Judge Jerome 
Frank on the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.54 Her 
tireless and meticulous work during her clerkship yielded a one-sentence 
letter of recommendation. But what a sentence it was: “She is the best law 
clerk that I ever had. Signed, Jerry Frank.”55 
Pat worked at a law firm and then left to spend ten years focusing on 
her family and five young children. Working into the early morning hours 
while her children slept, she dedicated herself to such projects as a book on 
law and poverty and another book with a Yale classmate that helped spur the 
Bail Reform Act of 1966.56 She went back to work full time when her 
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youngest was in kindergarten.57 In 1979, President Jimmy Carter made her 
the first woman appointed to the District of Columbia, and she later became 
its first woman Chief Judge.58 She was a force on the bench, authoring over 
800 opinions. She was also devoted to public service throughout her life.59 
Her service to the nation and to the world continued well after she left the 
federal bench. I was fortunate to teach with her, including at the International 
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, and to see firsthand her gifts as a teacher, the 
depth of her character, and the impact she had. Pat never stopped working to 
improve the world around her. 
Judge Diana Murphy, appointed in 1994 by President William Clinton 
to be the first woman on the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth 
Circuit, and the only woman there for nineteen years,60 was another tireless 
worker even in the face of physical adversity. Diana also did not take a 
traditional path to the district61 and appellate bench. She went to law school 
after raising two sons and graduated from law school twenty years after her 
college graduation. 
Although one would not know it, Diana’s rheumatoid arthritis increased 
in intensity during the course of her career. In 1999, while she was a busy 
judge on the Eighth Circuit, Diana became the first woman to take on another 
enormous responsibility—chair of the United States Sentencing 
Commission,62 which establishes the federal sentencing guidelines and 
collects, analyzes, and distributes information on federal sentencing 
practices. There she fought for, and laid the foundation for changing, the 
unjustified and unfair 100-to-1 crack versus powder cocaine sentencing 
disparity which adversely affected so many communities of color.63 
Judge Jonathan Lebedoff reflected: 
In all the many years of our friendship, I never heard Diana complain to me 
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or to anyone else about her physical difficulties. Her strength of character 
would not allow her to lessen her legal or community service, at a cost that 
she kept to herself. . . . Her responsibilities as head of the Sentencing 
Commission required frequent flights to Washington. She typically 
handled both duties in a brilliant fashion, without complaint and at a 
physical cost known only to herself. Diana faced a physical challenge that 
would have left most men and women housebound, and defeated it by 
ignoring it.64 
Diana Murphy, like many women, worked hard, no matter how difficult 
the challenge. 
“None of the judges favored my appointment.”65—
Florence Allen 
Don’t give up. In 1962, the year after Consuelo Marshall graduated 
from law school, the Los Angeles City Attorney’s Office had never hired a 
woman attorney.66 That did not stop Connie from applying. Her interviewer 
made it clear that the office did not hire women attorneys, and he took her to 
see the City Attorney himself to explain the policy. The City Attorney 
explained that all deputy attorneys began in the criminal section, and 
attorneys there might need to use words that could be embarrassing to 
women. Connie was not deterred. The City Attorney reconsidered, and she 
became the first female attorney in the office. She later said, “There was no 
way I wouldn’t have taken the job because of the challenge.”67 
She met another young attorney there named Johnnie L. Cochran, Jr. 
and went to work with him when he went into private practice. After 
distinguished service on the state court bench, she was appointed to the 
United States District Court for the Central District of California in 1980 by 
President Jimmy Carter.68 She was the first woman of color appointed in the 
West69 and the first woman Chief Judge of color west of the Mississippi.70 
As Chair of the Ninth Circuit Pacific Island Committee, she has helped 
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transform the courts in republics and U.S. territories in the Pacific. Like she 
always has for her beloved law clerk family, Connie provided me with wise 
counsel and guidance through the years. Her calm presence, dedication, 
patience, and good humor in the face of any challenge are legendary. 
Amalya Kearse was elected Order of the Coif at the University of 
Michigan Law School and was an editor of the Law Review. She wanted to 
work at a Wall Street law firm after graduation, later reflecting, “I felt that 
Wall Street was the big time, and I wanted to see if I could make it on Wall 
Street.”71 But there were very few women lawyers in Wall Street firms at the 
time, and few if any African American lawyers. One male lawyer who 
interviewed her looked at her resume and said, “I wish you were a man.”72 
Another said his firm had no women lawyers and had only recently started 
employing women secretaries, so he could not imagine what his partners 
would say if he told them a woman wanted to be a lawyer in their firm.73 
Amalya, whose mother was the only woman in her medical school 
class, persisted. She received an offer and joined the Wall Street firm of 
Hughes, Hubbard & Reed.74 She worked nonstop, remarking, “Literally, 
there is no time for anything else.”75 After only seven years, she became a 
partner at the firm.76 One of her colleagues commented, “She became a 
partner here not because she is a woman, not because she is black, but 
because she is just so damned good—no question about it.”77 Four years 
later, she was named head of the firm’s hiring committee.78 
In 1979, at the age of forty-one, President Jimmy Carter nominated her 
to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, the court on 
which she still sits. She became the first woman of color appointed to a 
federal appellate court. The night she was sworn in, Amalya and her mother 
were the first to arrive for a celebratory dinner. A guest asked the restaurant 
maître d’ whether Judge Kearse and Dr. Kearse had arrived, to which the 
maître d’ replied, “No, just two ladies.”79 Although the maître d’ did not 
recognize her, I was well aware of Amalya’s brilliance and extraordinary 
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achievements long before I was appointed to the Seventh Circuit and had the 
privilege of getting to know her. And Amalya’s brilliance is not limited to 
the law. She is also a World Bridge Federation World Life Master and seven-
time U.S. national champion.80 This legal giant has been a tremendous role 
model of shining light. 
“[T]o do justly is one of the highest human 
endeavors.”81—Florence Allen 
Standing up. In 1979, Judge Gabrielle McDonald became the first 
woman of color to be appointed to the federal bench in Texas and in the 
South.82 Two years later, the Ku Klux Klan tried to disqualify her in a case 
where Vietnamese shrimpers sued the Klan for burning several shrimp 
boats.83 Gaby received hate mail, including four one-way tickets to Africa.84  
Klan members attended the court hearings.85 For the first time, a metal 
detector was installed in the courthouse.86 Gaby stood her ground and would 
not recuse herself.87 She told Klan members they were not entitled to a judge 
of their choosing, but to one who would be fair. And fair she was. 
A few years later, Gaby refused to recuse herself after the City of 
Houston asserted that, as an African American woman, she was a member 
of the class that would benefit from the suit that alleged racial discrimination 
in employment, election practices, and provision for municipal services. She 
wrote: “If my race is enough to disqualify me from hearing this case, then I 
must disqualify myself as well from a substantial portion of cases on my 
docket. This circumstance would cripple my efforts to fulfill my oath as a 
 
 80. Joe Messa, The Honorable Amalya Lyle Kearse, MESSA & ASSOCS., 
https://www.messalaw.com/the-honorable-amalya-lyle-kearse-second-circuit-appeals-court-judge-and-
world-class-bridge-player [https://perma.cc/5LH9-FWUE] (last visited Dec. 10, 2019). 
 81. See ALLEN, supra note 1, at vii. 
 82. See The Honorable Gabrielle Kirk McDonald, HISTORYMAKERS, 
https://www.thehistorymakers.org/biography/honorable-gabrielle-kirk-mcdonald 
[https://perma.cc/9G2Z-CWAE] (last visited Nov. 26, 2019). 
 83. See Barbara Canetti, Vietnamese Fishermen Confronted the Ku Klux Klan and Texas, UNITED 
PRESS INT’L (May 11, 1981), https://www.upi.com/Archives/1981/05/11/Vietnamese-fishermen-
confronted-the-Ku-Klux-Klan-and-Texas/2090358401600 [https://perma.cc/J968-26H3]. 
 84. See Steven J. Niven, McDonald, Gabrielle Kirk, in AFRICAN AMERICAN LIVES 578 (Henry 
Louis Gates, Jr. & Evelyn Brooks Higginbotham eds., 2004). 
 85. See Andrew Chin, The KKK and Vietnamese Fishermen, UNIV. OF N.C. SCH. OF LAW, 
http://www.unclaw.com/chin/scholarship/fishermen.htm [https://perma.cc/6ZRH-2UJZ] (last visited 
Nov. 26, 2019). 
 86. William Horne, Judging Tadic: Former U.S. District Judge in Houston Answers State 
Department’s Call, CASE FILES COURT TV, 
https://web.archive.org/web/20050112110546/http://www.courttv.com/archive/casefiles/warcrimes/rep
orts/judge.html [https://perma.cc/DB5K-BTUB]. 
 87. See Canetti, supra note 83. 
180  WOMEN & LAW  
federal judge[.]”88 Gabrielle McDonald, standing up. After leaving the 
federal bench, she became one of the first judges on the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia.89 Pat Wald took her seat when 
Gaby stepped down in 1999, and Gaby later served on the Iran-United States 
Claims Tribunal.90 Gaby was a role model for me as I was the first woman 
of color to serve as a district judge in the three-state Seventh Circuit. I vividly 
remember when she joined the Tribunal to advance the rule of law 
internationally, and that served as an inspiration to me in my efforts to 
advance the rule of law in Africa while I sat on the bench and in my current 
work. 
Phyllis Kravitch also stood up. She was rejected from a Supreme Court 
clerkship and from every law firm to which she applied because she was a 
woman, so she returned to Savannah to practice with her father.91 As a 
lawyer, she refused to follow the practice in the South of referring to African 
American people by their first names, not by “Mr.” or “Mrs.” like other 
parties and witnesses.92 Her extensive civil rights work included a lawsuit 
she and her father brought to allow African Americans to vote in the 
Democratic primary.93 She also joined the county Board of Education and 
fought against the extensive disparities in segregated schools.94  
Of her time on the bench, her colleague of seventeen years, Judge 
Thomas Clark, said: 
All of us seek approval of others—it makes us feel good. But there are times 
in life when the crowd may be moving in an errant direction and one must 
be courageous enough to take a stand against the majority. Phyllis Kravitch 
has always been courageous. . . . At times she has been a minority of one.  
In every instance she has abided by what she thought was right. She has 
never “gone along to get along.”95 
Phyllis knew how to stand up, all five feet or so tall of her. But she also 
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knew how to keep her cool. For one of her first sittings on the Fifth Circuit, 
Phyllis traveled to New Orleans and was waiting for a cab in pouring rain 
outside the hotel. Two men cut in front of her and jumped into the cab, one 
saying he had somewhere important to be. Phyllis caught the next cab. At 
oral argument that morning, the men who had taken Phyllis’s cab looked up 
and saw that she was on the bench.96 Later that day during the judges’ 
conference, one of Phyllis’s colleagues said he was shocked that the first 
lawyers could barely speak at the argument because their brief had been 
written so well.97 Her strength under fire, courage that never failed, and 
graciousness in the face of all challenges inspired me even before I met and 
interviewed her about her incredible life story. 
“A great public service is demanded of lawyers.”98—
Florence Allen 
Giving back. Diana Murphy came into my life one year after I was 
appointed. She took me under her wing during a meeting of the National 
Association of Women Judges and became a mentor and sponsor. She 
encouraged me to be active in the Federal Judges Association, an 
organization which she and Betty Fletcher of the Ninth Circuit helped found. 
They were also the FJA’s first two women presidents.99 The FJA, which 
fights for the independence of the federal judiciary and works to sustain our 
system of justice through civics education and public outreach, now has over 
1,100 district and appellate judge members. She and Betty supported me as 
I rose and helped me, step by step, to become the FJA’s president, the first 
judge of color. 
Diana also said “yes” when I asked her to be one of the original board 
members of what is now Equal Justice Works, which has awarded more than 
2,000 fellowships to recent law school graduates committed to public 
service.100 I started the two-year fellowship program with $2.3 million in cy 
pres funds from a case I presided over as a district judge,101 and I appointed 
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Diana as one of the first board members. Diana Murphy was always giving 
back. In recognition of her pathbreaking and exemplary service to the bench 
and community, the federal courthouse in Minneapolis was named the Diana 
E. Murphy United States Courthouse in 2019.102 That courthouse is only the 
second in the country to be named solely after a woman judge. The first was 
the Sandra Day O’Connor U.S. Courthouse in Phoenix. 
Constance Baker Motley became one of my mentors from the beginning 
of my time on the bench. I had read about her in magazines as a teenager and 
college student. I was in awe when we first met soon after I took the bench. 
At first, I could only call her “Judge Motley.” She also devoted her life to 
giving back. Connie was at the forefront of the civil rights movement, from 
writing the draft complaint for Brown v. Board of Education to representing 
James Meredith in his long fight to become the first African American to 
attend the University of Mississippi.103 She inspired me to strive to practice 
humility and commitment to equal justice under the law throughout my 
career both on and off the bench, just as she did. 
Inspired by impactful mentors in her own life, Connie was a generous 
mentor with mentees too numerous to count. Connie’s life was forever 
changed when Clarence Blakeslee, a wealthy white philanthropist, heard her 
speak as a teenager.104 He paid for Connie’s college and law school 
education. He mentored and supported her. She could not have paid for her 
education without his help. She also learned from another mentor, Thurgood 
Marshall, to laugh off indignities. Early in her judicial career, Connie’s 
judicial colleagues snuck her onto a club’s male-only floor in New York City 
for judges’ dinner meetings by saying she was the secretary.105 While it was 
true that as the junior judge she had to take notes at the meeting, she called 
it “an amusing experience” when she learned why she had been able to enter 
the male-only upper floors so easily. I am grateful to have learned from her 
when to laugh off an “ism.” 
Connie was one of the first judges to support the creation of Just The 
Beginning—A Pipeline Organization, an organization I co-founded. It works 
to inspire young people of color and from other underrepresented groups to 
enter the legal profession through programs for middle school, high school, 
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and law school students.106 Connie was a pillar of JTB-APO and a pillar in 
my life. I am fortunate to be one of the many judges, law clerks, lawyers, 
and friends mentored by Connie, who always gave back. 
“We don’t accomplish anything in this world 
alone . . . and whatever happens is the result of the 
whole tapestry of one’s life and all the weavings of 
individual threads from one to another that creates 
something.”107—Justice Sandra Day O’Connor 
I have been blessed throughout my legal career with an abundance of 
threads from people of many walks of life, races, and creeds. Two of the 
most vibrant threads in my tapestry are those of my parents, Joshua Marcus 
Williams and Dorothy Ethel Williams, who both passed at the age of ninety-
two. 
Every day my parents lived values I would later see in trailblazing 
women on the bench: dreaming big, working hard, not giving up, standing 
up, and giving back. Because of racial discrimination, my African American 
parents could not obtain work in their fields in the 1940s even though they 
had college degrees. My mother, who had a degree in home economics, 
could not get a job in Detroit as a full-time public-school teacher. She taught 
at a training school for delinquent children for twelve years, then served as a 
substitute teacher for five years. Finally, the doors opened so she could teach 
full time. 
My dad, with degrees in political science and psychology, tried to sell 
insurance. But he was a poor salesman, so he drove a bus for twenty years in 
Detroit like so many African American educated and professional men at the 
time. When he applied for a supervisor position, he was told by his white 
boss that he could not handle it. But my father had been a staff sergeant in 
the United States Army and served during World War II. 
He became fed up. Since he had enough money in his pension, he quit 
his job so he could go back to school to become a teacher. As fate would 
have it, we were in college together at Wayne State University. During a 
speech class, my professor asked me to talk about the person I admired most 
in life. I said, with tears rolling down my cheeks, “Daddy.” I had loved my 
dad’s job as a child. I relished running down the bus aisles after his shift, 
helping him roll coins, and seeing how handsome he looked in his uniform. 
But it hit me in that class: “Bus driver, college degree. College degree, bus 
 
 106. Hon. Ann Claire Williams, CORNELL LAW SCH., 
https://www.lawschool.cornell.edu/womenandjustice/About-Us/Williams.cfm [https://perma.cc/F4TF-
RQYR] (last visited Dec. 10, 2019). 
 107. DENNIS ABRAMS, SANDRA DAY O’CONNOR: U.S. SUPREME COURT JUSTICE 41 (2009). 
184  WOMEN & LAW  
driver.” How could he do it? When I got home that night, I asked him, 
“Daddy, why aren’t you burning down the streets of Detroit?” 
He answered: “No one can take my education away. And being a bus 
driver is good, honest work. I wanted you and your two sisters to have a 
better life. So I did what I had to do.” He had a great sense of humor and 
added, “Besides, I used a lot of psychology with people on the bus.” 
And so I have tried to live my life, doing what I had to do, standing up 
for justice and equality. I stand on my parents’ shoulders and the shoulders 
of the many that have come before me, including Florence Allen and the 
women judges of every race, creed, and ethnic origin who opened the 
courthouse doors for me and held out their hands to me and so many others. 
On the 100th anniversary of the Nineteenth Amendment, the catalyst 
for women to enter the federal judiciary, I honor and celebrate the “first” 
women of the federal judiciary. They dreamed big. They worked hard. They 
never gave up. They stood up. And they gave back. To borrow the words of 
one of Florence Allen’s Sixth Circuit colleagues at her portrait unveiling, it 
is my hope that “[t]he heart and mind of Florence Allen,” and the hearts and 
minds of Amalya Kearse, Phyllis Kravitch, Consuelo Marshall, Gabrielle 
McDonald, Constance Baker Motley, Diana Murphy, Patricia Wald, and the 
many other trailblazing women judges “will flame for generations as a 
beacon for thousands of young women who will take their rightful places in 
government, in the practice of the law, and in judicial service.” The flames 
of the Nineteenth Amendment have changed the course of history.108 
 
 
 108. ALLEN, supra note 1, at 148. 
